concurring. I concur stice, express my disagreement with the majority’s reliance on the concept of domicile in determining which of two states is the proper forum for the probate of an estate. Specifically, the majority’s reliance on Phillips v. Sherrod Estate, 248 Ark. 605, 453 S.W.2d 60 (1970), is misplaced. In Phillips, we interpreted Texas statutes, which operate in terms of domicile. Id. Conversely, a review of Arkansas statutes reveals that a standard of residence applies in determinations of forum for the administration of estates. The probate statutes repeatedly refer to residence as opposed to domicile.
The Arkansas venue statute dictates the proper forum for the administration of an estate. The statute reads as follows, in pertinent part:
(a) The venue for the probate of a will and for administration shall be:
(1) In the county in this state where the decedent resided at the time of his or her death;
(2) If the decedent did not reside in this state, then in the county wherein is situated the greater part, in value, of the property of the decedent located in this state;
(3) If the decedent had no residence or property in this state, but died in this state, then in the county in which he or she died; and
(4) If the decedent had no residence or property in this state and died outside of this state, then in any county in which a cause of action may be maintained by his or her personal representative.
Ark. Code Ann. § 28-40-102(a) (Repl. 2004) (emphasis added).
Furthermore, the Arkansas statute dealing with time limits for probate states that, to the extent that it relates to real property, the will of a nonresident admitted to probate in another jurisdiction may be admitted here without regard to the time limit. Ark. Code Ann. § 28-40-103(c)(l) (Repl. 2004). A petition for probate of a will or for the original appointment of a general personal representative must state the residence of the decedent and, if the decedent did not reside in this state at the time of death, must provide a general description of the property located in each county. Ark. Code Ann. § 28-40-107(c)(1), (4) (Repl. 2004). The chapter dealing with ancillary administration states that “the law and procedure relating to the administration of estates of resident decedents shall apply to the ancillary administration of estates of nonresident decedents.” Ark. Code Ann. § 28-42-101 (Repl. 2004) (emphasis added). It is clear from the probate statutes that residence is the applicable standard in Arkansas.
Our case law supports this conclusion. For example, as early as 1920, we held that letters testamentary and of administration are to be issued in the county in which the testator or intestate resided. Groschner v. Winton, 146 Ark. 520, 226 S.W. 162 (1920). In addition, we have held that “the will of a nonresident of this state may have original probate in this state, if the testator owned property in this state which might be the subject of administration in this state, or where there was a debt or demand due the testator which required administration to collect.” McPherson v. McKay, 205 Ark. 1135, 1138-1139, 172 S.W.2d 911, 912 (1943) (emphasis added). Several cases have expressed the importance of residence in determining venue. See Lawrence v. Sullivan, 90 Ark. App. 206, 205 S.W.3d 168 (2005); Smith v. Rudolph, 221 Ark. 900, 256 S.W.2d 736 (1953); Shelton v. Shelton, 180 Ark. 959, 23 S.W.2d 629 (1930).
In short, we have never relied on domicile in determining the proper forum for the administration of an estate. Residence has always been the applicable standard. In the instant case, the circuit court found that the greater part of Mary Ann Daley’s estate was located in Arkansas. Thus, I would affirm the circuit court’s decision under Ark. Code Ann. § 28-40-102(a)(2).