dissenting:
¶ 1 I agree with the majority’s analysis of the legal standard to be applied in custodial interrogations; however, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s application of that standard in the instant case.
¶ 2 The issue here is not the legitimacy of the troopers’ suspicions at the time the questioning was conducted, but rather whether *204the troopers used coercive tactics to obtain Appellee’s self-incriminating statements. Based on the facts of this case, ■ I conclude that an individual in Mannion’s situation would have felt that her freedom was significantly curtailed, and that the conditions of the interrogation sustained for more than two hours made her a virtual prisoner in her own home. Because I believe that the troopers’ tactics did not comport with Miranda requirements, and .that the suppression court’s findings of fact and inferences drawn therefrom are reasonable based on the record, I must respectfully dissent.
¶ 3 The procedural safeguards of the Fifth Amendment and one’s privilege against self-incrimination have long been recognized in our federal and state courts as the “hallmark of our democracy” and the “essential mainstay of our adversary system”. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1620, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (citations omitted). Despite the apparently harsh remedy of excluding evidence, the courts have consistently recognized that “an accused must not be compelled to incriminate himself.” Commonwealth v. Ziegler, 503 Pa. 555, 562, 470 A.2d 56, 59 (1983). Indeed, “the [Miranda ] warnings were institutioned to protect an accused from giving statements as a result of having his will overborne by coercive police tactics.” Id.7
¶ 4 To that extent, the prosecution is prohibited from using inculpatory statements that are derived from a “custodial interrogation” unless Miranda warnings are administered. Moreover, our courts have consistently applied an objective test in which the court must consider the nature of the encounter and the totality of the circumstances to determine whether an individual would reasonably believe that her freedom of action was restricted by the interrogation, thus triggering Miranda warnings. Commonwealth v. Gwynn, — Pa. -, -, 723 A.2d 143, 148 (1998) (emphasis added).
¶ 5 As the facts of this case are not in dispute, our sole inquiry is to determine whether the legal inferences drawn by the suppression court are reasonable. Commonwealth v. Gommer, 445 Pa.Super. 571, 665 A.2d 1269, 1270 (1995), appeal denied, 546 Pa. 676, 686 A.2d 1308 (1996) (citation omit ted). The suppression court drew the following legal inferences from the evidence presented at the suppression hearing:
In the case sub judice, although Mrs. Mannion was in her own home and the detectives had told her some two hours prior that she was free to not answer their questions, the totality of the circumstances of having two police officers in her home questioning her for the second time for over two hours and changing their tone with her from conversational to accusatorial while standing menacingly close to her, would have led a reasonable person, especially a woman 63 years of age, to believe that she was in custody. The fact that she felt that she had to ask permission to answer her phone shows that even before the police became accusatorial she did not feel free. In addition, before confessing to her crime, she was crying, and after confessing she asked if she would be “dragged out” that day.
... we believe that Tpr. Sauers’ accusation that Mrs. Mannion was lying and would be arrested, followed by his immediately rising from his chair to stand close beside her and repeat in a low voice that he believed she did it, adding that she probably did it for her children, amounted to the classic coercion and erosion of an independent will to not incriminate oneself upon which Miranda warnings were founded.
Trial Court Opinion, 8/19/97, reinstated and corrected 10/3/97, at 6-7. Based on a thorough and independent review of the record, I agree with the suppression court’s conclusion that the police conduct was carefully calculated to elicit an admission and that a reasonable person in Mannion’s situation would not have felt free to leave or to ask the troopers to leave. I would therefore find that the suppression court’s inferences drawn from the evidence are legitimate and reasonable.
*205¶ 6 The majority acknowledges that the suppression court used the correct test in determining whether Mannion’s statements were the product of custodial interrogation so as to require Miranda warnings. See Commonwealth v. Gwynn, supra. However, the majority fails to apply the “totality of the circumstances” test to the facts of the case. Instead, the majority singles out certain of the suppression court’s factual findings and discounts others.8 Specifically, the majority states that, even assuming the police investigation did focus on Appellee, a “custodial interrogation was not automatically triggered.” (emphasis added). The majority further maintains, “the fact that Trooper Sauers spoke in a low voice, in and of itself, fails to evidence any threat of force or coercion.” (emphasis added).
