(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent and as my dissenting opinion adopt the reasoning summarized in an opinion written in Division II by Eager, Special Commissioner, as follows:
The original statute taxed sales of tangible personal property for use or consumption by the purchaser. In the Berry-Kofron case, referred to in the majority opinion, the court held that a dentist purchasing a denture from a laboratory does not use or consume the denture in his practice when he places it in his patient’s mouth in the course of his professional services; that the patient is the one who uses it by applying it to the purposes for which it was intended. The same is true of crowns and bridges. The 1947 amendment provides that the pur*13chase of tangible personal property by dentists and physicians which is “used in the practice of their professions” is deemed to be a purchase for use and consumption. Thus, the requirement of “use” in the practice is preserved in the amendment. And the key element here is just that: is the crown or bridge “used” by the dentist in his practice? Berry-Kofron says it is not. The legislature may perhaps have intended to negate the effect of Berry-Kofron, as respondent says, but, if so, it did not choose appropriate language. We must be guided by the language which it did use. And, in fact, we must assume, perhaps more theoretically than realistically, that the legislature was cognizant of the meaning of the language as construed in the Berry-Kofron case. In any event, “used in the practice” means what this court has previously held that it means, absent some contrary provision in the statute, or absent our overruling Berry-Kofron. I would not overrule that case, and note that the majority opinion does not.
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment and remand the case with directions that the circuit court enter judgment reversing the decision of the Director of Revenue with directions to him to abate his assessment of sales tax against appellant.