CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge SMITH-RIBNER.I concur in the majority’s analysis and conclusions regarding the application to this case of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine. I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority’s conclusion that Section 5726(b) of the Nonprofit Corporation Law of 1988(Law), as amended, 15 Pa.C.S. § 5726(b), grants boards of directors the power to remove a director for any “proper cause,” regardless of whether the corporation’s bylaws specify the cause as a ground for removal. Section 5726 provides for the removal of directors as follows:
(a)By the members. — Unless otherwise provided in a bylaw adopted by the members, the entire board of directors, or a class of the board, where the board is classified with respect to the power to select directors, or any individual director, may be removed from office without assigning any cause by the vote of members entitled to cast at least a majority of the votes which all members present would be entitled to east at any annual or other regular election of the directors or of such class of directors. In case the board or such a class of the board or any one or more directors are so removed, new directors may be elected at the same meeting. If members are entitled to vote cumulatively for the board or a class of the board, no individual director shall be removed unless the entire board or class of the board is removed in case sufficient votes are cast against the resolution for his removal, which, if cumulatively voted at an annual or other regular election of directors, would be sufficient to elect one or more directors to the board or to the class.
(b) By the board. — Unless otherwise provided in a bylaw adopted by the members, the board of directors may declare vacant the office of a director if he is declared of unsound mind by an order of court or is convicted of a felony, or for any other proper cause which the bylaws may specify, or if, within 60 days, or such other time as the bylaws may specify, after notice of his selection, he does not accept such office either in writing or by attending a meeting of the board of directors, and fulfill such other requirements ... as the bylaws may specify. (Emphasis added.)
(c) By the court. — The court may, upon petition of any member or director, remove from office any director in case of fraudulent or dishonest acts, or gross abuse of authority or discretion with reference to the corporation, or for any other proper cause, and may bar from office any director so removed for a period prescribed by the court. The corporation shall be made a party to such action.
The majority reads the phrase “for any other proper cause which the bylaws may specify” in Section 5726(b) to mean that a board may remove a director “for any other proper cause” it deems legitimate but that the corporation may or may not choose to list that cause in its bylaws as a ground for removal. The majority correctly notes what is the ideal grammatical practice, i.e., that the word “that” functions as a restrictive (defining) pronoun *477and the word “which” functions as a nonrestrictive (nondefining) pronoun. However, I believe that the majority’s reading of the subject phrase is incorrect.
First, authorities now acknowledge that the words “that” and “which” are often used interchangeably and, more specifically, that the word “which” commonly functions as a restrictive and nonrestrictive relative pronoun. H.W. Fowler provides a more thorough explanation:
Restrictive that/which and non-restrictive which. Take two sentences or parts of sentences from Anita Brook-ner’s A Family Romance (1993): with the ball-point pen which my father had bought for me in ,a curiously shaped department store; This sharpness of gaze gave her an air of vanity, which I dare say was justified. The first contains a restrictive clause led by which. In it which could have been replaced by that without change of meaning and without giving offence to any rule of syntax. The second contains a non-restrictive use of which preceded by a comma. In the first sentence the which-clause defines and particularizes; and that would have done the same work just as well. In the second example, the which-dause provides additional information as a kind of parenthetic aside. In other words it is a non-restrictive clause.
... ’The two kinds of relative clauses, to one of which that and to the other of which which is appropriate, are the defining and the non-defining; and if writers would agree to regard that as the defining relative pronoun, and which as the non-defining, there would be much gain both in lucidity and in ease. Some there are who follow this principle now; but it would be idle to pretend that it is the practice either of most or of the best writers.’
The New Fowler’s Modern English Usage 774 (R.W. Burchfield ed., 3d ed.1996) (last paragraph quoting H.W. Fowler, 1926).
The phrase here “for any other proper cause which the bylaws may specify” contains a restrictive clause not because of the choice of pronoun but because of the structure and punctuation: nonrestrictive clauses are parenthetic and therefore should be separated 'by commas. William Strunk, Jr. and E.B. White, The Elements of Style 59 (4th ed.2000), at 4. Fowler provides further guidance:
[’]Non-restrictive relative clauses are usually separated from the noun phrases they modify by parenthetical punctuation (usually commas, but sometimes dashes or brackets). In speech, there may be a pause that serves the same function as the parenthesis.’ When these are taken together it emerges that a non-restrictive relative clause can normally be recognized because of its parenthetical punctuation or its spoken equivalent — pauses in the flow of speech.
