dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The Texas Constitution imposes on the State the burden of suitably providing for public education. For purposes of implementation, and as an alternative to a unified and centralized system, the Constitution permits the legislature to create districts and allows local taxation for support of the schools within a district. Nowhere, however, does the Constitution permit the creation or adoption of any school system other than one which is efficient and which comports with the requirements of equal rights under the law. The adequacy of a child’s education in a competitive, free-market economic and political system such as ours is relative; it is a function of what other children are getting. A program of instruction available to one child cannot truly be deemed adequate or efficient if other children are afforded a better educational program and are thereby consistently advantaged in the lifelong competition for money, status, and political influence.
I
The trial court’s findings of fact, and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting them, are undisputed. Among the many findings not articulated by the majority are the following:
The wealthiest school district in Texas has over $14,000,000 of property wealth per student, while the poorest district has approximately $20,000 of property wealth per student. The one million students in school districts at the upper range of property wealth have more than two and one-half times as much taxable property wealth to support their schools than do the one million students in the poorer districts. *868The 300,000 students in the lowest-wealth schools have less than three percent of State property wealth to support their education, while the 300,000 students in the highest-wealth schools have over twenty-five percent of State property wealth to support their education.
In the 1985-86 school year, due to great disparities in district property wealth, spending per student varied between districts from $2,112 to $19,333. The 600,000 students in the wealthiest districts had two-thirds more spent on their education than the 600,000 students in the poorest districts.
Because of the wide variations in school district wealth, there are vastly differing burdens imposed upon district taxpayers to support education. In the poorest districts, taxpayers must pay more than twenty cents per one hundred dollars valuation to raise one hundred dollars per student; in the wealthiest districts taxpayers need pay less than two cents per one hundred dollars valuation to raise one hundred dollars per student.
Greater financial support enables wealthy school districts to provide much broader and better educational experiences for their students, including such things as better facilities, more extensive curricula and more co-curricular activities, enhanced support through additional training materials and technology, better libraries and library professionals, additional curriculum- and staff-development specialists and teacher aides, more extensive counseling services, special programs to combat dropouts, parenting programs to involve the family in the student’s educational experience, lower pupil-teacher ratios, and the ability to attract and retain better teachers and administrators.
The educational preparation of over one-third of the State’s population is inadequate. One-third of the school districts do not meet the State’s standards for maximum class size, and the great majority of these are low wealth districts. The great majority of school districts not fully accredited because of inability to meet State standards are low wealth districts.
The Foundation School Program does not guarantee each eligible student a basic instructional program suitable to his or her educational needs, and students in low wealth districts do not have an equal opportunity to obtain instruction under the State’s requirements.
The poorer districts cannot afford to and do not provide as high quality facilities as the wealthier districts, negatively affecting the educational opportunity of children in those districts.
There is a pattern of heavy concentration of families below poverty level in the poorer districts as compared to the wealthier districts, and an even greater concentration of both low-income families and students in the very poorest districts. Furthermore, while in 1980 twenty-one percent of the State’s population was Mexican-American, eighty-four percent of the population in the poorest districts was Mexican-American; and it is significantly more expensive to provide equal educational opportunity to low-income and minority children than to educate higher income and non-minority children.
Forty-five percent of Hispanic ninth grade students drop out of school before graduation, while thirty-four percent of Blacks and twenty-seven percent of Whites do so. Nearly half of Hispanic dropouts complete less than ninth grade when they discontinue schooling, compared to eighteen percent of Black and White dropouts.
The Texas public school finance system continues to have a negative impact on the education of students in low wealth districts in terms of their ability to learn, to master basic skills, to acquire salable skills, and their quality of life.
In the creation and development of school district boundaries, the legislature did not follow any rational or articulated policy. Neither in their creation nor in their perpetuation has an effort been made to equalize the districts’ local tax bases. There is no underlying rationale in the boundaries of many school districts, and many are pure tax havens.
*869II
Texas Const, art. I, § 3 provides:
All free men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services, (emphasis added)
Texas Const, art. I, § 3a provides:
Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin. This amendment is self-operative.
