ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Appellants complain that in our opinion we did not mention Hunt’s testimony that: (1) although he did not deny telling Dave Hall that he was going to remove certain fixtures from the building at four o’clock that afternoon, he was merely jesting; (2) that although he was not served with a restraining order until the next day, he made no effort to remove anything the day of the conversation; and (3) that he had no intention to move anything from the premises; or Dave Hall’s testimony to the effect that if Hunt had tried to move out the people on the dock woud have called him, Hall, and he would ask him not to move it.
We did not mention this testimony as we did not think it in any way controlled the decision. The trial judge heard all of this testimony and was in much better position than we are to determine whether Hunt was jesting when he threatened to move his fixtures, and whether or not he really intended to do so, and whether the fact that he did not do so on the day he said he would was sufficient to nullify the effect of the threat to do so; also whether the telephone call from “the people on the dock” to the building manager would have so effectively prevented the removal of the property from the building as to make the temporary injunction unnecessary or the granting thereof wrongful. We cannot say that any of those things point to an abuse of discretion by the trial judge.
Appellants also say that our opinion is in conflict with Kostoff v. Harris, Tex.Civ.App., 266 S.W.2d 204, wr. ref. n. r. e., wherein we reversed an order granting a temporary injunction because the plaintiff had failed to show that an injurious wrong, irreparable in nature, was imminently threatened. We do not consider the two opinions to be in conflict. In Kostoff the parties had had a personal encounter and the plaintiff obtained a temporary injunction restraining the defendant from further molesting him on a petition alleging that the defendant was threatening to give trouble, etc. However, the plaintiff admitted on the witness stand that no sueh threat had occurred. The difference between the two cases is readily seen.
Accompanying appellants’ motion for rehearing is a motion for additional findings which consists of a group of interrogatories propounded to us. We feel that we have made a complete statement of the facts of the case. Rule 455, T.R.C.P. does not require us to detail the evidence supporting our findings, or evidence which may conflict therewith, which is what the motion urges us to do. Thaxton v. Reed, Tex.Civ.App., 339 S.W.2d 241, wr. ref. n. r. e.
The motions for rehearing and for additional findings of fact are both overruled.
Overruled.