dissenting.
I dissent. The appellant did not get a fair trial because he was not represented by effective counsel.1
There are two versions of the appellant’s role in the events that gave rise to the indictment. The State’s evidence was that an undercover officer went to an apartment to purchase cocaine; he discussed the purchase with Hurtado, who made a number of telephone calls; other people were present in the apartment; someone was preparing food on a grill on the patio; about 20 minutes after the last telephone call, the appellant came to the apartment carrying a plastic bag containing four kilos of cocaine; when the officer gave the signal, the other officers made the bust; a number of the people in the apartment tried to escape, but appellant did not; Clodo-miro, one of the people who tried to escape, grabbed the cocaine; at the time of the bust, there were nine people in the apartment, more than the officer’s making the bust had expected.
The appellant’s version was Hurtado sold food in the apartment, that is why the grill was hot and there were so many people there; the appellant was one of the people at the apartment waiting to eat; the appellant did not bring the cocaine to the apartment; Clodomiro, the man who grabbed it and tried *665to escape, is the one who brought the cocaine to the apartment.
Failure to object to improper and incorrect argument
In point of error one2, the appellant claims the prosecutor’s argument during punishment regarding the application of parole law was fundamental error. In point of error two, the appellant claims he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel because his lawyer did not object to improper and incorrect argument by the prosecutor, among other things.3 The appellant argues that the prosecutor committed two sins in his argument: (1) he circumvented the court’s instruction not to discuss parole; and (2) he made a misstatement of fact and law in his hypothetical explanation of parole law.
During closing arguments of the punishment phase of the trial, the prosecutor argued:
The charge talks about the award of good conduct time to a prisoner who exhibits good behavior and parole. To caution you right now, first off, you can’t guess or estimate anything about good conduct time or parole to this guy. This is for your information, for you to know that whatever the term of years in a case that a defendant gets sentenced to, his time in the penitentiary can be reduced by the award of good conduct time and by parole. They say the formula here as to when he becomes eligible for parole would be when a defendant has his actual time plus his good conduct time added together and they equal one fourth of the sentence. That means if there is a forty-year sentence, one fourth of that is ten years, and let’s say you get three days credit for every one you serve. That’s the good conduct time. That means you can effectively become eligible for parole on a forty-year sentence in about two years. That’s the way this reads.
The State concedes that the prosecutor’s math was wrong, that a person who receives a 40-year sentence cannot be eligible for parole in two years.
On motion for new trial, appellate counsel called as witnesses the prosecutor and George Tyson, an experienced defense lawyer. Appellate counsel asked the prosecutor if in the argument (quoted above) he was trying to tell the panel how the parole law operated. The prosecutor refused to answer the question until the court instructed him to answer. The prosecutor then admitted he made the argument to attempt to communicate to the jury how the parole law works. When the appellate counsel asked the prosecutor why he told the jury that appellant would become eligible for parole in two years, the prosecutor merely answered that he made the argument as a hypothetical.
By his argument, the prosecutor invited the jury to consider the parole law in assessing punishment by informing the jury what effect the parole law might have on a 40-year sentence. Article 37.07, section 4 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure expressly prohibits the jury from considering the manner in which parole law may be applied to a particular defendant. Trial counsel should have objected to the prosecutor’s argument.
By his argument, the prosecutor gave the jury erroneous information about how the parole law would apply to a 40-year sentence. It is error for the State to present a statement of the law that is contrary to that presented in the charge to the jury. Whiting v. State, 797 S.W.2d 45, 48 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). The prosecutor’s miscalculation was intended to, and in all probability, did mislead the jury. Again, trial counsel should have objected.
On this record, we should hold the failure to object to an argument that invites consideration of parole laws, and is a misstatement *666of the application of the parole laws, is as a matter of law ineffective assistance of counsel. The majority’s ruling will encourage prosecutors to misstate the application of the parole law, particularly when a defendant is represented by counsel the prosecutor thinks might not catch the error, often in cases where the trial counsel is appointed.
