¶ 1. After a traffic stop that resulted in processing for driving while under the influence, the arresting officer served defendant Anderson with a Notice of Intention to Suspend and/or Disqualify Driver’s License for Privilege to Operate, pursuant to 28 V.S.A. § 1205. At the preliminary hearing, Anderson moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. He based his motion on the fact that the results of his breath test, as indicated on the suspen*45sion form, produced a reading of an alcohol concentration of 0.077, which is not “equal to or more than .08%,” as required on the form. The court agreed and dismissed the civil suspension case. The State appeals and argues that the court erred in not allowing the matter to go to a final hearing, at which it would be allowed to introduce expert evidence relating Anderson’s blood alcohol level back to the time he was operating a vehicle. We affirm the district court.
¶ 2. The State argues that, when the evidentiary test is below the legal limit, the State should be allowed to prove at the final healing that the operator’s BAC at the time of operation would have been greater than 0.08 by using the officer’s affidavit and an affidavit of the State’s chemist. This approach confuses the State’s burden of proof at a civil suspension hearing with the statutory basis for commencing a civil suspension proceeding and fails to acknowledge the premise of the civil suspension procedure. The civil suspension procedure is designed to serve the remedial purpose of protecting public safety by quickly removing potentially dangerous drivers from the roads through purely administrative means. To that end, a law enforcement officer is authorized to issue a notice of intention to suspend, which itself serves as a temporary operator’s license until the date of the suspension unless, within seven days, the operator contests the suspension and seeks a hearing in the district court. 23 V.S.A. § 1205(d)(2), (3). In this case, the officer lacked the statutory prerequisite to issuance of a notice of intention to suspend — a breath test reading of 0.08 BAC or more. Thus, the court was correct in determining that the officer’s affidavit was “facially insufficient to support the commencement of civil suspension proceedings.”
¶ 3. A review of the relevant statutes is in order. A criminal DUI is defined as follows: “A person shall not operate, attempt to operate, or be in actual physical control of any vehicle on a highway [] when the person’s alcohol concentration is 0.08 or more;... or when the person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor.” 23 V.S.A. § 1201(a)(1), (2). Recognizing that criminal cases can be protracted and slow to resolve, in the 1989 session, the Legislature created the civil suspension system to facilitate a speedy and summary procedure to get drunk drivers off the roads through license suspension. State v. Stearns, 159 Vt. 266, 271, 617 A.2d 140, 142-43 (1992). “The summary suspension scheme serves the rational remedial purpose of protecting public safety by quickly removing potentially dangerous drivers from the roads.” State v. Strong, 158 Vt. 56, 61, 605 A.2d 510, 513 (1992).
*46¶ 4. If an officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person was operating, attempting to operate, or in actual physical control of a vehicle “in violation of section 1201,” the officer shall request that the person submit to a breath or blood test to determine the person’s alcohol concentration. 23 V.S.A. § 1202(a)(3). Consent to taking such tests to determine blood alcohol content is implied pursuant to § 1202(a)(1).
¶ 5. Under the civil suspension process, a law enforcement officer who requests an evidentiary test can issue a notice of intention to suspend, on behalf of the commissioner of motor vehicles, if the test result indicates that the person’s alcohol concentration “was 0.08 or more at the time of operating, attempting to operate or being in actual physical control of a vehicle in violation of section 1201.” 23 V.S.A. § 1205(c). The affidavit of the officer must accompany the notice, and it shall be sufficient if it avers that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the person was operating in violation of § 1201, and, after being informed of his or her rights under § 1202(d), the person submitted to a test whose results “indicated that the person’s alcohol concentration was 0.08 or more, or the person refused to submit to an evidentiary test.” § 1205(b). Thus begins the civil suspension process.
¶ 6. Pursuant to § 1205(a), upon affidavit of a law enforcement officer that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that a person was operating, attempting to operate, or in actual physical control of a vehicle in violation of § 1201, and the person submitted to a test and “the test results indicated that the person’s alcohol concentration was 0.08 or more at the time of operating, attempting to operate or being in actual physical control, the commissioner shall suspend the person’s operating license ... for a period of 90 days and until the person complies with section 1209a of [Title 23].” Section 1205(a) governs the actions of the commissioner, not the law enforcement officer. For his part, the officer issues a notice of intention to suspend. The commissioner suspends after any challenge to the civil suspension is finally resolved — after it has been determined or conceded that the operator’s BAC was 0.08 or more at the time of operation.1 See also id. *47§ 1206(a) (governing suspensions after criminal conviction or final determination of an appeal).
