concurring:
This case involves the interpretation of Section 303 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended by Section 6 of the Act of December 5, 1974, P.L. 782, No. 263 (77 P.S. § 481 [1976-1977 Supplement]). The issue raised in the appeal is whether or not the amended section proscribes the joinder of the employer of an injured employee by a third party defendant whom the employee has sued for damages arising out of his injuries.
Because I believe that our function is to determine the intent of the Legislature when its enactments are challenged, even though that intent is inartfully expressed, I concur in the result of the Majority Opinion.
The Section of the Act in question provides basically “. . . the employer . . . shall not be liable to a third party for damages, contributions, or indemnity in any action at law or otherwise . . .” (except in certain cases not relevant to our disposition). The amended Act does not expressly provide that the employer cannot be joined as an additional defendant by an original third party defendant.
The amending Act creates many questions which it ignores, the most obvious of which questions are as follows:
In the event judgment goes against the third party defendant, does he have a right of set-off or recoupment for the amount of compensation paid or to be paid to the injured plaintiff?
*371If he has this right, how is it to be determined?
If the third party defendant does not have this right of set-off, is it the intention of this Act to provide a double recovery for the plaintiff, i. e., first a recovery under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and second, a recovery against the third party tortfeasor?
Does the employer have a right of subrogation against the third party, and if so, how is this to be determined? Since the employer can no longer be joined under the provisions of the Act, not only questions of procedure will arise, but also questions of collateral estoppel. Despite the shortcomings, I believe it is the intention of the Legislature to preclude the joining of the employer by an alleged third party tortfeasor. Hence, I concur in the result of the Majority Opinion.