dissenting.
Because the majority opinion’s interpretation of V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 19.-06, is clearly and totally erroneous, I dissent. In light of the way the majority opinion interprets Section 19.06, to me at least, it closely resembles something that Piscasso might have painted when he was a very young child.
Section 19.06 is clearly written and provides as follows:
In all prosecutions for murder or voluntary manslaughter, the state or defendant shall be permitted to offer testimony as to all relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and the previous relationship existing between the accused and the deceased, together with all relevant facts and circumstances going to show the condition of the mind of the accused at the time of the offense. (My emphasis.)
This statute has been a part of our law at least since 1927, and is evidence that the Legislature recognized that the state of mind of the slayer was to be considered by the trier of fact. The Legislature placed no restrictions or limitations on the admis*647sibility of such evidence, save and except that such evidence must go to the condition of the mind of the accused at the time of the offense, and the majority opinion errs in holding that it did otherwise. The fact that this Court might have erroneously interpreted the statute in the past is no justification for this Court to continue to compound the error of interpretation.
In interpreting this statute, and holding that the proffered testimony that Peter Alan Werner, hereinafter referred to as the appellant, wanted admitted into evidence was inadmissible evidence, the majority opinion appears to subscribe to the rule that because we cannot directly see, hear, or feel the state of another person’s mind, testimony going to another person’s state of mind is based on mere conjecture and therefore has an inadequate data base for its admissibility. Dean Wigmore made short shrift of such foolish thinking when he stated the following: “This argument is finical enough; and it proves too much, for if valid it would forbid the jury to find a verdict upon the supposed state of a person’s mind. If they are required and allowed to find such a fact, it is not too much to hear such testimony from a witness who has observed the person exhibiting in his conduct the operations of his mind.” 2 J. Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 661 at 773-74 (3rd ed.1940).
Because Section 19.06 is so unmistakenly clearly written, this court has no business trying to rewrite it so that it will read as some members of this Court might desire it to read. It is not the function of this Court to rewrite Section 19.06; it is the function of this Court to interpret the statute as it is written, and, in this instance, because the statute is written in unambiguous language, it is subject to only one interpretation. This Court should give the statute the broad meaning that the Legislature obviously intended it to have when it enacted the statute.
Under Section 19.06, supra, any relevant facts and circumstances going to show the condition of the mind of the accused at the time of the offense is admissible evidence. So saith our Legislature. However, by the statute’s very terms, before evidence is admissible on the issue of the defendant’s state or condition of his mind at the time of the offense, such evidence must be relevant. What this means to me is that any evidence going to the defendant’s state of mind at the time the offense was committed is admissible; the statute merely restricts the proof of the state of mind to relevant facts and circumstances going to the state of mind of the defendant at the time the offense is committed. So saith our Legislature.
“Relevancy” is ordinarly defined to be that which conduces to the proof of a pertinent hypothesis — a pertinent hypothesis being one which, if sustained, would logically influence the issue. Hence it is relevant to put in evidence any circumstance which tends to make the proposition at issue either more or less probable. Waldrop v. State, 138 Tex.Cr.R. 166, 133 S.W.2d 969 (Tex.Cr.App.1939).
In the dissenting opinion that he filed in this cause, when it was pending in the Houston First Court of Appeals, Justice Levy of that court correctly observed the following: “The very purpose of 19.06’s sweeping language was to distinguish the particular ‘mind of the accused at the time of the offense’ from the mind of the theoretical ‘reasonable and prudent man,’ and permit the jury, as the trier of fact — not the court — to evaluate the killing in such light.” Werner v. State, 680 S.W.2d 858, 867 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st] 1984).
My understanding of the appellant’s proffer of proof regarding Dr. Roden is that Dr. Roden would not have testified to any ultimate factual issue that had to be resolved by the jury, but, instead, would have merely supplied the jury with background data on the state of mind that the appellant had at the time in question in order to aid the jury in finding what the appellant’s state or condition of his mind was at the time of the fatal shooting; thus, he would have explained to them that because the appellant was suffering from the effects of “The Holocaust Syndrome” this *648affected his state or condition of his mind at the time of the fatal shooting.
