RAKER, J., dissenting, joined by BELL, C.J., and GREENE, J.:
The majority cuts the heart out of the writ of coram nobis in Maryland by holding that petitioner waived the right to challenge his conviction through a petition for writ of coram nobis by his failure to file an application for leave to appeal his guilty plea or a petition for post-conviction relief. If a person must first file an application for leave to appeal or a petition for post-conviction relief, will a writ of error coram nobis ever be appropriate? In effect, the majority overrules Skok v. State, 361 Md. 52, 760 A.2d 647 (2000), sub silentio.
I would hold that a person who enters a guilty plea but who does not file an application for leave to appeal or a post-conviction petition challenging that plea does not waive the right to later challenge the resulting conviction in a coram nobis petition. I would remand the matter to the Circuit Court for that court to consider whether petitioner satisfied the requirements for relief, particularly the threshold question of whether valid reasons exist for his failure to attack the conviction earlier.
A writ of error coram nobis, like a habeas corpus proceeding and a proceeding under the Maryland Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act, may be used to collaterally challenge a criminal judgment. Skok, 361 Md. 52, 760 A.2d 647; Ruby v. State, 353 Md. 100, 111, 724 A.2d 673, 678 (1999). It is an *476extraordinary remedy, to be employed only upon compelling circumstances. Skok at 72, 760 A.2d 647 (citing United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 511-12, 74 S.Ct. 247, 252-53, 98 L.Ed. 248 (1954)). Relief pursuant to a writ of error coram nobis is justified “only under circumstances compelling such action to achieve justice” and only where “sound reasons” exist for the failure to seek appropriate earlier relief. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 511-12, 74 S.Ct. 247, 252-53, 98 L.Ed. 248 (1954). One of the issues which may be raised by way of coram nobis is the voluntariness of a plea in a criminal case. Skok, 361 Md. at 68, 760 A.2d at 656.
In Skok v. State, 361 Md. 52, 760 A.2d 647, we explored the applicability of a writ of error coram nobis to the claim of an involuntary plea. This court, like other state courts, embraced the rationale of the leading Supreme Court case on coram nobis proceedings, United States v. Morgan. We stated as follows:
“Along with the vast majority of appellate courts which have considered the matter, we believe that the scope of coram nobis, as delineated in United States v. Morgan, is justified by contemporary conditions and public policy. Very often in a criminal case, because of a relatively light sanction imposed or for some other reason, a defendant is willing to forego an appeal even if errors of a constitutional or fundamental nature may have occurred. Then, when the defendant later learns of a substantial collateral consequence of the conviction, it may be too late to appeal, and, if the defendant is not incarcerated or on parole or probation, he or she will not be able to challenge the conviction by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus or a petition under the Post Conviction Procedure Act.”
Id. at 77, 760 A.2d at 660.
We recognized that the “scope of coram nobis to challenge criminal convictions is, however, subject to several important qualifications.” Id. at 78, 760 A.2d at 661. We noted that the three essential conditions necessary to grant relief pursuant to a coram nobis petition were the grounds for challenging the *477criminal conviction must be of a constitutional, jurisdictional or fundamental character, the burden of proof is on petitioner to rebut the presumption of regularity that attaches to the underlying criminal procedure, and the coram nobis petitioner must be suffering or facing significant collateral consequences from the conviction. Id. at 78-79, 760 A.2d at 661-62. In addition, we noted that basic principles of waiver are applicable to coram nobis proceedings. Id. at 79, 760 A.2d at 661-62. Discussing waiver, we stated as follows:
“Basic principles of waiver are applicable to issues raised in coram nobis proceedings. Similarly, where an issue has been finally litigated in a prior proceeding, and there are no intervening changes in the applicable law or controlling case law, the issue may not be relitigated in a coram nobis action. Therefore, the same body of law concerning waiver and final litigation of an issue, which is applicable under the Maryland Post Conviction Procedure Act, Code (1957, 1996 ReplVol., 1999 Supp.), Art. 27, § 645A (b) through (d), shall be applicable to a coram nobis proceeding challenging a criminal conviction.”
