dissenting.
In my view, Article 5118a, Texas Revised Civil Statutes Annotated (Vernon 1971 to 1981 Pamphlet Supp.),1 which authorizes sheriffs to allow credit on the sentences of misdemeanants for their good conduct, does not empower sheriffs to bestow on con-temnors any good conduct credit to apply on jail confinements ordered by the courts for contempt. Consequently, and because relator Sandra Lee Bishop Rogers had served, at the time we authorized her release on bond, only twenty-one of the thirty days’ punitive punishment fixed by the court for her contempt, I respectfully register this dissent to my Brethren’s premature granting of the writ of habeas corpus.
At the outset, I recognize that the Act’s broad language, considered alone, can reasonably convey the idea of its application to all of “the inmates of each county jail;” yet, I do not perceive that the legislature intended the statute to apply to contemnors who are punished by confinement in jail. Such an intent is completely incompatible with the many provisions of the law of contempt, and is negated by both the historical development of the law and intentional expressions in collateral legislative enactments.
Historically, some form of clemency has been provided in this State to encourage rehabilitation and discipline of a prisoner who is serving a sentence imposed as punishment for the commission of a criminal offense prosecuted by indictment or information. See, e.g., Tex.Const. art. IV, § 11; Tex.Code Crim.Pro.Ann. art. 42.12 (Vernon 1979; Vernon Supp.1982) and arts. 43.09 & 43.10 (Vernon Supp.1982); 1955 Tex.Gen. Laws, ch. 461, § 1 at 1182; 1963 Tex.Gen. Laws, ch. 371, § 1 at 943; Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Ann. art. 5118a (Vernon 1971 to 1981 Pamphlet Supp.). The latter enactment, the application of which by the majority to jail confinements for contempt has induced *673this dissent, has been appraised, in conformity to my view, by our supreme court for criminal matters thusly:
It is clear from the history and the wording of the present statute [Article 5118a] that the same is applicable only to misdemeanor “terms of prisoners * * * regardless of whether the judgment of conviction is a fine or jail sentence or a combination of jail sentence and fine.”
State ex rel. Vance v. Clawson, 465 S.W.2d 164, 167-68 (Tex.Cr.App.), cert. denied sub nom. Pruett v. Texas, 404 U.S. 910, 92 S.Ct. 226, 30 L.Ed.2d 182, rehearing denied 404 U.S. 996, 92 S.Ct. 529, 30 L.Ed.2d 548 (1971). And the note addressing good time credit for prisoners in 51 Texas L.Rev. 348, 349 (1973), speaks of the statute as applying to “misdemeanor prisoners in county jails.”
The opinion that the statute is applicable only to misdemeanor terms of prisoners is consistent with the exclusion from its operative effect of confinements for contempt. Logically and traditionally, an act of contempt adjudged to call for punitive redress is necessarily followed by an order of commitment, Ex parte Barnett, 600 S.W.2d 252, 256 (Tex.1980), not by the traditionally prescribed sentence for execution of the punishment assessed in the judgment of conviction for a misdemeanor offense. Tex.Code Crim.Pro.Ann. arts. 42.01 & 42.02 (Vernon Supp.1982). And traditionally, those committed to the county jail for contempt are given the appellation contemnors, or con-temners, not the nomenclature of misde-meanant prisoners or inmates of the county jail, those to whom Article 5118a is specifically made applicable.
Also historically, a court has had the power necessary to preserve order and decorum, to demand respect, and particularly to enforce its mandates and decrees. Ex parte Davis, 171 Tex.Cr.R. 629, 353 S.W.2d 29, 34 (1962). This protective power includes the power to adjudicate and punish for contempt, which is an inherent power of a court and an essential element of judicial independence and authority. Ex parte Gorena, 595 S.W.2d 841, 843 (Tex.1979). In harmony therewith, the statutes of this State neither define contempt of court nor state the circumstances under which the courts exercise jurisdiction over contempt proceedings, Ex parte Norton, 144 Tex. 445, 191 S.W.2d 713, 714 (1946); and, by statute, the legislature has affirmatively approved the protective power of the courts. Tex. Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 1911a, § 1 (Vernon 1965 to 1981 Pamphlet Supp.).2
Consistent therewith, a court’s protective power may be exercised when necessary to safeguard its dignity and authority. Ex parte Davis, supra. In upholding its authority, the court may utilize its power of contempt, purposed on the vindication of the majesty of the law, Ex parte Green, 116 Tex. 515, 295 S.W. 910, 911 (1927), to punish the contemnor for some completed act which affronted the dignity and authority of the court. Ex parte Werblud, 536 S.W.2d 542, 545 (Tex.1976).
