OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
PHILIPS, Judge.On original submission the panel reversed appellant’s conviction for forgery because the indictment failed to allege that the check purported to be the act of another. The state has filed a motion for rehearing urging that the “purport” element of the offense is supplied by the attachment to the indictment of a photocopy of the check. According to the state, the “purport” element is satisfied because the maker’s name on the check differs from appellant’s name as alleged in the indictment. The state relies on Jiminez v. State, 552 S.W.2d 469 (Tex.Cr.App.1977).
As we noted in Minix v. State, 579 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Tex.Cr.App.1979, Opinion on State’s Motion for Rehearing), Jiminez upheld a conviction for forgery by making, under V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 32.-21(a)(l)(A)(i).1 In such a case it is the defendant himself who is alleged to have completed the check “so that it purports to be the act of another ...” Section 32.-21(a)(l)(A)(i), supra. For this reason, a difference in the defendant’s name as alleged in the indictment and the maker’s name on the check is equivalent to an allegation that the writing purports (through the maker’s signature) to be the act of another. As stated in Minix, supra, at 468:
. . . the conflict between the allegation that the accused in fact made the instrument and the appearance from the face of the instrument set out haec verba that someone else made it was sufficient to supply the purport element under the haec verba rule, (emphasis supplied)
*907This does not hold true for the offenses of forgery by uttering or forgery by possession, as set forth in Section 32.-21(a)(1)(B) and Section 32.21(a)(1)(C), respectively.2 Under these subsections, a person commits an offense if he utters (or passes, issues, etc.) or possesses with intent to utter a writing that is forged within the meaning of Paragraph A. The defendant need not be the actual forger, i. e., the maker of the check. He need not himself sign the check or alter the maker’s signature. It is sufficient that the defendant utter or possess with intent to utter a check that he knows to have been unlawfully altered, completed, etc., by someone else.
A defendant might be innocent of forgery under Paragraphs B or C if the check is made out by another person in that person’s name. In such a case the check may well purport to be the act of the person who in fact signed the check, rather than the act of another. A difference in the defendant’s name as alleged in the indictment and the maker’s name on the check would not imply that the check purports to be the act of another. Accordingly, the state must go further and negate the possibility that a person other than the defendant made out the check in his own name. It must affirmatively be alleged that the check purports to be the act of another.
In the present case the cheek is made out by Anna M. McFarland. Suppose that appellant’s wife is named Anna M. McFarland. For all we know from the face of the indictment appellant’s wife may have made out the check in her own name. In that case appellant may not be guilty of the offense of forgery.
Because the indictment in this case fails to allege the “purport” element of the offense, it is fundamentally defective.
The state’s motion for rehearing is overruled.
. That subsection provides in pertinent part:
(1) “Forge” means:
(A) to alter, make, complete, execute, or authenticate any writing so that it purports:
(i) to be the act of another who did not authorize that act;
. Under Paragraph B, “forge” means: to issue, transfer, register the transfer of, pass, publish, or otherwise utter a writing that is forged within the meaning of Paragraph (A) of this subdivision; Under Paragraph C, “forge” means: to possess a writing that is forged within the meaning of Paragraph (A) with intent to utter it in a manner specified in Paragraph (B) of this subdivision.