Skok at 79, 760 A.2d at 661-662 (some internal citations omitted). Based on this language, the majority concludes that a petitioner waives coram nobis relief if the individual failed to file an application for leave to appeal or to file a petition for post-conviction relief. The majority’s reliance on this language to support its holding is misplaced.
Writing for the Court in Skok, Judge Eldridge discussed the reasons a defendant might not challenge an error by moving to withdraw a plea or by way of post-conviction action. He stated as follows:
“Very often in a criminal case, because of a relatively light sanction imposed ... a defendant is willing to forego an appeal even if errors of a constitutional or fundamental nature may have occurred. Then, when the defendant later learns of a substantial collateral consequence of the conviction, it may be too late to appeal, and ... he or she will not be able to challenge the conviction by a petition for a writ of *478habeas corpus or a petition under the Post Conviction Procedure Act.”
Skok, 361 Md. at 77, 760 A.2d at 660. The situation Judge Eldridge addressed is very common, and, in fact, reflects the circumstances in both Skok and the case at bar. This Court, in Skok, could not have meant what the majority today holds.
Petitioner contends that because he is suffering serious collateral consequences as a result of his 1992 conviction, i.e., that he was sentenced to an enhanced penalty under the federal recidivist sentencing guidelines, he is entitled to the same coram nobis relief that Skok enjoyed. Petitioner argues that, like Skok, he has not waived his right to seek error coram nobis relief because he did not file an application for leave to appeal his conviction and sentence.
This argument is persuasive. The procedural similarities between petitioner and Skok illustrate that this Court in Skok did not mean for waiver to apply to collateral attacks on guilty pleas where no application for leave to appeal was filed. Skok held that the voluntariness of a guilty plea may be raised in a coram nobis proceeding even when it had not previously been raised. Like petitioner, Skok pled guilty; Skok never filed an application for leave to appeal and a request to withdraw his guilty plea; and Skok did not file a petition for post-conviction relief raising the voluntariness of his guilty plea. Id. at 56, 760 A.2d at 649. Despite his failure to raise his claim prior to the action at issue, Skok was not found to have waived the common law right to file a writ of error coram nobis. See id. at 79, 760 A.2d at 661-662. We stated as follows:
“The issues concerning Skok’s pleas have not previously been litigated, and Skok is clearly facing substantial collateral consequences from his two convictions. Skok, not being incarcerated or on parole or probation as a result of the convictions, presently has no other common law or statutory remedy. Under the circumstances, Skok was entitled to a hearing under his motion for coram nobis relief.”
*479Id. at 82, 760 A.2d at 663. Similarly, petitioner is suffering serious collateral consequences.1 Because he is not incarcerated, on parole or probation, he too has no other avenue of relief. His claims concerning the constitutional infirmity of his plea have never before been litigated. No waiver was found in Skok. The same should hold true in the instant case— there should be no waiver for failure to file application for leave to appeal or post-conviction relief.
Petitioner presents a second argument. He asserts that the waiver language of § 7-106(b) does not apply to defendants who do not file an application for leave to appeal because the General Assembly did not specifically address the case of those who never file such an application even though they specifically address those who fail to file a direct appeal. Specifically, petitioner contrasts the language in Section 7-106(b)(l)(i)(4) of the Criminal Procedure Article of the Maryland Code pertaining to applications for leave to appeal with the language in Section 7—106(b)(l)(i)(3) concerning direct appeal. Section 7—106(b)(l)(i) states as follows:
“(b) Waiver of allegation of error.—(l)(i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii) of this paragraph, an allegation of error is waived when a petitioner could have made but intelligently and knowingly failed to make the allegation
3. on direct appeal, whether or not the petitioner took an appeal;
4. in an application for leave to appeal “a conviction based on a guilty plea; ...”
Md.Code (2001, 2006 Cum.Supp.), § 7-106(b)(l)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Article (emphasis added). Petitioner then argues that waiver does not apply when an application for *480leave to appeal is not filed, as compared to when an application is filed and the alleged error is omitted.