The New Fowler’s Modern English Usage, supra, at 672 (quoting S. Greenbaum in The Oxford Companion to the English Language (Tom McArthur ed.1992)). Here, the sentence structure and the lack of parenthetical punctuation in the phrase “for any other proper cause which the bylaws may specify” indicate that the phrase “which the bylaws may specify” is a restrictive clause that identifies the type of “proper cause” for which a director may be removed. Thus inclusion of the clause was intended to limit a board’s power to remove a director.
Second, the word “may” has several functions, and in the context of the sentence at issue the word “may” does not denote a permissive action that can be taken by a board or the membership at its discretion. Instead, it denotes the possi*478bility that a particular fact will arise or be true, e.g., that a particular “proper cause” will be listed in a corporation’s bylaws. See Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 718-719 (10th ed.1997); Black’s Law Dictionary 1000 (8th ed.2004).
Third, no reason exists for Section 5726(b) of the Law to announce that a corporation may, as a permissive action, specify the proper causes for which a board director may be removed. The corporation already enjoys that power: “The bylaws may contain any provisions for managing the business and regulating the affairs of the corporation not inconsistent with law or the articles.” Section 5504(a), as amended, 15 Pa.C.S. § 5504(a). If specifying in the bylaws the proper causes for which a board may remove a director is not controlling, then the clause “which the bylaws may specify” has no effect, and that part of Section 5726(b) should have read “or for any other proper cause.... ” Therefore, inclusion of the clause “which the bylaws may specify” makes sense only if it acts as a limit on a board’s power to remove a director.1
Fourth, and finally, an interpretation of Section 5726(b) of the Law that allows a board to remove a director by its own vote, and for a reason not set forth in the bylaws, is inconsistent with other provisions of the Nonprofit Corporation Law of 1988 that assign the primary responsibility for the selection and removal of directors to the corporation’s membership.2 Under the majority’s interpretation, a board may decide to remove one of its directors, e.g., because of his or her personal associations, sexual preferences or some other cause that the board deems to be proper. That is not the intent of Section 5726(b) of the Law. Consequently, even if one allows that the statutory language at issue is ambiguous, any such ambiguity should be resolved in a manner that restricts rather' than expands the power of a board as compared to that of the corporate membership.
Accordingly, I would hold that unless otherwise provided in the bylaws, Séction 5726(b) of the Law unequivocally permits a board of directors to remove a director for proper cause only when that cause is one specified in the corporation’s bylaws. Otherwise, the board must follow the procedures outlined in Section 5726(a) or (c) *479when it seeks to remove a director, i.e., by a vote of the members or by the court upon proper petition.
. See White v. Associates in Counseling & Child Guidance, Inc., 767 A.2d 638, 642 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001) (object of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent and courts must give effect to all statutory provisions so that none are rendered mere surplusage).
. Section 5504(a) of the Law grants ultimate authority to the members to alter bylaws:
The members entitled to vote shall have the power to adopt, amend and repeal the bylaws of a nonprofit corporation. Except as provided in subsection (b), the authority to adopt, amend and repeal bylaws may be expressly vested by the bylaws in the board of directors or other body, subject to the power of the members to change such action.
Section 5504(b) restricts a board’s power to alter certain bylaws:
[T]he board of directors or other body shall not have the authority to adopt or change a bylaw on any subject that is committed expressly to the members by any of the provisions of this subpart. See: ... Section 5721 (relating to board of directors). Section 5725(b) (relating to selection of directors). Section 5726(a) (relating to removal of directors by the members). Section 5726(b) (relating to removal of directors by the board).
Section 5725 of the Law, as amended, 15 Pa.C.S. § 5725, states that unless otherwise provided by a bylaw approved by the members, directors shall be elected by the members. Notably, only in the case of removal by the members may a director be "removed from office without assigning any cause." 15 Pa.C.S. § 5726(a).