The relevant question, therefore, is whether Dr. Roden’s methodology had the required general acceptance — not whether there was, in addition, a general acceptance of the Holocaust syndrome derived from that methodology.
The proffered testimony of Dr. Roden on “The Holocaust Syndrome”, and how it affected the condition of the appellant’s mind at the time he shot the deceased, should make it obvious to anyone that it comes within the rule that expert opinion testimony on issues to be decided by the jury is admissible where the conclusion of the expert is one which jurors would not ordinarily be able to draw for themselves. “But when the jurors are not competent to infer, without the aid of greater skill than their own, the probable existence of the facts to be ascertained, or the likelihood of their occurring from other facts actually proved, expert opinion evidence is rendered admissible.” Holloway v. State, 613 S.W.2d 497, 500-01 (Tex.Cr.App.1981). Also see Hopkins v. State, 480 S.W.2d 212 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).
The subject “The Holocaust Syndrome” appears to be a new type of syndrome in psychiatric circles. Excluding a reference to one book entitled Adolescent Psychiatry: Developmental and Clinical Studies, at p. 66 (1982), all other references that counsel for the appellant directs us to are articles found in three newspapers. My independent research has yet to find a single reported court case which has discussed this syndrome.1
Although there appears to be a paucity of case law regarding “The Holocaust Syndrome,” this in itself should not have been reason for the trial judge to have excluded Dr. Roden’s testimony; to the contrary, this is probably the best reason why such testimony should have been admitted in this case. Dr. Roden’s testimony was highly relevant on the issue of the condition of the appellant’s state of mind at the time he fired the fatal shot, and would have aided the jury, all of whom were probably totally unfamiliar with this type syndrome, in better deciding what the appellant’s state or condition of his mind was when he shot the deceased, and how his suffering from “The Holocaust Syndrome” affected the condition of his mind at that time.
Simply because a subject might be shrouded in the mystery of professional skill or knowledge, the light of that knowledge should not be withheld from the jury because of some fine distinction in the ordinary rules of evidence, which the majority opinion opts for. Of course, “Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a *649well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.” Frye v. United States, 293 P. 1013, 1014 (D.C.1923). However, courts should never be unduly prejudiced against the introduction of expert testimony that is based upon a theory that is in its infancy. Most courts agree that “neither newness nor lack of absolute certainty ... suffices to render it inadmissible in court. Every useful new development must have its first day in court.” United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 438 (6th Cir.1970).
Although I would prefer to have this record more complete on the subject of “The Holocaust Syndrome,” nevertheless, I find that all of the requisites for the admissibility of Dr. Roden’s testimony have been satisfied. See Holloway v. State, supra, which discusses the topic, the requisites for admissibility of an expert witness’ testimony. Also see Hopkins v. State, supra.
When a relatively large number of persons, having the same symptoms, exhibit a combination or variation of functional psychiatric disorders that leads to purely emotional stress that causes intense mental anguish or emotional trauma, i.e., trauma having no direct physical effect upon the body, psychiatrists put those persons under one or more labels. Today, we have the following labels: “The Battered Wife Syndrome,” (see post); “The Battered Woman Syndrome;” “The Battered Child Syndrome;” “The Battered Husband Syndrome,” (see Steinmetz, “The Battered Husband Syndrome, Victimology,” An International Journal (1977-1978); Gelles, “The Myth of Battered Husbands — And Other Facts About Sanity Violence,” Ms. (Oct.,1979); Schultz, “The Wife Assaulter,” 6 J. Soc. Therapy 103 (I960);” “The Battered Parent Syndrome;” “The Familial Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome,” (see State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983); “The Rape Trauma Syndrome,” (see “Admissibility, at Criminal Prosecution, of Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome,” 42 A.L.R.J)th, commencing at page 879); “The Battle Fatigue Syndrome;” “The Viet Nam Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome,” (see Miller v. State, 338 N.W.2d 673, 678 (S.D.1983) (Henderson, J., dissenting opinion); State v. Felde, 422 So.2d 370 (La.1982); “The Policeman's Syndrome,” see Binder, Psychiatry in the Everyday Practice of Law (2nd ed. 1982);” “The Post-Concussive Syndrome,” (Id.); “The Whiplash Syndrome;” “The Low-Back Syndrome;” “The Lover’s Syndrome;” “The Love Fear Syndrome,” (People v. Terry, 2 Cal.3d 362, 85 Cal.Rptr. 409, 466 P.2d 961 (1970); “The Organic Delusional Syndrome;” “The Chronic Brain Syndrome,” (Illinois v. Reed, 8 Ill.App.3d 977, 290 N.E.2d 612 (1972); and “The Holocaust Syndrome.” Tomorrow, there will probably be additions to the list, such as “The Appellate Court Judge Syndrome.”