In essence, petitioner asks us to adopt footnote five from Chief Judge Robert Bell’s dissent in McElroy v. State, 329 Md. 136, 617 A.2d 1068 (1993). In that case, McElroy appeared with counsel and pled guilty to distribution of PCP. Id. at 143, 617 A.2d at 1072. He had never filed an application for leave to appeal from his guilty plea but he subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his guilty plea was involuntary on the grounds that it was not intelligent and knowing because the trial court did not advise him that the court was not bound by the prosecutor’s sentence recommendation, and that if the court imposed a sentence more severe than the one recommended he had no right to withdraw his plea. Id. at 143-45, 617 A.2d at 1072. The Circuit Court denied McElroy’s petition on its merits, not on waiver. Id. at 145, 617 A.2d at 1073. The Court of Special Appeals granted McElroy’s application for leave to appeal the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Id. That court held McElroy had waived his right to post-conviction review. Id.
When this Court confronted the issues raised, the majority explicitly declined to address the question of whether the waiver provision contained in the Maryland Post Conviction Procedure Act, Section 645A(c) of Article 27 of the Maryland Code2 applied when an application for leave to appeal a *481conviction and sentence was not filed. Id. at 146, 617 A.2d at 1073 (discussing Md.Code (1957, 1992 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 645A). Instead, the majority assumed that the allegation of error was waived. Applying § 645A, the majority held that McElroy had failed to rebut the presumption that he had knowingly and intelligently waived the allegation and that McElroy also failed to prove any special circumstances that might excuse waiver. Id. at 149, 617 A.2d at 1074-75. The dissent, however, did consider the issue and determined that because the General Assembly had not stated waiver explicitly applied when an application for leave to appeal a conviction and sentence is not filed, as it had for direct appeals, the General Assembly must not have intended the waiver provision to apply when an application for leave to appeal is never filed. The footnote reads as follows:
“Unless § 645A requires the filing of an application for leave to appeal to preserve an error alleged to have occurred in the proceedings pursuant to which the application is required, the petitioner McElroy, who did not file such an application, cannot be said to have waived the allegations of error presently before the Court. I believe that § 645A does not so require. I reach this conclusion by application of the ordinary rules of statutory construction.”
“Those rules require us to look no further than to the language the Legislature used to convey the meaning it wished the statute to be interpreted to have. When those words are clear and unambiguous, ordinarily we need not go any further, although, in the interest of completeness, we may look at the purpose of the statute and compare the *482result obtained by use of the plain language with the purpose of the statute. We are also to give effect to the entire statute, neither adding, nor deleting, words in order to give it a meaning not otherwise evident by the words actually used. Finally, we seek to give the statute a reasonable interpretation, not one that is illogical or incompatible with common sense.”
“When these rules of statutory construction are applied, it is clear that filing an application for leave to appeal, in which is included any and all allegations of error a defendant may have, is not a condition precedent to seeking post conviction relief.”
“Section 645A(c)(l) makes clear that, unlike in the case of direct appeal, a defendant does not waive an allegation of error that could have been raised by way of application for leave to appeal simply by not filing such an application. ” That section provides:
“For the purposes of this subtitle, an allegation of error shall be deemed to be waived when a petitioner could have made, but intelligently and knowingly failed to make, such allegation before trial, at trial, on direct appeal (whether or not the petitioner actually took such an appeal), in an application for leave to appeal a conviction based on a guilty plea, in any habeas corpus or coram nobis proceeding actually instituted by said petitioner, in a prior petition under this subtitle, or in any other proceeding actually instituted by said petitioner, unless the failure to make such allegation shall be excused because of special circumstances. The burden of proving the existence of such special circumstances shall be upon the petitioner. (Emphasis added).”
“Section 645A(c)(2), largely tracking the language of 645A(c)(l), is of similar effect. This difference in treatment of direct appeals and applications for leave to appeal clearly indicates that the Legislature intended that the presumption apply only in the case of direct appeals. To construe the statute any other way requires that language similar to that *483used in connection with direct appeals be added to the provision pertaining to applications for leave to appeal.”
“Moreover, § 645A(c)(l) and (2) were amended in 1988 to be consistent with legislation enacted in 1983, see Ch. 295, Acts of 1983, which added subsection (e) to Maryland Code (1980, 1983 Repl.Vol.) § 12-302 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, and made judgments entered on guilty pleas subject to review only on application for leave to appeal.” See also Ch. 726, Acts of 1988, the preamble to which provides:
“FOR the purpose of clarifying that, if a person fails under certain circumstances to allege an error in an application for leave to appeal a certain conviction, the allegation is deemed to be waived for the purposes of a post conviction proceeding; clarifying a certain presumption relating to failure to make a certain allegation of error; and generally relating to waiver of allegations of error in a certain appeal.”