Failure to object to references to “organized crime”
The appellant contends his counsel was ineffective during the guilt/innocence stage of the trial because he did not object to the police officers stating they were assigned to the Harris County Organized Crime Narcotic’s Task Force. He also contends that counsel should have objected to the prosecutor stating he was assigned to the drug task force and prosecuted “major narcotics cases.”
I agree. In Dexter v. State, 544 S.W.2d 426, 428 (Tex.Crim.App.1976), the prosecutor, in direct contravention of an expressed order of the trial court, attempted to connect the appellant with “organized crime” throughout the course of the trial. The prosecutor placed a file cabinet with an attached sign that said “organized crime” in front of the jury and argued during closing that the defendant was connected to organized crime. Id. at 427. The court held that the conduct of the prosecuting attorney prevented the defendant from receiving a fair and impartial trial. Id. at 428.
The references to organized crime in this case arose when three of the testifying officers were questioned about their employment. Each officer identified which law enforcement agency he was from, and that he was assigned to the Organized Crime Narcotic’s Task Force.
It was not necessary for the officers to state they were part of Organized Crime Narcotic’s Task Force as a preliminary inquiry into them background. The references to the task force were not necessary to assess the credibility of the officers or weight to be given the officers’ testimony. The references to the “organized crime task force” served to connect the appellant with organized crime. Because a connection with organized crime would only prejudice the appellant, I cannot envision any trial strategy that would justify not requesting a motion in limine or objecting to this type of testimony.
Failure to conduct an adequate voir dire
The appellant contends his counsel was ineffective during voir dire because a reasonably competent counsel in a felony case should ask prospective jurors if they: (a) are willing to apply the presumption of innocence and require the State to meet its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt; (b) have ever been the victim of a crime; (c) have any involvement with law enforcement; (d) know the prosecutor or prosecution’s witnesses; and, (e) can consider the minimum punishment. I agree.
The appellant’s counsel asked only 12 questions on voir dire. Of those questions, five related to irrelevant matters. For example, counsel asked whether any person on the panel was prejudiced against a person from the Heights; whether any panel member knew his wife, his son, his daughter; he asked if any members of the panel were “into heavy rock.” Some of his voir dire was simply unintelligible.4 For example:
This is what is called a bifurcated trial. First part will be the facts and the second part will be the punishment. And you really can’t find guilty or punish him right or find him not guilty plus I believe it.
You hear on television of people saying things like let’s hang the guy, give a fair trial and go on. We don’t have that in the United States and we don’t have that in Texas yet.
At the hearing on the motion for new trial, appellate counsel elicited from the prosecutor the admission that he found it difficult to understand the appellant’s trial counsel’s pronunciation of his words.
*667From Tyson, appellate counsel established that a competent defense counsel should question the panel about its perception of the presumption of innocence, whether any member of the panel or relative had been victim of a crime, whether any member or relative worked for a law enforcement agency, whether any member would give more credibility to the testimony of a police officer than to a private citizen, whether any member of the panel would require the appellant to testify, and whether they could assess the minimum sentence option. In Tyson’s opinion, the trial counsel did not conduct a reasonably competent voir dire.
The voir dire process is designed to ensure that an intelligent, alert, disinterested, and impartial jury will perform the duty assigned to it. Salazar v. State, 562 S.W.2d 480, 482 (Tex.Crim.App.1978). We should, therefore, vigorously protect the accused’s right to a fair trial by a jury untainted by bias or prejudice.
Generally, defendant’s counsel is expected to determine if any prospective juror either knew or was related to the prosecutor or any of the State’s witnesses. Miles v. State, 644 S.W.2d 23, 24 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1982, no pet.). Also, counsel should inquire about the willingness of the jurors to apply the presumption of innocence and them willingness to require the State to meet its burden of proof. Id. Merely telling the panel of these provisions of the law without inquiring about the panel giving them full effect does not normally meet expected standards of one who diligently represents his clients. Id.
When the defendant elects for the jury to assess punishment, the critical questions for a prosecution involving delivery of narcotics to an undercover officer concern the relationship between venire persons and law enforcement personnel, a venire person’s inclination to believe the testimony of police officers over that of non-police witnesses, and the venire person’s ability to presume that the defendant is innocent. Brown v. State, 797 S.W.2d 686, 687 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no pet).
