dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I do not believe that Killian v. J & J Installers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 158 (Mo. banc 1991), supports the trial court’s action. The allegations here establish that this is not a claim exclusively within the Workers’ Compensation Law. Cf. Hollrah v. Freidrich, 634 S.W.2d 221 (Mo.App.1982).
A “narrow exception” to the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law is “one that imposes common law tort liability on an employer for intentionally inflicting injury on an employee.” McCoy v. Liberty Foundry Co., 635 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Mo.App.1982). See Generally Annotation, What conduct is willful, intentional, or deliberate within workmen’s compensation act provision authorizing tort action for such conduct, 96 A.L.R.3d 1064 (1980).
Federal and state courts have recognized that sexual harassment is not covered by workers’ compensation law. See for example, Pryor v. United States Gypsum Co., 585 F.Supp. 311 (W.D.Mo.1984); Pursell v. Pizza Inn Inc., 786 P.2d 716 (Okla.App.1990). See also Annotation, Workers’ Compensation: Sexual assaults as compensable, 52 A.L.R.4th 731, 742 (1987). The circuit court as a court of general jurisdiction has jurisdiction over such actions. See Schneider v. Union Electric Co., 805 S.W.2d 222, 224-226 (Mo.App.1991).
I would reverse and remand the matter for further proceedings in the trial court.