dissenting:
This is an appeal from a sentence to pay a fine of $100.00 and $11.00 costs for violation of a Township Ordinance. Upon motion by the appellee, Township, answer by appellant and after a hearing the court below struck the appeal.
On Saturday, October 26, 1974, Chris Schenk, who also called herself Sister Christine Schenk, appellant herein, was picketing along with others in front of an A. & P. supermarket in the Wynnewood Shopping Center in Lower Merion Township in Montgomery County. In the process, she was using a bull horn. Officer Dudrick came upon the premises, asked her to desist, upon her refusal he issued a citation charging her with violation of an Ordinance of Merion Township, No. 1415, of which Section 4 provided as follows:
“SPORADIC NOISE: No person shall create any sporadic noise which when measured in the 600-1200 cycles per *502second frequency band exceeds a sound pressure level of ■ 57 decibels during daylight hours, or 52 decibels during nighttime hours.”
A hearing was had upon the charge, after which hearing, she was sentenced to pay a fine of $100.00 and $11.00 costs. Except for the captioning of the action in the name of Lower Merion Township v. Chris Schenk, the entire proceedings before the Justice of the Peace were handled in the manner of a criminal proceeding. The appellant took an appeal to the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, following the procedure prescribed by Rule 67 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure governing appeals from summary judgments.
After her appeal was filed, the Township, appellee, filed a motion to strike the appeal for the reason that the appellant had failed to comply with the Pennsylvania Justices of the Peace Rules No. 1002, 1004 and 1005.1
As recently as 1974 in a unanimous opinion in the case of City of Easton v. Marra, 230 Pa.Super. 352, 326 A.2d 637 (1974) we held in unequivocal language that a suit for the recovery of a penalty for the violation of a municipal ordinance is a civil proceeding not a criminal one and that one desiring to appeal from the imposition of such a penalty must do so in accordance with Pennsylvania Justices of the Peace Rules or be subject to having the attempted appeal stricken. In pertinent part we said:
“ ‘an action brought against a defendant for the violation of a municipal ordinance is a suit for the recovery of a penalty due the municipality and is a civil proceeding,’ 188 Pa.Super. at 585, 149 A.2d 681. The action is civil despite the captioning of the case in the name of the Commonwealth, [see Commonwealth v. Ashenfelder, 413 Pa. 517, 198 A.2d 514 (1964)]; despite the fact that the *503penalty imposed is termed a fine [see York v. Baynes, supra]; despite the designation of the offense as a misdemeanor, [see Steelton v. Rashinsky, 33 Dauphin 227 (1930), cited with approval in York v. Baynes, supra]; and despite the institution of an action by warrant, [see Commonwealth v. Ashenfelder, supra]. See also Commonwealth ex rel. Ransom Township v. Mascheska, 429 Pa. 168, 239 A.2d 386 (1968); Philadelphia v. Home Agency, Inc., 4 Cmwlth.Ct. 174, 285 A.2d 196 (1971).”
We further held in that case:
“. . . Since the case was a civil proceeding, appellant was bound to perfect his appeal in accordance with Pennsylvania Justices of the Peace Rules 1004 and 1005. By failing to do so appellant was subject to the sanction of Rule 1006, providing for the striking of appeals upon the praecipe of the appellee.”
The Majority would hold that Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 67 overrules York v. Baynes, 188 Super.Ct. 581, 149 A.2d 681 (1959) which was referred to in Easton v. Marra. The Pa.R.Crim.P. are, as they are specifically designated, rules which govern criminal procedures. In defining the scope of those rules and the construction to be placed on them, Rules 1 and 2 are clearly controlling. Rules 1 and 2 provide in pertinent part as follows:
“RULE 1. SCOPE OF RULES.
(a) These rules shall govern criminal proceedings in all courts including courts not of record.”
“RULE 2. PURPOSE AND CONSTRUCTION.
These rules are intended to provide for the just determination of every criminal proceeding.”
Pa.R.Crim.P. govern criminal proceedings. They do not govern civil proceedings. Easton v. Marra clearly holds that a suit for penalties for violation of a municipal ordinance is a civil proceeding not a criminal proceeding. In such a suit Pa.R.Crim.P. cannot possibly control.2 Part of the reasoning *504behind the Marra decision was to settle the contentions arising over whether the action was a civil one or a criminal one by declaring it to be civil. If the ruling is to be changed it should emanate from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
In the instant case, the Ordinance does not provide for imprisonment.3 Under the holding of Easton v. Marra, the proceeding in the instant case to recover a penalty for violation of Ordinance No. 1415 of Lower Merion Township is a civil action.
In view of the fact that appellant attempted to appeal in accordance with the Rules of Criminal Procedure and did not perfect her appeal in accordance with the Pennsylvania Justices of the Peace Rules the court below acted properly in striking the appeal.4
I would affirm.
JACOBS and PRICE, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.. No notice of appeal was filed with the Prothonotary of the Court of Common Pleas as required by Rule 1002. There was no praecipe to the Prothonotary to enter a Rule upon appellee to file a complaint within twenty days after service or suffer judgment of non pros as required by Rule 1004(B) and there was no proof of service of the Rule as required by Rule 1005(B).
. The Majority also would hold that Pa.R.Crim.P. 67 (which anyway applies to criminal not civil proceedings), although it was in effect at the time of the Marra decision, was not in effect at the time of *504Marra’s violation; therefore Rule 67 was not applicable and Marra is therefore really not applicable to the instant case and that Marra should be overruled. I believe our law is not so unstable as to be brushed aside on such equivocal reasoning.
. The Majority tries to bring the action in the instant case under the umbrella of the criminal rules by claiming that the Act of 1931, June 24, P.L. 1206 Art. XXXIII, § 3304; 1949, May 27, P.L. 1955, § 62; 53 P.S. § 58304 which permits imprisonment for failure to pay a penalty for violation of the ordinance of a First Class Township makes the action a criminal proceeding. The ordinance does not in fact provide for imprisonment and furthermore such an interpretation would be directly contrary to the ruling in Easton v. Marra.
. Appellant has filed no application to reinstate the appeal.