¶ 7. The Legislature was aware of this important distinction and required that the process commence only upon an officer’s affidavit stating that “[t]he officer obtained an evidentiary test (noting the time and date the test was taken) and the test indicated that the person’s alcohol concentration was 0.08 or more____” Id. § 1205(b)(5). To be clear, “alcohol concentration” means the number of grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath, and the breath test indicates the person’s alcohol concentration. Id. § 1200(1)(B), (3). Obviously, the test result indicates only the person’s alcohol concentration at the time of the test. It does not, standing alone, establish the alcohol concentration at the time of operation.
¶ 8. However, the Legislature also created a statutory presumption to support an allegation that the person’s BAC was 0.08 or more at the time of operation. Section 1205(n) provides that, “[i]n a proceeding under this section, if there was at any time within two hours of operating, attempting to operate or being in actual physical control of a vehicle an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more, it shall be a rebuttable presumption that the person’s alcohol concentration was 0.08 or more at the time of operating, attempting to operate or being in actual physical control.” Thus, if a test taken one and one-half hours after an officer has stopped an operator results in a BAC of 0.08, the law will presume, and the officer may presume, that the person’s alcohol concentration was 0.08 or more when he or she was operating the vehicle. In this case, the presumption does not operate.
¶ 9. When the intended civil suspension is contested, a hearing is scheduled. The issues to be decided at the final civil suspension hearing are set forth in § 1205(h). At the final hearing, as pertains to this case, the court must determine whether the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person was violating 23 V.S.A. § 1201, whether the person’s rights were adequately explained, and whether a test was properly taken and indicated a BAC of 0.08 or higher “at the time of operating, attempting to operate or being in actual physical control of a vehicle in violation of section 1201.” Id. § 1205(h)(1), (2), (4). It is only after the final hearing that the commissioner suspends a license on the *48grounds that, at the time of operation, the person’s BAC was 0.08 or more at the time of operation. Id. § 1205(a).
¶ 10. At the hearing, the State can rely on the officer’s affidavit to prove the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the person was driving while under the influence, that the officer explained the person’s rights, and that a test taken by a properly trained officer indicated a BAC level of 0.08 or more. The State can then rely on the affidavit of a chemist who works for the Department of Health, certifying that the test complied with Health Department regulations on breath-testing methods and was an accurate and valid indication of the alcohol concentration in the defendant’s system at the time of the test. Thus, if a test result produces a reading of 0.08 or more, and there is no question of relating the test result back to the time of operation, the summary suspension hearing is indeed summary.
¶ 11. The confusion in this case stems from the Legislature’s specification of a test result “at the time of operation” in § 1205(a) and (h)(4). As explained above, those sections address the elements to be proven at contested final hearings before the court and the ultimate authority of the commissioner to suspend a license, not the initial basis for a notice of intention to suspend. The necessary prerequisite of a civil suspension notice is an affidavit from the processing officer stating that he requested a breath test and “the test indicated that the person’s alcohol concentration was 0.08 or more.” Id. § 1205(b)(5) (emphasis added). The officer’s affidavit necessarily can attest only to the result generated by the test taken during the processing of the operator. Thus, as the trial court noted:
[t]here is nothing in the statute from which it might be inferred that the Legislature intended to imbue law enforcement officers with the expertise of chemists, allowing them to issue civil suspension notices upon their own speculation that a DataMaster result lower than .08% would likely be extrapolated reliably tó a breath alcohol concentration above the legal limit at the time of operation. Rather, presumably in the interests of creating a straightforward and streamlined proceeding, the Legislature provided that a notice of suspension must be supported by an affidavit indicating that “[t]he officer obtained an evidentiary test (noting the time and date the test was taken) and the test indicated that the person’s alcohol concentration was 0.08 or more____” (emphasis added), 23 V.S.A.§ 1205(c)(5).