In this instance, there is no challenge by the State to Dr. Roden’s qualifications to testify on the subject “The Holocaust Syndrome.” From his impressive list of credentials, as well as his study of the subject, Dr. Roden appears to possess special knowledge upon the specific matter about which his expertise was sought.
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to better understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue, a witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, and he should be able to testify in the form of opinion evidence.
In this instance, I find that the subject “The Holocaust Syndrome” was beyond the ken of the average lay person. The jury was entitled to know that when the appellant fired the fatal shot he believed that because of his past experiences, if his life was ever threatened, he would act to protect himself, and that is why he acted in the manner in which he did, i.e., that his state of mind at the time was affected, not only by that which he visually saw on the night in question, but also because of his belief that it was necessary for him to defend himself because he comes from a *650family who did not defend themselves, thus causing them to perish in the Holocaust. Dr. Roden’s proffered testimony as to what effect being a descendant of a survivor of “The Holocaust” had upon the appellant, as to his reasonable belief of danger, was not only relevant and material as to his state of mind, but it was also relevant and material on his defense of self-defense, on which the jury was instructed.
It can probably easily be argued that the state of mind or condition of a defendant’s mind is not, in the nature of things, susceptible of firsthand knowledge. Hence, testimony directly on the state of mind or condition of a defendant’s mind should always be excluded. But for the provisions of Section 19.06, supra, that rule might be appealing. However, when the Legislature of this State enacted Section 19.06, if it had intended to limit the admissibility of testimony going to the defendant’s state or condition of his mind at the time the offense was committed it could have easily stated this. However, it chose not to do so and this Court should not graft exceptions, limitations, or place restrictions on the statute that the Legislature did not make or intend to make.
The existence of a state of mind or condition of the mind of another may be proved by circumstances which would produce it. Thus, knowledge may be proved by evidence of what the person was told. A state of mind may also be proved by external manifestations of the person from which the state may be inferred. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Dutton, 585 F.2d 1289, 1294 (5th Cir.1978) (Daughter permitted to testify as to whether insured believed his wife would shoot him.) Also see Bohannon v. Pegelow, 652 F.2d 729, 732 (7th Cir.1981).
Thus, in this instance, the question should be whether the jury could have received any appreciable aid from Dr. Ro-den’s testimony that might have given them guidance in determining what the appellant’s state or the condition of his mind was at the time he shot the deceased. Holloway v. State, supra, at page 501. Because I find that Dr. Roden’s testimony was both relevant and material on the issue of the appellant’s state of mind or condition of his mind when he fired the fatal shot, I must dissent to the majority opinion’s contrary holding.
The majority opinion appears to place much stock in the fact that at no time during his testimony was the appellant asked or did he state that he was a son or grandson of survivors of the Holocaust, or that stories about the Holocaust had any influence upon his state of mind at the time of the offense. To me, this reflects or indicates the majority opinion’s total lack of understanding of relevancy and materiality. Without the testimony from Dr. Ro-den, any such testimony from the appellant would have truly been irrelevant and immaterial and the trial judge would have probably committed error by admitting it into evidence. However, had Dr. Roden been permitted to testify, it should be obvious to anyone that we would be reading a record far different from the one that is presently before us — assuming there would have been an appeal.