Texas Const, art. VII, § 1 provides:
A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preservation of the liberties and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature of the State to establish and make suitable provisions for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools, (emphasis added)
Texas Const, art. VII, § 3, provides:
One-fourth of the revenue derived from the State occupation taxes and poll tax of one dollar on every inhabitant of the State, between the ages of twenty-one and sixty years, shall be set apart annually for the benefit of the public free schools; and in addition thereto, there shall be levied and collected an annual ad valorem State tax of such an amount not to exceed thirty-five cents on the one hundred ($100.00) dollars valuation, as with the available school fund arising from all other sources, will be sufficient to maintain and support the public schools of this State for a period of not less than six months in each year, and it shall be the duty of the State Board of Education to set aside a sufficient amount of the said tax to provide free text books for the use of children attending the public free schools of this State; provided, however, that should the limit of taxation herein named be insufficient the deficit may be met by appropriation from the general funds of the State and the Legislature may also provide for the formation of school districts] by general law; and all such school districts may embrace parts of two or more counties, and the Legislature shall be authorized to pass laws for the assessment and collection of taxes in all said districts and for the management and control of the public school or schools of such districts, whether such districts are composed of territory wholly within a county or in parts of two or more counties, and the Legislature may authorize an additional ad valorem tax to be levied and collected within all school districts heretofore formed or hereafter formed, for the further maintenance of public free schools, and for the erection and equipment of school buildings therein; provided that a majority of the qualified property taxpaying voters of the district voting at an election to be held for that purpose, shall vote such tax not to exceed in any one year one ($1.00) dollar on the one hundred dollars valuation of the property subject to taxation in such district, but the limitation upon the amount of school district tax herein authorized shall not apply to incorporated cities or towns constituting separate and independent school districts, nor to independent or common school districts created by general or special law. (emphasis added)
The district court held that education is a “fundamental right” necessitating strict judicial scrutiny of the funding scheme under article I, §§ 3 and 3a; that wealth is a “suspect classification” in the school finance context, also necessitating strict scrutiny; that article I, §§ 3 and 3a, demands “fiscal neutrality” in school funding (expenditures per pupil for instruction and facilities in any district may not be a function of wealth other than the wealth of the State as a whole); and that the existing funding scheme is unconstitutionally “inefficient.”
Ill
The legislature is, of course, free to determine the “methods, restrictions, and regulations” necessary to administer public schools “so long as that determination is not so arbitrary as to violate the constitutional rights of Texas’ citizens.” Spring *870Branch I.S.D. v. Stamos, 695 S.W.2d 556, 559 (Tex.1985).
The majority opinion is correct in its observation that the United States Constitution and that of Texas are different, in that the Texas charter addresses a number of normally-legislative matters of a non-fundamental nature, but the opinion fails to observe that none of these matters is perceived, as is education, as “being essential to the preservation of the liberties and rights of the people,” nor are they couched in constitutional language lending itself to such treatment.
A
The majority relies on San Antonio I.S. D. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973) (wherein a five-judge majority of the United States Supreme Court, in construing the federal Constitution, held education not to be a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment) for its conclusion that education is not a fundamental right; and further reasons, based on Rodriguez, that because food and shelter are essential to the exercise of recognized fundamental rights, a right to them must also be fundamental if education is determined to be so under the “nexus” theory. Such reasoning fails to recognize that the Court in Rodriguez was relying on the federal Constitution, which includes no explicit provision for education. The claim before us relies instead on the Texas Constitution, which does include such a provision, explicitly recognizes that education is indispensable to the meaningful exercise of other fundamental liberties and rights, and mandates the legislature to make “suitable” provision for an “efficient” education system.
Furthermore, the fact that a fundamental right may not be enumerated in the Bill of Rights of either our federal or state constitutions is certainly no impediment to its existence. People v. Belous, 71 Cal.2d 954, 80 Cal.Rptr. 354, 458 P.2d 194 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 920, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970). “Certain unarticulated rights are implicit in enumerated guarantees .... [and] fundamental rights, even though not expressly guaranteed, have been recognized ... as indispensable to the enjoyment of rights explicitly defined.” Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 579-80, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 2828-29, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980). Texas Courts have repeatedly protected fundamental interests despite their lack of specific textual bases in our State Constitution. See, e.g., Texas State Emp. Union v. Tex. Dept. of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 746 S.W.2d 203 (Tex.1987) (right to privacy); Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18 (Tex.1985) (parental rights); Waller v. State, 68 S.W.2d 601 (Tex.Civ.App.1934, writ ref’d) (right to pursue an occupation).