“When the amendment was effected, the parenthetical condition pertaining to direct appeals was already in the Code; nevertheless, the Legislature chose not to include such language with respect to the application for leave to appeal provision. Because the provision pertaining to direct appeals has been interpreted to mean that failure to raise an issue on direct appeal constitutes a waiver, whether or not a direct appeal was taken, and the Legislature is presumed to have had knowledge of that interpretation when it added the language pertaining to applications for leave to appeal, it must have intended a different result in those cases involving applications for leave to appeal. Thus, the history of that provision also contradicts the holding of the intermediate appellate court.”
Id. at 156-58 n. 5, 617 A.2d at 1078-79 n. 5 (Bell and Chasanow, JJ., dissenting) (some internal citations omitted, first emphasis added).
I agree with Chief Judge Bell and Judge Chasanow, and would hold that a person who does not file an application for *484leave to appeal a guilty plea does not waive the right to file a writ of error coram nobis. There are many cases where a defendant, after pleading guilty, is satisfied with the disposition in the case and therefore, has no reason or incentive to set aside the plea. If significant collateral consequences of the conviction and sentence that were unforeseen by the defendant at the time of the plea bargain arise after the defendant is no longer incarcerated or on parole, and the defendant is thereby ineligible to file a petition for post-conviction relief, he or she should be afforded the opportunity to petition for a writ of error coram nobis.
LACHES
It appears to be the common law rule that there was no time limitation within which to file a petition for a writ of coram nobis, except perhaps laches. State v. Romero, 76 N.M. 449, 415 P.2d 837, 840 (1966) (citing James W.M. Moore & Elizabeth B.A. Rogers, Federal Relief From Civil Judgments, 55 YALE L.J. 623, 674 (1946); State v. Huffman, 207 Or. 372, 297 P.2d 831, 852 (1956)). See also Morgan, 346 U.S. at 507, 74 S.Ct. at 250 (coram nobis petition allowed “without limitation of time”). Nonetheless, the right to file for coram nobis relief is not unlimited. See discussion supra. Just as the Skok Court noted that basic principles of waiver to apply to the inquiry at hand, this case prompts the consideration of laches as a limitation on the scope of the right to petition for a writ of error coram nobis.
In Maryland, the essential elements of the doctrine of laches are inexcusable delay and prejudice to the opposing party. Liddy v. Lamone, 398 Md. 233, 243-44, 919 A.2d 1276, 1283 (2007); Ross v. Board of Elections, 387 Md. 649, 668-70, 876 A.2d 692, 703-04 (2005); Buxton v. Buxton, 363 Md. 634, 645-46, 770 A.2d 152, 158-59 (2001); Parker v. Board Of Elec. Sup’rs, 230 Md. 126, 130, 186 A.2d 195, 197 (1962).
Several federal courts of appeal have applied the doctrine of equitable laches to petitions for post-conviction relief. See, e.g., Telink v. United States, 24 F.3d 42 (9th Cir.1994) (holding *485that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying laches after a five year delay in filing a writ of coram nobis); Oliver v. United States, 961 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir.1992) (holding doctrine of laches supported the denial of a § 2255 motion when there was an unreasonable delay of seventeen years); United States v. Darnell, 716 F.2d 479 (7th Cir.1983) (holding the doctrine of laches applicable to petitions for coram nobis relief and applying it to bar claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and involuntary guilty plea after a twenty-year delay). The courts base their reasoning in language from United States v. Morgan, emphasizing the public policy goal of finality of judgments and by noting that the United States Supreme Court limited the application of coram nobis to cases where “sound reasons” existed for failure to seek earlier appropriate relief. United States v. Darnell, 716 F.2d 479, 480-81; see also Telink v. United States, 24 F.3d 42, 47-48 (1994); cf. Foont v. United States, 93 F.3d 76, 80 (2nd Cir.1996) (holding that language in Morgan v. United States requiring “sound reasons” for delay does not amount to application of the doctrine of laches but only requires the consideration of reasons surrounding petitioner’s delay, not prejudice to the government).