I would hold that the appellant was deprived of a fair voir dire.
Incoherent counsel
The appellant contends his counsel was ineffective throughout the trial because his counsel gave incoherent and irrelevant explanations to the venire members on the war on drugs, reasonable doubt, and on the bifurcated trial system. He further asserts that counsel failed to conduct a meaningful cross-examination of any witness.
During the trial, the appellant’s counsel made some confusing statements. During trial, trial counsel made the following objection,
Your honor, I object to anything of number 15 [a photograph of the appellant and other defendants] which is the picture of my client as such as on trial because everything we are doing to other people and yet this man has not been shown to do anything and to introduce any of these felons would be not only — it’s prejudicial to my case in defense of this man. I object to all the pictures.
The Court: You are saying irrelevant to these other people that are there?
Counsel: No, sir. I say prejudicial. That all these people have either gone to trial or pled guilty and that to introduce what they did back in from of this jury to this man is not making a fair trial for this man.
There is no evidence in the record that counsel attempted to obtain substitute counsel or ask for a continuance until such time that he could speak clearly. The disciplinary rules state that a lawyer should withdraw from a case if his physical condition materially impairs the lawyer’s fitness to represent his client. Supreme Court of Texas, State Bar Rules art. 10, § 9 (Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct) Rule 1.15(a)(2) (1989) (located in the pocket part for Volume 3 of the Texas Government Code in title 2, subtitle G app., following § 83.006 of the Government Code). The prosecutor admitted that counsel was difficult to understand; therefore, it was likely that the jury had difficulty understanding counsel. The disciplinary rules recognize that there comes a time when counsel should withdraw because his impairment affects his ability to represent his client. I would hold the trial *668lawyer’s speech impairment contributed to his ineffective assistance as counsel for the appellant.
Counsel’s summation at the punishment stage was inadequate
The appellant contends that counsel’s summation at the punishment phase was inadequate because he continued to argue the appellant’s innocence, did not request leniency, and, he asked the jury to “keep in mind how many kids would have been turned off.” When a claim is made of ineffective assistance of counsel at the punishment phase of a non-capital offense trial, this Court is to judge the effectiveness of counsel by a single standard of reasonably effective assistance of counsel. Ex parte Cruz, 739 S.W.2d 53, 57-58 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). This standard requires a showing of harm due to the ineffective assistance. Stone v. State, 751 S.W.2d 579, 582-83 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd).
The appellant’s trial counsel told the jury, Whether it would be one year or a hundred years, that’s a long time for any man of to make a recovery from. So when you are doing your argument or discussing the punishment, make the punishment something that is practical, please.
The appellant also stated that he disagreed with the legislature’s assessment of 15 years.
Conclusion
Counsel’s conduct during most of the trial was ineffective. Stickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Ex parte Cruz, 739 S.W.2d at 57-58. Counsel’s failure to conduct an adequate voir dire, his failure to request a motion in limine, his failure to object to references to organized crime, his failure to object to the State’s discussion of the parole law, his failure to object to the State’s misstatement of the application of the parole law, compounded by his speech impairment, in light of his total representation, resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel to the appellant. The appellant’s trial counsel’s performance was so deficient that it violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064.
I would sustain point of error two, reverse the judgment of the trial court, and remand for a new trial.
. On appeal, the appellant was represented by appellate counsel different from his trial counsel.
. On point of error one, which complains about the prosecutor’s argument, I agree with the majority that we should overrule it. The error was not fundamental because, if counsel for appellant had objected and asked for an instruction to disregard, it would have cured any jury misconceptions.
. On point of error two, the appellant’s argument that his counsel was ineffective is strengthened by our overruling of point of error one — because the error of the argument was not fundamental, it became all the more important for counsel to object.
. Trial counsel has Bell’s palsy, which produces a temporary facial paralysis, and caused his speech to be impaired. During voir dire he told the jury panel he could not always control his voice or what he says.