It is apparent to me that what causes the majority opinion to be so awfully wrong in its interpretation of Section 19.06 lies in the fact that, at least implicitly, it is founded upon the wrong premise in that it construes the proffered testimony to show lack of specific intent. However, as counsel for the appellant has tried to emphasize to this Court, “Appellant never offered the evidence on the issue of specific or ‘special’ intent. Rather, he offered the evidence under Section 19.06, Tex.Penal Code, to show the condition of his mind at the time of the offense.” (P. 8, Appellant’s P.D.R.) Thus, operating from this false premise, the majority opinion, just like the opinion of the court of appeals, finds itself strangling because it fails to see the distinction between evidence offered to show a lack of specific intent to kill and evidence offered to show the defendant’s state or condition of his mind at the time the offense was committed. Not satisfied with being unable to draw a valid distinction between the *651two issues, the majority opinion, like the opinion of the court of appeals, then mixes apples with oranges to get grapefruit juice by trying to tie the provisions of Section 19.06 to the law governing the defense of self-defense.
The majority opinion does not cite us to any authority, nor have I found any, which expressly holds that under Section 19.06, in a prosecution for the offense of murder, testimony that goes to the condition of the mind of the defendant at the time of the commission of the offense, before it is admissible, must be relevant on the issue of the defense of self-defense. Section 19.06 is clearly worded, and permits the defendant to present any “relevant facts and circumstances going to show the condition of the mind of the accused at the time of the offense.” Under Section 19.06, supra, the admissibility of evidence is not limited by the law of self-defense.
Today, the majority opinion rules out evidence concerning “The Holocaust Syndrome.” In light of this opinion, what will tomorrow bring?
Although there are obvious differences between the syndrome now known as “The Battered Wife Syndrome” and the syndrome now known as “The Holocaust Syndrome,” in principle they have much in common. Today, it is not unusual for our more enlightened trial courts to admit testimony of expert witnesses on “The Battered Wife Syndrome,” as relevant to explain the legitimacy of a wife’s reactions to threats of danger from her spouse, and to counteract prosecutorial claims that the wife’s continued presence in the home means that the homicide was not necessary. It should be obvious to almost anyone that without such testimony it would be difficult, if not impossible, for persons unfamiliar with how “The Battered Wife Syndrome” manifests itself to understand what effect the actions of the former spouse had on the state or condition of the wife’s mind when she shot and killed her former spouse. In any event, it simply cannot be logically argued that such testimony would not be of assistance to the trier of fact in determining what the condition of the defendant’s mind might have been when the offense was committed. See Robinson, 2 Criminal Law Defenses, Section 131(a), footnote 4.
All courts are not in agreement that expert testimony in “The Battered Woman Syndrome” type case is always admissible. Some courts have held that such testimony is relevant to the issue of self-defense and therefore admissible, see State v. Allery, 101 Wash.2d 591, 682 P.2d 312 (1984); State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364 (1984); State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D.1983); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me.1981); Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 580, 277 S.E.2d 687 (1981), on remand, 159 Ga.App. 183, 283 S.E.2d 98 (1982); Hawthorne v. State, 408 So.2d 801 (Fla.Dis.Ct.App.1982); State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983); Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C.1979), appeal after remand, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C.1983), other courts have held that such testimony is admissible for reasons other than self-defense, see People v. Minnis, 118 Ill.App.3d 345, 74 Ill.Dec. 179, 455 N.E.2d 209 (1983); State v. Baker, 120 N.H. 773, 424 A.2d 171 (1980); State v. Kelly, 102 Wash.2d 188, 685 P.2d 564 (1984); Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374 (Wyo.1981); Fultz v. State, 439 N.E.2d 659 (Ind.App.1982); Commonwealth v. Me Cusker, 448 Pa. 382, 292 A.2d 286 (1972), while other courts hold that such testimony is absolutely inadmissible, see State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St.2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137 (1981); People v. White, 90 Ill.App.3d 1067, 46 Ill.Dec. 474, 414 N.E,2d 196 (1980). Also see the annotation entitled “Admissibility of Expert or Opinion Testimony on Battered Wife or Battered Woman Syndrome,” 18 A.L.R.4th, commencing at page 1153; Criminal Law Defenses, supra; Thar, “The Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Battered Wife Syndrome ... An Evidentiary Analysis,” 77 Northwestern Law Review 348 (1982); Jones, “When Battered Women Fight Back,” 9 Barrister 12 (Fall, 1982); “The Battered Wife’s Dilemma: To Kill or to be Killed,” 32 Hastings Law Journal 895 (1981); Cross, “The Expert as Educator: A Proposed Approach to the Use of Battered *652Woman Syndrome Expert Testimony,” 35 Vanderbilt Law Review 741 (1982); Gian-nelli, “The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A Half-Century Later,” 80 Colum. Law Review 1197 (1980); Comment, “Expert Testimony Based Upon Novel Scientific Technique: Admissibility Under Federal Rules of Evidence,” 48 George Washington Law Review 774 (1980); Graham, “Lay Witness Opinion Testimony; Opinion oh Ultimate Issue By Lay or Expert Witness,” Criminal Law Bulletin, March-April 1986), commencing at page 144.
