On Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing.
Invoking Rule 455, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, appellants move for supplementary findings; outlining seriatim the matters upon which such conclusions, both of fact and of law, are desired. The request is denied, because: (1) same tends to conflict with conclusions already made in original opinion or relates to matters which are claimed to be reflected in undisputed testimony and available to appellants on any petition for writ of error without fact findings or conclusions by the appellate court, in this, a jury trial.
More particularly, request No. 5 calls upon this Court to decide “that the jury found that defendant City failed to remove an obstruction from its sewer line within a reasonable time after notice” when such an issue was not submitted to the jury. And as appellee points out, appellants now request us to define the word “timely” “when *875the trial court was not requested to define the term., nor did the trial court deem it necessary; and for the further reason that the jury did not have the benefit of such a definition.”
In points one and two of the motion appellants call attention to inaccuracies of opinion which it is our duty to correct: (1) that appellants did not request submission of issues five, six and seven as stated therein; and (2) a statement purporting to have been made in jury argument by counsel for appellee in connection with an affirmative answer to issue five is withdrawn as dehors the record. Such is of no consequence however as counsel for appellants admit in motion for rehearing that “there was no question in this case but that the obstruction was not removed until after the damage had occurred in plaintiffs’ home. That was admitted, conceded and recognized by everyone.”
Further argued is inapplicability of Little Rock Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Dunn, supra, as to the rule there discussed relative to “proper lookout” ; in short, that the word “timely” in issue five can have no other significance than defendant’s failure to remove the obstruction within a reasonable time after notice; constituting negligence and in irreconcilable conflict with issue six. But as appellee further points out, the jury is entitled to give a word not defined by the court any reasonable interpretation ; and that the term “timely removed” could have been properly used by them as meaning in time to prevent damage, with no resulting conflict in the two issues.
Appellants argue with great force that the negative answer to issue six has not a scintilla of evidence in support; or at least that the jury verdict is against the great weight and preponderance thereof. Some difficulty has attended an appraisal of the record in this regard, having in view our duty as outlined in Re King’s Estate, Supreme Court, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660. Sufficient answer to appellants’ argument of no evidence and insufficiency there-
of may be found in Appellee’s Reply to Motion for Rehearing, viz.: “Appellee’s contention is, and the jury so found, that the Police Department was not negligent in its failure to immediately relay the notice of plaintiffs’ difficulties to the Sanitation Department because of its pressing obligations in an emergency situation. There is ample evidence in the record to show the existence of emergency conditions in the Police Department.” In this connection see Le Master v. Fort Worth Transit Company, 138 Tex. 512, 160 S.W.2d 224 (Syl. 5) (emphasis ours) that “in trial before a jury, the decision of conflicts in the evidence is for the jury, and even if evidence is not conflicting, if reasonable minds might differ as to the effect, a fact issue for the jury is presented.”
The motion for rehearing is overruled.
On Appellants’ Motion for Rehearing.