On Motion for Rehearing
Plaintiffs’ counsel has now presented us with a lengthy motion for rehearing where*462in he includes eleven assignments of error. Such is the duty of an attorney at the bar; but, counsel has also included in this same instrument statements which coincide with those mentioned in Rust v. Rust, 88 S.W.2d 787, 794 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1935), modified, 131 Tex. 532, 117 S.W.2d 59 (1938). In so doing, it is apparent that counsel has failed to heed the admonitions of Honorable Garland F. Smith of the Wes-laco Bar as found in Appellate Procedure in Texas, § 19.10 (State Bar of Texas, 1964).
We say, as was said in City of San Antonio v. Santa Rosa Infirmary, 249 S.W. 498, 510 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1923), reversed on other grounds, 259 S.W. 926 (Tex.Com.App.1924, jdgmt. adopted):
“This court is not supersensitive, and gentlemen of the bar know that we invite their vigorous argument and forceful criticism, so long as such arguments and criticisms are respectful in language and intent. We ask no more than this; but all of it will be required.
“However, out of consideration for the rights of appellees, who, of course, are not responsible for the conduct of their counsel, we have concluded not to strike the objectionable documents from the files of the court, as first intended.”
Notwithstanding counsel’s approach to the questions presented, we have again reviewed the voluminous record and again will place a few of his present complaints against the record; and, having done so, the motion for rehearing is overruled for the reasons now to be stated.
Counsel cites to us the opinion in Dorfman Development Co. v. American Commonwealth Development Co., 523 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ), stating:
“It is undisputed that this is a suit to cancel a Deed of Trust Lien. A suit to cancel a Deed of Trust Lien is one to remove an encumbrance within the mandatory application of subdivision 14.”
A text was relied upon in Dorfman and it is clear that in order to maintain venue under the subdivision, the moving party (plaintiff) must be an owner. Dorfman, being a limited partner had standing to maintain the suit. Plaintiffs below, in the case at bar, were not owners.
Next, citing five no-writ cases holding that suits to cancel liens securing usurious notes may be maintained under subdivision 14, counsel contends that we erred in failing to retain venue in the county of suit. Again, he assumes his major premise; but, in our case, the plaintiffs have never owned the land; they were neither owners nor mortgagors; they were not parties to the liens; they were not authorized to maintain the suit to set aside the liens.
Counsel argues at considerable length what he conceives to be the holding in Universal Metals & Machinery, Inc. v. Bohart, 539 S.W.2d 874 (1976) concluding that our “contrary reasoning ... is grotesquely fallacious.”
We did, at least, submit two late cases supporting our views, neither of which is even mentioned by plaintiffs’ counsel. One of the cases which we cited, Micrea, Inc. v. Eureka Life Ins. Co. of Amer., 534 S.W.2d 348 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.), was interesting in that plaintiffs’ present counsel is shown to be the only attorney for the losing party, Micrea, Inc. His failure to mention this decision, under the circumstances, may be understandable, but is inexcusable. Although not of counsel in Hartnett v. Adams & Holmes Mortgage Co., Inc., 539 S.W.2d 181 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1976, no writ), plaintiffs’ counsel in this ease again fails to mention the decision which is squarely in point in the case at the bar.
Counsel takes us to task for having noted that the plaintiffs testified that they each had only one meeting with any representative of Ryan and that was in the Warwick Hotel in Houston. We have checked the record and find that our statement so made was true.
Plaintiff Lehmann testified:
“Q. You met with Mr. Thorne [Ryan’s representative] one time, is that right?
*463“A. Right.
“Q. And I believe you all had dinner in the Warwick Hotel in Houston?
“A. Right.”
Plaintiff Monroe, mentioning his conversation with Thorne at the Warwick Hotel meeting attended by Lehmann, did not testify as to any meetings with or representations made to him by any representative of Ryan in Montgomery County. Instead, the testimony upon which plaintiffs’ counsel relies is that of the erstwhile president of Berton Land — not from either of the plaintiffs in this case.
Neither of our plaintiffs was interrogated as to whether he relied upon representations made to other people in Montgomery County and communicated by these people to the plaintiffs.
Finding no merit in any of the contentions advanced in the motion for rehearing, it is overruled.
STEPHENSON, J., not participating.