The problem with using the above authorities lies in the fact that the provisions of Section 19.06 are not implicated in any of the cases cited, or any of the articles mentioned.
However, the lack of uniformity is not surprising; attempts to expand testimony into new fields have often resulted in judicial confusion and inconsistency. In sum, “There has never been a precise formulation of how courts should decide whether certain evidence is a proper subject for ‘expert testimony’.” Northwestern Law Review, supra.
I agree that if one restricts Section 19.06 to the law of self-defense, i.e., that before a defendant can introduce expert testimony going to his state of mind at the time he committed the offense, he must tie this testimony to the defense of self-defense, such expert testimony would probably not be admissible. But, that is the point. In enacting Section 19.06, the Legislature did not restrict or intend to restrict testimony going to a defendant’s condition of his mind at the time the offense was committed to the defense of self-defense; it just made such testimony admissible in order that the trier of fact could place whatever weight that it desired to place on such testimony in deciding what the condition of the defendant’s state of mind might have been when the offense was committed.
How testimony going to the defendant’s state of mind can ever be inadmissible under Section 19.06, in making the determination of what the state or condition of his mind might have been at the time in question, clearly escapes me, and the majority opinion does not truly explain how, under the express provisions of Section 19.06, the testimony of Dr. Roden was inadmissible to show the appellant’s state or condition of his mind at the time he fired the fatal shot. For this reason, if no other, the majority opinion is simply dead wrong in holding that the trial court did not err in excluding the proffered testimony of Dr. Roden.
For the above and foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
. My independent research also reveals that the following articles have been written on the subject: Kestenberg, "Psychoanalyses of Children of Survivors From the Nazi Persecution: The Continuing Struggle of Survivor Parents,” 5 Vic-timology 368-373 (Spr-Fall 1980); Danieli, "Countertransference in the „ Treatment and Study of Nazi Holocaust Survivors and Their Children," 5 Victimology 355-367 (Spr-Fall 1980); Ammon, "Symposium on the Psychody-namics of the Holocaust — Psychiatric and Psy-chohistorical Aspects,” 17 Dynamische Psychiatric (1984); Nadler, Kav-Venaki, Gleitman, "Transgenerational Effects of the Holocaust: Externalization of Aggression in Second Generation of Holocaust Survivors," 53 Journal oj Consulting & Clinical Psychology 365-369 (1985); Krell, "Holocaust Survivors and Their Children: Comments on Psychiatric Consequences and Psychiatric' Terminology," 25 Comprehensive Psychiatry 521-528 (1984); Virag, "Children of the Holocaust and Their Children’s Children: Working Through Current Trauma in the Psy-chotherapeutic Process," 2 Dynamic Psychotherapy 47-60 (Spr-Sum 1984); Schmolling, "Human Reactions to the Nazi Concentration Camps: A Summing Up,” 10 Journal of Human Stress 108-120 (Fall, 1984); Roden, "Children of Holocaust Survivors,” 10 Adolescent Psychiatry 66-72 (1982); Steinitz, “Psychological-Social Effects of the Holocaust on Aging Survivors and Their Families," 4 Journal of Gerontological Social Work 145-152 (Spr-Sum, 1982); Ornstein, "The Effects of the Holocaust on Life-Cycle Experiences: The Creation and Recreation of Families,” 14 Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry 135-154 (1981).