¶ 7 While it is true that neither of these factors, viewed alone, triggers Miranda warnings per se, Commonwealth v. Ellis, 379 Pa.Super. 337, 549 A.2d 1323, 1332 (1988), appeal denied, 522 Pa. 601, 562 A.2d 824 (1989), such factors are extremely relevant in determining whether a custodial interrogation took place based on the totality of the circumstances. See Commonwealth v. Busch, 713 A.2d 97, 101 (Pa.Super.1998). Yet, the majority fails to evaluate these important factors together and along with the many other factors found and relied upon by the trial court, including Mannion’s age, the accusatorial tone and menacing conduct of the troopers, the duration of the second interrogation, the trooper’s statement that she was lying and that she would be arrested, and the fact that she did not feel comfortable enough in her own home to answer the phone or to ask the troopers to leave. Had the majority assessed these factors along with the others in their totality, they would have come to the inexorable conclusion, as did the suppression court, that Mannion did not feel free to ask the officers to leave.9 Thus, the majority’s conclusion that Appellee was not in custody when she made inculpatory statements to police is erroneous and inconsistent with the “totality of the circumstances” test as enunciated in case law and borne out from the facts in the case sub judice.
¶ 8 Further, the learned and experienced suppression court had the benefit of hearing the testimony firsthand and observing the demeanor of the witnesses. Accordingly, the suppression court was in the best position to determine whether a reasonable person in Mannion’s situation would have felt free to ask the officers to leave her residence. Moreover, the facts as adduced by the suppression court were supported by the record. It is not within the province of this Court, based on a cold record, to substitute our judgment for that of the suppression court absent an error of law. Commonwealth v. Prosek, 700 A.2d 1305, 1308 (Pa.Super.1997); Commonwealth v. Rosario, 438 Pa.Super. 241, 652 A.2d 354, 365 (1994), appeal denied, 546 Pa. 668, 685 A.2d 547 (1996). The majority fails to demonstrate such an error in this case.
¶ 9 Accordingly, I would affirm the order entered by the trial court granting Appellee’s motion to suppress.10
*206¶ 10 President Judge McEWEN, Judges CAVANAUGH and DEL SOLE join the Dissenting Opinion by Judge SCHILLER.
. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. opined in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) (Dissent), "... it is a less evil that some criminals should escape, than that the government should play an ignoble part.”
. In explaining the rationale behind Miranda requirements, Chief Justice Earl Warren stated, "it [is] necessary to insure that what was proclaimed in the Constitution ha[s] not become but a ‘form of words’ in the hands of government officials.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (citation omitted).
. This conclusion is particularly justified in light of our recent decision in Commonwealth v. Zogby, 455 Pa.Super. 621, 689 A.2d 280 (1997). In Zogby, we stressed the inherently coercive nature of an encounter between a civilian and a police officer:
... it must be remembered that a police officer is an authoritative figure and that an officer’s authority is commonly reinforced when encountering a “suspect".... ‘‘The police officer retains the upper hand and the accouterments of authority. That the officer lacks legal license to continue to detain them is unknown to most citizens, and a reasonable person would not feel free to walk away as the officer continues to address him.”
Commonwealth v. Zogby, supra, at 282 (citation omitted).
.I note that my conclusion here does not conflict with our recent decision in Commonwealth v. Busch, 713 A.2d 97 (Pa.Super.1998). In Busch, the trial court found that the officers questioned the suspect during a second visit at his home for one-half hour or less, the suspect felt comfortable enough to ask the officers to leave his home, and the officers complied. Despite the fact that the suspect was told he was the focus of the investigation, this Court held that the *206trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress absent additional evidence that a “deprivation of liberty” was present. Busch, supra (citing Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 475 Pa. 97, 379 A.2d 1056 (1977)). In this case, the evidence at the suppression hearing established that the questioning on the second visit lasted approximately two hours, Appellee became the focus of the investigation, and she reasonably believed her freedom of movement was restricted. Thus, Busch, supra, is distinguishable from the case sub judice.