Once the court exercises its contempt power by rendering a judgment of contempt, the power to modify that judgment rests with the rendering court, Ex parte Davis, 101 Tex. 607, 111 S.W. 394, 396 (1908), and not within the clemency power granted for relief against a criminal conviction. Ex parte Heptinstall, 118 Tex.Cr.R. 160, 39 S.W.2d 75, 76 (1931). The power to remit the punishment inflicted for contempt was early established as coming within the discretion of the court exercising its contempt power. Taylor v. Goodrich, 25 Tex.Civ.App. 109, 40 S.W. 515, 524 (Tex.Civ.App.—1897, no writ). Indeed, when the legislature has spoken directly to the subject, it has confirmed the discretionary power of the court to modify the jail confinement for contempt. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. *674art. 1911a, § 4 (Vernon 1965 to 1981 Pamphlet Supp.) (providing that a court which has punished a person by confinement for contempt of court for disobedience of a child support order may, in its discretion, modify its assessment of jail confinement to permit, consistent with Tex.Code Crim.Pro.Ann. art. 42.03, § 5 (Vernon Supp. 1982), serving the jail time awarded during off-work hours or on weekends; or, conformable to Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 14.12 (Vernon Supp.1982), suspend its order of commitment and place the contemnor on probation).
Thus, from my viewpoint of the historical precedents and expressed observance of them, it is not logically sound to say that the legislature, in authorizing sheriffs to reward misdemeanant jail prisoners for good conduct with deductions from their sentences, intended that the authorization should extend to confinements of con-temnors. Contempt is a matter sui generis, and to allow sheriffs to remit the definite confinement fixed for it is to sanction interference with the court’s protective power, which heretofore has remained unchallenged, to preserve and uphold the sanctity of its judgments and decrees.3 The dignity and integrity of the courts demand that there should remain inviolate the inherent power to enforce their valid orders and to exact definite penalties from those who deliberately despise such orders.
Accordingly, I would hold that Article 5118a does not apply to the punitive punishments fixed for contemnors. I would order that the relator be remanded to the custody of the sheriff to be held and confined in jail until she has served the thirty days’ commitment ordered by the court as punitive punishment for her deliberate contempt. See Ex parte Young, 103 Tex. 470, 129 S.W. 599, 600 (1910).
. The text of the statute reads: “In order to encourage county jail discipline, a distinction may be made in the terms of prisoners so as to extend to all such as are orderly, industrious and obedient, comforts and privileges according to their deserts; the reward to be bestowed on prisoners for good conduct shall consist of such relaxation of strict county jail rules, and extension of social privileges as may be consistent with proper discipline. Commutation of time for good conduct, industry and obedience may be granted the inmates of each county jail by the sheriff in charge. A deduction in time not to exceed one (1) day for each day of the original sentence actually served may be made from the term or terms of sentences when no charge of misconduct has been sustained against the prisoner. This Act shall be applicable regardless of whether the judgment of conviction is a fine or jail sentence or a combination of jail sentence and fine; provided, however, that such deduction in time shall not exceed one-third ('A) of the original sentence as to fines and court costs assessed in the judgment of conviction. A prisoner under two (2) or more cumulative sentences shall be allowed commutation as if they were all one sentence. For such sustained charge of misconduct in violation of any rule known to the prisoner (including escape or attempt to escape) any part or all of the commutation which shall have accrued under this Act in favor of the prisoner to the date of said misconduct may be forfeited and taken away by the sheriff, provided that the sheriff has complied with discipline proceedings as approved by the Texas Commission on Jail Standards. No other time allowance or credits in addition to the commutation of time for good conduct herein provided for may be deducted from the term or terms of sentences. The sheriff shall keep or cause to be kept a conduct record in card or ledger form and a calendar card on each inmate showing all forfeitures of commutation time and the reasons therefor.”
. By the initial section of this statute, the legislature expressed its approval in these words:
Section 1. A court possesses inherently all powers necessary for the exercise of its jurisdiction and the enforcement of its lawful orders, including authority to issue such writs and orders as may be necessary or proper in aid of its jurisdiction. It has the duty to require the proceedings shall be conducted with dignity and in an orderly and expeditious manner and to so control the proceedings that justice is done. A court, has the power to punish for contempt.
. Interestingly, the Sheriff of Lubbock County makes this statement in his affidavit: “Unless the Court in its order specifically excludes consideration of good time credit, it is my normal procedure to award one-half day credit of good time for each day of calendar time.”