Food and shelter are not explicitly provided for in our State Constitution, nor does the State undertake to provide them for all its children. If it did so, a serious question would arise whether the State must do so on a substantially equal basis. But the principle of equal citizenship implicit in article I, §§ 3 and 3a, is not a charter for economic leveling, nor a guarantee that the government will provide the necessities of life. Basic to our tradition of responsible citizenship is, after all, the concept that an individual should provide for himself and his family. It is another matter altogether if the State provides the opportunity and means to acquire these necessities to some, but substantially denies the same means and opportunities to others.
B
The majority opinion acknowledges that “fundamental rights have their genesis in the express and implied protections of personal liberty recognized in federal and state constitutions,” Spring Branch I.S.D. v. Stamos, supra at 559, but concludes that government has no affirmative obligation to ensure all persons the financial resources necessary to exercise such rights or liberties. Here, again, the opinion fails to recognize that our State Constitution explicitly and prominently imposes just such an obligation on State government with regard to education. The State has undertaken to provide an educational sys*871tem, and is mandated to make that provision “suitable” for the support and maintenance of an “efficient” system adequate to preserve other “liberties and rights of the people.” The State has, with few exceptions, made that system compulsory and individuals are not at liberty to avoid it. Tex.Educ.Code Ann. § 21.032 (1987).
As noted by the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.
347 U.S. 483, 493, 74 S.Ct. 686, 691, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954) (emphasis added).
C
The majority opinion correctly notes that this Court, in Hernandez v. Houston 1.S.D., 558 S.W.2d 121 (Tex.Civ.App.1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.), relying on San Antonio 1.S.D. v. Rodriguez, supra, adopted the federal constitutional analysis in determining the existence of a constitutional right to education, but fails again to note that Rodriguez deals only with the federal Constitution. Moreover, Hernandez was decided without separate consideration of the explicit provisions in the Texas Constitution, nor was the question whether education is a fundamental right under the Texas equal rights provision raised in the Hernandez petitioners’ application for writ of error to our Supreme Court. The question was not before the Texas Supreme Court in Hernandez. Furthermore, the Dallas Court of Appeals specifically concluded that “[pjublic education is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Texas constitution,” under article VII, even though “public education is not a right guaranteed to individuals by the United States Constitution,” citing Rodriguez, in Stout v. Grand Prairie I.S.D., 733 S.W.2d 290, 294 (Tex.App.1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
The majority opinion does acknowledge that the precise holding in Hernandez was overruled by the United States Supreme Court in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982), wherein that Court held Texas’ denial of access to free public schools to the children of illegal aliens violated federal constitutional guarantees, even though that Constitution provides no fundamental right to education. The Court reasoned in Plyler that
[pjublic education is not a “right” granted individuals by the [U.S.] Constitution. But neither is it merely some governmental “benefit” indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation. Both the importance of education in maintaining our basic institutions, and the lasting impact of its deprivation on the life of the child, mark the distinction. ... In addition, education provides the basic tools by which individuals might lead economically productive lives to the benefit of us all. In sum, education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society. We cannot ignore the significant social costs borne by our Nation when select groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our social order rests....
******
... The stigma of illiteracy will mark them for the rest of their lives. By denying these children a basic education, we deny them ability to live within the structure of our civic institutions, and foreclose any realistic possibility that they will contribute in even the smallest way to the progress of our Nation. ...
* * * * * *
*872... It is difficult to understand precisely what the State hopes to achieve by promoting the creation and perpetuation of a subclass of illiterates within our boundaries, surely adding to the problems and costs of unemployment, welfare, and crime. It is thus clear that whatever savings might be achieved by denying these children an education, they are wholly insubstantial in light of the costs involved to these children, the State, and the Nation.