*49¶ 12. In this case, the officer had no basis to issue a notice of intent to suspend defendant’s license because the blood alcohol test did not produce a result equal to or greater than 0.08.2 Nor could the officer rely on the statutory presumption contained in § 1205(n) to support a notice to suspend.
¶ 13. The Legislature, in crafting this procedure to summarily suspend a person’s license to operate a motor vehicle, intended the bright line to be a test result of 0.08. The State can still criminally prosecute an operator for drunk driving if the test result is less, assuming there is other evidence to either relate a test result back to the time of operation or to indicate actions and behavior that support a finding of intoxication. But the ability to commence a summary license suspension based solely on an officer’s affidavit does not exist unless the test result is 0.08 or more.
¶ 14. The dissent suggests that the district court’s ruling “imposes an additional element of the offense for civil suspension purposes — that is, that a test result must show that the operator had an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or greater when the test was administered.” Post, ¶ 29 (emphasis in original). First, that is exactly what a test result shows. The dissent confuses the elements necessary to support a civil suspension as delineated in subsection (a)'(specifying, as noted above, when the commissioner shall suspend a license) with the legal sufficiency of the officer’s notice of intention to suspend and its supporting affidavit found in subsection (b). These are not the same.
¶ 15. The dissent argues that the Legislature could have expected a trained officer to be able to identify “reasonable grounds” to believe that a person was operating with an alcohol concentration over 0.08, citing to § 1205(a). This is wrong. That section clearly requires a law enforcement officer to have reasonable grounds to believe that a person was operating in violation of § 1201(a), which governs both operation with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more or driving while under the influence. 23 V.S.A. § 1201(a)(1), (2). But, this case does not involve a crime, it involves a summary civil suspension, which needs as its genesis a breath test result of 0.08. Id. § 1205(b)(5).
¶ 16. The dissent also suggests that the rebuttable presumption found in § 1205(n) shows that the Legislature understood that in some *50cases there would be no such test and “the State would have to bear the greater burden of relating back the test result.” Post, ¶ 40. This is incorrect. If there is no test because the defendant refused, then suspension is automatic. The State’s burden is lessened. For a civil suspension to proceed there must be either a refusal or a test result indicating a BAC of 0.08 or more at the time of operation. That BAC can be shown by the rebuttable presumption or through relation back evidence. But first there must be a test result of at least 0.08.
¶ 17. Understanding that subsections (a) and (h) address the elements to be proved for a summary suspension to take place and thus explain the difference between an officer’s affidavit that merely relates what the test result showed and the ultimate question of whether the operator was violating § 1201, § 1205(c) requires further explanation. It authorizes a law enforcement officer to serve notice of intention to suspend on a person who submits to a test, “the results of which indicate that the person’s alcohol concentration was 0.08 or more at the time of operating, attempting to operate or being in actual physical control of a vehicle in violation of section 1201.” Id. § 1205(c) (emphasis added). At first blush, this section appears to assume the test will provide relation-back evidence. Again, it cannot. However, the statutory presumption, in conjunction with a test result of 0.08 or more, permits an inference that an operator’s alcohol concentration was 0.08 or more at the time of operation.
¶ 18. When the Legislature created the summary suspension procedure, it permitted a suspension to occur without any court involvement, unless the operator contested the issue and requested a hearing. To create a threshold for suspension, it added a section affording law enforcement and the courts a presumption that, if a test result taken within two hours of operation produced a result of 0.08 or more, one could presume an alcohol concentration at the time of operation of 0.08 or more. In this case, there is no test result of 0.08 or more that would permit use of the statutory presumption. The officer had no statutory authorization to initiate a civil suspension case. The trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
This authority of the commissioner mimics the authority given the commissioner prior to the enactment of the civil suspension process, when “[u]pon a finding by the court that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant was ... operating, attempt ing to operate, or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle on a highway [while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or other drugs, or both], the court shall forward the report of the summary hearing to the commissioner of motor vehicles, who shall suspend *47the person’s operator’s license ... for a period of one year.” 1981, No. 103, § 6. See also 1983, No. 134 (Adj. Sess.),§4.
This is, of course, not to say that an officer obtaining a test result of less than 0.08 cannot process the operator for a violation of § 1201(a)(2), operating under the influence of intoxicating liquor.