concurring.
I agree with the result reached in the opinion of the Court authored by Justice Boyd, and with the rationale for that result, except in one respect. I do not believe the legislature can deprive a court of the power to require a person sentenced to jail for criminal contempt to serve the full sentence, without good time credit, if the court so orders. Thus, I view Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Ann. art. 5118a (Vernon 1971 to 1981 Pamphlet Supp.) as a valid grant of discretionary authority to a sheriff only if it is recognized that the exercise of that authority is inferior to the court’s inherent power in contempt matters. The authority to require full service of a criminal contempt sentence is, in my opinion, a part of the power to punish and, thus, a part of that inherent power. As stated by the Supreme *672Court in Ex parte Barnett, 600 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Tex.1980), “The power to punish a party who fails or refuses to obey a prior order or decree of the court for contempt is an inherent power of the court and is an essential element of judicial independence and authority.” See abo Vondy v. Commissioners Court of Uvalde Cty., 620 S.W.2d 104, 108-10 (Tex.1981).
In this case, the sheriff recognizes that limitation on his power (see footnote 3 in the dissenting opinion) and the record does not reflect an order prohibiting good time credit; therefore, the sheriff could give it. If, however, the court had ordered the sheriff to refrain from giving good time credit to the relator I would hold that the sheriff could not give such credit.