The factual circumstances of Oliver v. United States illustrate both the necessity and the utility of the doctrine of laches in assessing the appropriateness of post-conviction relief. In that case, Oliver pled guilty to two related federal bank charges in 1973. Oliver v. United States, 961 F.2d 1339, 1341 (7th Cir.1992). At the time of the proceedings, Oliver had not yet begun to serve the sentence for the federal charges because he was serving a life sentence imposed by the State of Indiana. Id. at 1341. Fourteen years later, in 1987, Oliver filed a “motion for records of proceedings,” seeking a transcript of his plea and sentencing. The district court denied the motion and informed Oliver that he first needed to file a § 2255 motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, in order to get a copy of the transcripts. Id. Three years passed before Oliver filed the § 2255 motion, alleging that during his guilty plea he was not advised of his right to confront his *486accusers or of his right against self incrimination. Id. The district court found that the transcripts were no longer available because they could not be located and the long delay in filing meant the routine date of destruction of United States’ Attorney’s notes had passed. Id.
The district court denied the § 2255 motion, finding procedural defects and that the doctrine of laches barred Oliver’s claim. Oliver, 961 F.2d at 1341. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the application of laches, holding that the district court was justified in finding “that Oliver’s seventeen-year delay in bringing his section 2255 action prejudiced the government in its ability to respond to the merits of Oliver’s allegations” and that the district court was also justified in finding Oliver’s delay unreasonable. Id. at 1342. The Seventh Circuit’s application of laches in this case resulted in an outcome that took into account the importance of maintaining an available avenue of post-conviction challenge to constitutionally infirm guilty pleas and the reality that the government may often be unable to adequately defend against such challenges when they are preceded by long delay.
In Telink, Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 42 (9th Cir.1994),3 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit similarly applied the doctrine of laches in a writ of coram nobis action. Discussing laches, the court stated:
“Because a petition for writ of error coram nobis is a collateral attack on a criminal conviction, the time for filing a petition is not subject to a specific statute of limitations. Rather, the petition is subject to the equitable doctrine of laches. Unlike a limitations period, which bars an action strictly by time lapse, laches bars a claim if unreasonable delay causes prejudice to the defendant. ‘[Ljaches is not *487like limitation, a mere matter of time; but principally a question of the inequity of permitting the claim to be enforced—an inequity founded upon some change in the condition or relations of the property or parties.’ ”
Id. at 45 (internal citations omitted). The court held that the time available to file a coram nobis petition should be based on a “flexible, equitable time limitation,” Id. at 47 (quoting Darnell, 716 F.2d at 480), and that a district court could at any time apply the doctrine of laches to bar a claim. Id. at 47.
Laches is a valuable tool for the trial judge in evaluating a petition for coram nobis. As in Oliver, it can prevent the government from being unfairly prejudiced by evidentiary destruction resulting from long, unexcused delay. Unlike waiver, it allows the trial court to consider both the prejudice to the government and the reasons for delay. In balancing the two factors, the trial court has more flexibility to allow writs of coram nobis to proceed in those cases where fairness demands an opportunity to be heard on the matter of post-conviction relief. In erroneously applying the waiver contained in § 7-106(b)(l)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Article of the Maryland Code, the trial judge did not consider the reasons for delay or the merits of the claim that the plea was constitutionally invalid. I would remand this case to permit petitioner to proceed in the Circuit Court and to demonstrate that he can satisfy all the elements, including “sound reasons” for delay, to justify coram nobis relief.
Voluntary and Intelligent Guilty Plea
As to the merits of Petitioner’ claim, if the Circuit Court finds that laches does not bar the coram nobis action, I would hold that the plea was involuntary and that he should be permitted to withdraw the plea because he was not informed of the offense to which he was pleading guilty The Circuit Court found that there was no requirement to inform petitioner of the maximum possible sentence for the charges he pled to, but determined that his guilty plea was constitutionally infirm because he was not advised of the nature of the charge to which he was pleading guilty. The Court of Special Appeals agreed with the Circuit Court that petitioner need not *488be informed of the maximum penalty he faced, but disagreed that petitioner’s plea was constitutionally infirm because the statement of facts read into the record during the guilty plea hearing was sufficient to inform Petitioner of the nature of the charge and the elements of the crime to which he pled guilty. I disagree with the Court of Special Appeals and would hold that petitioner’s plea was constitutionally infirm because he was not advised of the nature of the charge to which he was pleading guilty and because he was not informed of the maximum penalty he faced as a result of his guilty plea.