If the State is to deny a discrete group of innocent children the free public education that it offers to other children residing within its borders, that denial must be justified by a showing that it furthers some substantial state interest. No such showing was made here.
457 U.S. at 221-23, 230, 102 S.Ct. at 2396-97, 2401 (citations omitted).
IV
The majority opinion again relies on Rodriguez for its conclusion that wealth is not a “suspect classification” for purposes of Texas equal rights analysis, but the majority further fails to note that in so finding the United States Supreme Court observed that the record in Rodriguez did not include the undisputed findings of fact made by the trial court in the case before us today:
Even a cursory examination ... demonstrates that neither of the two distinguishing characteristics of wealth classifications can be found here. First, in support of their charge that the system discriminates against the “poor,” appel-lees have made no effort to demonstrate that it operates to the peculiar disadvantages on any class fairly definable as indigent, or as composed of persons whose incomes are beneath any designated poverty level.... [Tjhere is no basis on the record in this case for assuming that the poorest people — defined by reference to any level of absolute impecu-nity — are concentrated in the poorest districts.
Second, neither appellees nor the District Court addressed the fact that ... lack of personal resources has not occasioned an absolute deprivation of the desired benefit.... Texas asserts that the Minimum Foundation Program provides an “adequate” education for all children in the State.... The State repeatedly asserted in its briefs in this Court that it has fulfilled this desire and that it now assures “every child in every school district an adequate education.” No proof was offered at trial persuasively discrediting or refuting the State’s assertion.
For these two reasons — the absence of any evidence that the financing system discriminates against any definable category of “poor” people or that it results in the absolute deprivation of education— the disadvantaged class is not susceptible of identification in traditional terms.
* sje * * sjc *
... We hardly need add that this Court’s action today is not to be viewed as placing its judicial imprimatur on the status quo. The need is apparent for reform in tax systems which may well have relied too long and too heavily on the local property tax. And certainly innovative thinking as to public education, it methods, and its funding is necessary to assure both a higher level of quality and greater uniformity of opportunity.
411 U.S. at 22-5, 58, 93 S.Ct. at 1290-92, 1309 (emphasis added).
In the case before us, the district court did find that poor people are heavily concentrated in the poorer districts. Poor people in the low wealth districts, which constitute the great majority of school districts in Texas not fully accredited because of inability to meet basic minimum state standards, might well be a “suspect classification” because of their financial inability to provide adequate basic schooling in our compulsory system. The relative powerlessness of these people to alter their situation through political means indicates strongly that they should be considered a suspect class in the education context. Plyler v. Doe, supra 457 U.S. at 220-21, 102 S.Ct. at 2396.
V
The majority opinion concludes that the drafters of the 1876 Constitution, in the *873exercise of “close economy,” did not provide for local taxation for schools, but after a subsequent change in public sentiment the amendment to article VII, § 3 was adopted permitting local financing with the intent to set up a school system retaining a significant degree of local control; presumably authorizing the present finance system, warts and all. I disagree.
The primary rule in interpretation of our State Constitution is to ascertain, if possible, and give effect to the intent of the voters who adopted it and gave it life. Williams v. Castleman, 112 Tex. 193, 247 S.W. 263, 265 (1922). Smissen v. State, 71 Tex. 222, 9 S.W. 112, 116 (1888).
For as the constitution does not derive its force from the convention which framed, but from the people who ratified it, the intent to be arrived at is that of the people, and it is not to be supposed that they have looked for any dark or abstruse meaning in the words employed, but rather that they have accepted them in the sense most obvious to the common understanding, and ratified the instrument in the belief that was the sense designed to be conveyed.
1 T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 143 (8th ed. 1927) (emphasis added); see also C. Antieau, Constitutional Construction § 3.01 (1982).
In determining original intent, we look first to the literal text of the provision in question and attempt to determine how it would have been understood by a voter of ordinary intelligence at the time .of its adoption. Cramer v. Sheppard, 140 Tex. 271, 167 S.W.2d 147, 152 (1943). Where the terms of the provision are clear, that which the words declare is the meaning of the provision, unless such a literal interpretation would lead to a result not intended by the voters. See 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law § 23 at 82 (1984); C. Antineau, supra, § 2.04; H. Black, Construction and Interpretation of the Laws 15 (1896). When determining whether a certain interpretation should be given the language of a provision, it is proper to consider whether the voters who adopted it would have intended the consequences which must follow such interpretation. Koy v. Schneider, 110 Tex. 369, 218 S.W. 479, 481 (1920). If the text is ambiguous, we try first to ascertain its meaning by examining other parts of the Constitution. Cox v. Robison, 105 Tex. 426, 150 S.W. 1149, 1151 (1912).
