concurring and dissenting.
In my judgment the appeal of the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission at No. 618 should be quashed. Accordingly, I do not reach the merits of the Commission’s appeal in this lawsuit and do not express any opinion as to that subject. The majority in concluding that the order of the Commonwealth Court granting Atlantic Richfield’s motion for summary judgment as to all alleged underpayments made more than six years prior to the date of the commencement of suit relied heavily upon this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 473 Pa. 432, 375 A.2d 320 (1977). While I did not participate in the consideration or decision in Wheeling, supra, I am presently of the view that the result reached in that decision was incorrect. It is my opinion that the present order and the order in Wheeling were not final orders that would permit immediate appellate review;.*
*625I am in agreement with the majority of the Court that the appeal of Atlantic Richfield Company at No. 626 should be quashed. I would therefore quash both of these appeals and postpone consideration of the merits until a final order has been entered in the court below.
I am not satisfied with the jurisprudential soundness of the distinction suggested by Mr. Justice POMEROY in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, (see opinion, supra, 495 n.l), (distinguishing *625between court orders that preclude the pleading of defenses which might provide a complete defense to the entire lawsuit and those which do not).