It is fundamental that to be valid, a guilty plea must be entered voluntarily and intelligently. Metheny v. State, 359 Md. 576, 601, 755 A.2d 1088, 1102 (2000); Yoswick v. State, 347 Md. 228, 239, 700 A.2d 251, 256 (1997); State v. Priet, 289 Md. 267, 274-75, 424 A.2d 349, 353 (1981); Davis v. State, 278 Md. 103, 118, 361 A.2d 113, 121 (1976). Maryland Rule 4-242 sets forth the procedure for the acceptance of a guilty plea, requiring either the court or counsel to ask the defendant questions concerning the voluntariness of his plea on the record in open court. In 1992, at the time of petitioner’s guilty plea proceeding, Rule 4-242(c) provided as follows:
“(c) Plea of guilty. The court may accept a plea of guilty only after it determines, upon an examination of the defendant on the record in open court conducted by the court, the State’s Attorney, the attorney for the defendant, or any combination thereof, that (1) the defendant is pleading voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea; and (2) there is a factual basis for the plea. The court may accept the plea of guilty even though the defendant does not admit guilt. Upon refusal to accept a plea of guilty, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty.”
Md. Rule 4-242 (1992).4
A defendant must be informed of the nature of the charge to which he or she is pleading. A proffer of facts by the State *489that includes conduct amounting to a robbery is insufficient to advise a defendant of the nature of the charge to which he or she is entering a guilt plea. Even though a robbery in fact occurred, a defendant could have been entering a plea to the lesser included offenses of either theft or assault.
Certainly, the requirement that the defendant have a basic understanding of the charge to which he or she is pleading guilty requires the trial court to inform the individual of the charge to which he or she is pleading guilty. Because a guilty plea is an “admission of conduct that constitutes all the elements of a formal criminal charge,” Metheny, 359 Md. at 599, 755 A.2d at 1101 (quoting Sutton v. State, 289 Md. 359, 364, 424 A.2d 755, 758 (1981)), and cannot be voluntary unless the individual possesses an understanding of the charge to which he or she is pleading guilty, it cannot be said that a *490guilty plea is entered voluntarily and intelligently if the individual does not know to what charge he is pleading guilty.
In the case sub judice, a review of the transcript from the guilty plea hearing confirms that petitioner was not informed that he was pleading guilty to robbery with a deadly weapon; the court did not, nor did his counsel, refer to the count of the indictment nor to the specific offense to which he was pleading guilty. The voir dire in the courtroom does not indicate that the court or counsel advised petitioner of the charge to which he was entering a guilty plea.
The State contends, however, that petitioner was charged only with robbery with a deadly weapon, and that the statement of facts read during the guilty plea proceeding was sufficient to inform petitioner of the nature of charge of robbery with a deadly weapon. Both arguments are misplaced. The docket entries reflect that petitioner was charged with robbery with a deadly weapon, assault with intent to commit, robbery, carrying a concealed deadly weapon, and openly carrying a deadly weapon with the intent to injure, and that all of the charges were disposed of at the 1992 guilty plea hearing.
Moreover, the statement of facts read into the record during the guilty plea proceeding was not sufficient to advise petitioner of the nature of the charge to which he was pleading guilty. The statement of facts specified only that on September 20, 1992, petitioner approached two people in the 1700 block of West North Avenue in Baltimore City, produced a pellet gun, demanded money, and received $54.00 collectively from the two individuals. It is not evident from the statement of facts that petitioner was pleading guilty to robbery with a deadly weapon as opposed to any of the other crimes for which he was charged or the lesser included charges such as theft or assault. Rule 4-242(c) required the trial court to ensure that petitioner understood the nature of the charge to which he was pleading guilty before accepting his plea. The court did not do so, therefore petitioner’s plea was constitutionally infirm.