Constitutional provisions must be interpreted in a manner to give effect to every phrase of the document; no provision ordinarily duplicates another, and provisions should not be interpreted so as to be rendered meaningless. In the Interest of McLean, 725 S.W.2d 696 (Tex.1987); Hanson v. Jordan, 145 Tex. 320, 198 S.W.2d 262, 263 (1946).
One part may qualify another so as to restrict its operation, or apply it otherwise than the natural construction would require if it stood by itself; but one part is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction the two can be made to stand together.
1 T. Cooley, supra at 127-129. In other words, all parts of the Constitution must be interpreted, if possible, so that they are in harmony. Clapp v. State, 639 S.W.2d 949, 951 (Tex.Cr.App.1982).
If, after examining the entire document, we are still unsure of the meaning of a particular provision, then we may consider, with hesitation and circumspection, such extraneous factors as the social and political conditions existing at the time of adoption, the apparent evil to be remedied or purpose to be achieved, and (as a last resort) the statements of the drafters. Mumme v. Marrs, 120 Tex. 383, 40 S.W.2d 31, 35 (1931); 1 T. Cooley, supra at 141-142, 171; 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law § 30 (1984). If a constitutional provision is finally open to more than one interpretation, it must be interpreted equitably so as not to lead to absurdity or unjust discrimination. Cramer v. Sheppard, supra, 167 S.W.2d at 155; Sargeant v. Sargeant, 118 Tex. 343, 15 S.W.2d 589 (1929).
A
By its literal terms, article VII, § 3, as amended in 1883 and subsequently, permits the legislature to establish a dual system of State and local funding involving dis*874tricts in rural and urban areas with potentially different tax rates. But nowhere does the provision explicitly repeal the equal rights provision with respect to school finance, and an implied repeal of an earlier provision — especially a provision of the Bill of Rights — is not to be inferred lightly. Collingsworth County v. Allred, 120 Tex. 473, 40 S.W.2d 13, 15 (1931) and 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law §§ 29, 40 (1984).
Would the voters who amended article VII, § 3 have interpreted their action as an implicit repeal of the equal rights provision with respect to school finance, so as to allow the highly inequitable system existing today? The answer must be “no.”
B
In the late nineteenth century, our State’s “population and property wealth were spread relatively evenly across the state.” Rodriguez, supra, 411 U.S. at 7-8, 93 S.Ct. at 1282-83. There were no great urban areas as there are today and no great concentrations of property wealth. See E. Cubberley, School Funds and Their Apportionment 21 (1906). In 1880, Texas was a land of small towns (only five with over 10,000 people and none with over 22,-000 people) and sparsely settled rural areas. See U.S.Dept. of the Interior, Compendium of the Tenth Census (June 19, 1880).
Beginning in 1883, when land was the primary source of wealth, the state granted progressively greater powers of property taxation to local districts to fund education. In an agriculture-centered society, perhaps property accurately measured the ability of local school districts to finance education. Rapid industrialization and a growing economy, however, delineated urban and rural communities, and created new categories and concentrations of property wealth. The cost of education forced property-poor districts to tax their property at higher rates than property-rich districts to raise the minimum legislated revenues. Poor districts struggled to meet minimum financial requirements; wealthier districts supplemented the minimum costs with comparatively little effort by raising tax rates slightly.
Note: Texas School Finance: The Incompatability of Property Taxation and Quality Education, 56 Texas L.Rev. 253, 254 (1978).
