dissenting.
Texas courts have been reasonable in permitting non-licensed attorneys to appear. However, it is a matter of grace not a right. Allowing out-of-state counsel to proceed although unlicensed pro hac vice is within the discretion of the trial court not this court. SUPREME COURT of Texas, Rules Governing Admission to the Bar of Texas, Rule XV (1989) [hereinafter Rule XV]. Clearly we should not issue our extraordinary writ of mandamus to command Judge Blanton to allow two Illinois attorneys to represent relator.
The underlying case is one of products liability. Real party in interest, Bill Miller, claims that he was injured as a result of an accident involving a ladder manufactured by Keller Industries, Inc. (relator). Relator claims that the firm with which the two applicants are associated represents Keller throughout the United States in similar cases.
The issuance of a writ of mandamus in this case is inappropriate because (1) the relator did not comply with the provisions of Rule XV and (2) the discretion involved is that of the trial court not this court. We are not permitted to substitute our discre*187tion for that of Judge Blanton and command him to accept attorneys before his court when these two unlicensed non-resident attorneys do not satisfy the provisions of the Supreme Court rule.
The application for admission pro kac vice was defective in at least the following respects:
1. The motion for admission failed to include the office address and Bar card number of Texas counsel with whom the Chicago lawyers would be associated.
2. There was no Texas attorney statement to the effect that applicants were known to be reputable attorneys and recommending their admission to practice before the court.
3. The motion failed to include a statement that the non-resident attorneys seeking admission had not been denied admission to the courts of any state or to any federal court during the preceding five years.
4. Documents referred to by the real party in interest respondents raised the suggestion that the firm involved had been denied admission in at least three California courts within the past five years.
The majority states that these defects are matters of “form” rather than “substance.” In a mandamus case form is substance. The writ should not issue on unclear or conflicting evidence.
The Supreme Court in State Bar v. Belli, 382 S.W.2d 475, 476 (Tex.1964), states that “when and if respondent seeks to participate in the trial of a particular case in the future the matter of his qualification as ‘[a] reputable non-resident attorney’ under Rule X(i) will be addressed to the discretion of the court in which the case is pending” (emphasis added).
The provisions of Rule XV adopted by our Supreme Court to govern the admission of attorneys pro hac vice have not been met by applicants.
Subsection (c) of that rule provides “[t]he judge may examine the non-resident attorney to determine that the non-resident attorney is aware of and will observe the ethical standards required of attorneys of this State. If the judge is not satisfied that the non-resident attorney is a reputable attorney and will observe the ethical standards required of attorneys in this State, the judge may deny the motion.” (emphasis added).
Relator never tendered the two moving attorneys to be questioned by the trial court. Obviously, it was the burden of the movant seeking temporary admission to satisfy the trial judge as to his qualifications and ethics. The rule expressly provides that the judge may question or examine the non-resident attorney to satisfy himself that such attorney is a reputable attorney and will observe the ethical standards required of attorneys in this State and if not so satisfied he may deny the motion.
Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex.1985), states “[t]he test for abuse of discretion is not whether, in the opinion of the reviewing court, the facts present an appropriate case for the trial court’s action. Rather, it is a question of whether the court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles ... whether the act was arbitrary or unreasonable.” The relator must establish that under the law and the facts of the case the trial court was permitted to make but one decision and it did not make that decision. Mother Frances Hosp. v. Coats, 796 S.W.2d 566, 569 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1990, no writ); Onda Enterprises, Inc. v. Pierce, 750 S.W.2d 812, 813 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1988, orig. proceeding [leave denied]).
Subsection (c) of Rule XV expressly gives a judge the right to examine non-resident attorneys. Judge Blanton was not afforded such opportunity. The rule also expressly provides, “[i]f the judge is not satisfied that the non-resident attorney is a reputable attorney and will observe the ethical standards required of attorneys in this State, the judge may deny the motion.” Clearly the discretion lay with Judge Blan-ton rather than this court.
A court of appeals acts in excess of its own writ power if it grants mandamus so *188as to substitute its discretion for that of the trial court. Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex.1985); Viggiano v. Emerson, 794 S.W.2d 564, 565 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1990, no writ).
Appellate courts frequently permit out-of-state attorneys to argue cases before such courts upon an appropriate showing. These attorneys appear for argument, may have their names on the brief, and depart while the court recedes into chambers to further deliberate, research and write. Trial courts, on the other hand, must be concerned with such matters as availability for depositions and preliminary hearings, as well as availability for trial on the merits. These factors along with the truism that we have enough home-grown “Rambos” compel the conclusion that trial court judges should have full discretion to determine which unlicensed attorneys will be granted the privilege to practice before them.
Relator and the majority emphasize the right of relator to have attorneys of its choice. This is a point that should be given some weight. However, if not in Houston, surely in Dallas, a Texas lawyer may be found who understands the design, manufacture and marketing of ladders.
I agree with my colleagues that the second prong of the mandamus sought relating to the expenses incurred in connection with the depositions are matters that may be the subject of points on appeal and hence mandamus is not an appropriate remedy.
I would deny the writ of mandamus in its entirety or would withdraw our leave to file as improvidently granted.