*491Petitioner asserts also that his guilty plea was not entered voluntarily and intelligently because he was not informed of one of the consequences of his plea, the statutory maximum penalty for the charge to which he is pleading. Both the Circuit Court and the Court of Special Appeals rejected petitioner’s argument and found that the trial court was not required to advise him of the statutory maximum penalty he faced. The State’s argument is based on the fact that petitioner’s sentence was mutually agreed upon, and therefore, the statutory maximum is irrelevant. Because I would hold that petitioner was not adequately advised of the nature of the charge to which he was pleading guilty, I would not address this second argument. I would remand this case to permit petitioner to proceed in the Circuit Court and to demonstrate that he can satisfy all the elements to justify coram nobis relief.
Chief Judge Bell and Judge Greene have authorized me to state that they join in the views expressed in this dissenting opinion.
. In United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 74 S.Ct. 247, 98 L.Ed. 248 (1954), respondent Morgan had pled guilty in federal court and had served his four year prison sentence. Several years later, he was convicted in a New York State court and was sentenced to a longer term as a second offender because of the prior federal conviction. The Supreme Court considered this enhanced sentence as a serious collateral consequence.
. As applicable in McElroy, the pertinent part of § 645A read as follows:
"(c) When allegation of error deemed to have been waived.—(1) For the purposes of this subtitle, an allegation of error shall be deemed to be waived when a petitioner could have made, but intelligently and knowingly failed to make, such allegation before trial, at trial, on direct appeal (whether or not the petitioner actually took such an appeal), in an application for leave to appeal a conviction based on a guilty plea, in any habeas corpus or coram nobis proceeding actually instituted by said petitioner, in a prior petition under this subtitle, or in any other proceeding actually instituted by said petitioner, unless the failure to make such allegation shall be excused because of special circumstances. The burden of proving the existence of such special circumstances shall be upon the petitioner.”
*481“(2) When an allegation of error could have been made by a petitioner before trial, at trial, on direct appeal (whether or not said petitioner actually took such an appeal), in an application for leave to appeal a conviction based on a guilty plea, in any habeas corpus or coram nobis proceeding actually instituted by said petitioner, in a prior petition under this subtitle, or in any other proceeding actually instituted by said petitioner, but was not in fact so made, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that said petitioner intelligently and knowingly failed to make such allegation.”
Md.Code (1957, 1992 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27 § 645A.
. Although the court in Telink notes that in that federal circuit, a writ of error coram nobis is a step in the original criminal proceeding, and in Maryland, a writ of error coram nobis is in the nature of a civil proceeding, the difference is immaterial as to whether the doctrine of laches applies to coram nobis.
. In 2001, in response to changes in federal immigration laws, Rule 4-242 was amended to as it currently provides. See Skok, 361 Md. at 77, *489760 A.2d at 661. The amended Rule requires the court, before accepting a guilty or nolo contendere plea, to inform the defendant that if he or she is not a United States citizen, he or she may face deportation, detention, or ineligibility for citizenship. Maryland Rule 4-242(c) and (e) states as follows:
“(c) Plea of guilty. The court may accept a plea of guilty only after it determines, upon an examination of the defendant on the record in open court conducted by the court, the State’s Attorney, the attorney for the defendant, or any combination thereof, that (1) the defendant is pleading voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea; and (2) there is a factual basis for the plea. In addition, before accepting the plea, the court shall comply with section (e) of this Rule. The court may accept the plea of guilty even though the defendant does not admit guilt. Upon refusal to accept a plea of guilty, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty.”
(e) Collateral Consequences of a Plea of Guilty or Nolo Contendere. Before the court accepts a plea of guilty or nolo "contendere, the court, the State’s Attorney, the attorney for the defendant, or any combination thereof shall advise the defendant (1) that by entering the plea, if the defendant is not a United States citizen, the defendant may face additional consequences of deportation, detention, or ineligibility for citizenship and (2) that the defendant should consult with defense counsel if the defendant is represented and needs additional information concerning the potential consequences of the plea. The omission of advice concerning the collateral consequences of a plea does not itself mandate that the plea be declared invalid.”