The voters of that period had no cause to believe that article VII, § 3, while permitting cities and towns to constitute separate school districts, authorized the great disparities existing today in the property wealth and abilities of the districts to raise money per pupil. Furthermore, although the 1883 version of article VII, § 3 limited the tax rate allowed by rural school districts, that limitation was removed by amendment in 1920. See G. Braden (ed.), The Constitution of the State of Texas; An Annotated and Comparative Analysis 513 (1977). By 1883, “[education was no longer regarded as a public or private charity but as a necessary function of government and the natural right of every child.” F. Eby, The Development of Education in Texas, at 195-6 (1925) (emphasis added). The people’s intent remained the same, but local economic circumstances changed.
C
Article VII, § 3 and article I, §§ 3 and 3a can be harmonized and interpreted equitably. See Clapp v. State, supra, 639 S.W.2d at 951, and Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal.3d 728, 135 Cal.Rptr. 345, 557 P.2d 929, 956 (1977) {Serrano II). Read fairly and in the proper historical perspective, article VII, § 3 and article I, §§ 3 and 3a — in conjunction — do not permit disparities between school districts to be substantial unless the State can show a compelling reason for such disparity. Here, the State has shown no compelling reason. If there are to be school districts, and if the legislature chooses to allow educational ad valorem taxes to be levied within those districts, the system must be designed to ensure that all such districts have approximately equal abilities to raise and spend revenue on a per pupil basis for support and maintenance of efficient instruction and facilities. The Texas Supreme Court, well before the *875development of the “fundamental rights” doctrine or the “suspect classification” analysis, recognized the requirement of equal protection in education — that “all” must be “treated alike” — but permitted disparity, at that time, under the “rational basis” test, which is inapplicable here. Mumme v. Marrs, supra, 40 S.W.2d at 36-7.
D
The majority opinion implies, by its reasoning, that the Texas Constitution places no limit whatsoever on the power of the legislature to establish school district boundaries. Such reasoning dangerously erodes that most precious of political rights — the right to be treated with respect and equality by the government, the right to full and participating citizenship in the state. Article I, §§ 3 and 3a, forbids legislation that degrades or stigmatizes through the use of “suspect classifications,” or that seriously impairs individual interests— whether explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or not — that are so critical to full participation in society as to be deemed “fundamental,” unless the state can show such legislation is absolutely necessary to attain a compelling State interest. Spring Branch I.S.D. v. Stamos, 695 S.W.2d at 559. Education is critical to an individual’s participation in today’s society; as a constitutional right it is hollow if its possessor is deprived of the opportunity to pursue it on a relatively equal basis with others in our open political system and labor market. The present disparities in the school financing scheme are not necessary to the survival of local control. Local control can be maintained as easily in an equitable system as in the present system. See Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359, 375-6 (1977).
VI
Finally, the majority opinion concludes that, while article VII, § 1 requires that the school system provided be “efficient,” it provides no guidance for this Court to arrive at a determination of what is efficient or inefficient. Clearly, it is within the discretion of the legislature, in the exercise of its constitutional duty, to determine what is a “suitable” provision for an “efficient” school system; but it can hardly be argued that a “patched-up and overly cobbled” compulsory system, which denies fully one-third of its students of a substantially equal educational opportunity to attain even the basic minimum required standards it imposes, is “efficient.” What may be “suitable” is a proper subject for legislative political debate and decision; but the system resulting from that process must be “efficient” enough to preserve protected constitutional rights in accordance with necessary, discernible and manageable legal standards. Mumme v. Marrs, supra, 40 S.W.2d at 36-37.
The legislative determination of methods, restrictions, and regulations is final, except when so arbitrary as to be violative of the constitutional rights of the citizen. ...
* * * ‡ # $
... Equal protection of laws is secured if the statutes do not subject the individual to arbitrary exercise of the powers of government. It is well settled that legislation is not open to objection if all who are brought under its influence are treated alike in the same circumstances....
⅜ * * * * *
That ... appropriations have a real relationship to the subject of equalizing educational opportunities in the state, and tend to make our system more efficient, there can be no doubt.
Id. (emphasis added).
Upholding the trial court’s judgment would not frustrate or embarrass the nonlegal policymaking function of the legislature. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962); and Note, Judicial Control of the Purse-School Finance Litigation in State Courts, 28 Wayne L.Rev. 1393, 1410-15 (1982).
With regard to the matters discussed, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.