concurring in part and dissenting in part:
The majority opinion comes to the conclusion that “the proposed cross-examination was prejudicial, [and] also ... it was totally devoid of probative value.” Yet, appellant’s only “mistake” was that he sought to cross-examine the government witness on a subject testified to by her on direct examination. This is because, says the majority, it was precluded by our decision in McLean v. United States, 377 A.2d 74 (D.C.1977).
But McLean simply held that the trial judge there had properly excluded testimony that the complaining witness had engaged in sexual relations with others on prior occasions and, also, excluded testimony that she had a reputation for unchastity. This court stated that the prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value. Id. at 79. The court went on to say that the credibility of the complaining witness should revolve around evidence relating to whether the complainant consented to the act and not on evidence of her prior sexual relations. Id.
This is all well and good, but it is not to say that McLean prevails over the right to cross-examine a witness on what she has volunteered on direct-examination about her sexual life. It is almost too obvious to mention that — where consent is the issue (as here) — if the complaining witness offers on direct examination, among other things, *1257that she is a lesbian, this may seriously impair a defense of consent to the charged rape.1
Furthermore, in a criminal case one should be given adequate scope on cross-examination to avail oneself of the elementary right of confrontation. Naturally, the trial judge is vested with discretion to limit reasonably the cross-examination. But this is not to say that the trial court should be supported where, as here, it is begrudging about the right to cross-examine. It is the most fundamental right a criminal defendant has — the right to confront the accuser. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of allowance of the cross-examination. It is no place to be hyper-technical.
While I would find error, I believe that on this particular record — where there was considerable disinterested testimony on the rape — the constitutional error does not require reversal here, under the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt test. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986).2
. The majority opinion states:
On direct examination Smith testified that she had no present romantic interest in men, that her sexual preference was for women, and that on May 17, 1983, she was not involved romantically with any men. She stated that she and a woman were living together at an address in Southeast Washington and that they were lovers. She also said that appellant knew she was gay and that she made no attempt to hide her preference for women from people in her neighborhood. She acknowledged that she had had a romantic interest in men in grade school and junior high school. (Emphasis added.)
While the majority in its discussion draws certain refinements, e.g., n. 2 and n. 5 of majority opinion, the fact remains that the majority s recitation of the record situation on its face establishes a clear right to cross-examine on the subject matter.
. I also disagree with the majority on the exclusion of the proffered Metropolitan Police Department Medical Examination Form (PD-124). It is essential only that the offering witness (the officer) be able to identify the record as authentic and made and preserved in the regular course of police business. It seems unwarranted to exclude this police form containing the results of the complainant’s medical examination after the incident.