Concurring opinion by
KRAUSE R, J.I reluctantly concur. I concur because I believe that the conclusion reached by the majority is consistent with current *471case law. I do so reluctantly because I believe that the rule applied by the majority to reach that conclusion should be reconsidered. I am referring of course to the rule that when the State rescinds or otherwise terminates a plea agreement, for any reason, any inculpatory statement procured by that agreement is inadmissible. In fact, I write this concurrence in the hope that the Court of Appeals will revisit this rule and discard or at least substantially modify it.
The majority opinion begins with a discussion of Maryland’s rule that a confession induced by a promise is inadmissible. This rule of exclusion is one of the most restrictive to be found in any jurisdiction. Stokes v. State, 289 Md. 155, 160, 423 A.2d 552 (1980).1 It excludes any inculpatory statement secured by a promise of a benefit, regardless of whether the promise was empty or meaningful, vague or unambiguous, misleading or straight forward, or proffered in good faith or bad. It is, to borrow a phrase from Wigmore, an “extravagant policy of exclusion.” 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 837, at 475 n. 1 (Chadbourn rev.1970).
This rule, however, is deeply rooted in Maryland law. It was first articulated one hundred and thirty years ago in Nicholson v. State, 38 Md. 140 (1873),2 and has been consistently re-affirmed. Winder v. State, 362 Md. 275, 309, 765 A.2d 97 (2001); Pappaconstantinou v. State, 352 Md. 167, 174, 721 A.2d 241 (1998); Birkenfeld v. State, 104 Md. 253, 256, 65 A. 1 (1906); Holmes v. State, 67 Md.App. 244, 249, 507 A.2d 197 (1986). At the time that the Nicholson rule was promulgated, it was a reflection of a growing consensus, among *472state3 and federal4 courts, that promises, which induce a confession, compromise the voluntariness of that confession.
Indeed, eleven years later, in Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884), the Supreme Court held that a confession induced by a promise was involuntary. And thirteen years after that, it constitutionalized this principle in Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897). There, it declared that the admission of a confession induced by “any direct or implied promises, however slight,” violated the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 542-43, 18 S.Ct. 183. But this of course occurred at a time when an accused had few protections during an interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), was sixty-nine years away and the right to counsel did not attach to interrogation sessions and, in any event, could only be exercised by those who could afford one.5
Moreover, in the years that followed Bram, the Court displayed an unusual reluctance to apply this principle. In Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 186, 73 S.Ct. 1077, 97 L.Ed. 1522 (1953), for example, the Court upheld a confession resulting from an agreement struck by Stein and the police. And in two other cases, Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 83 S.Ct. 917, 9 L.Ed.2d 922 (1963), and Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 74 S.Ct. 716, 98 L.Ed. 948 (1954), it conspicuously avoided the opportunity to reaffirm the principle that promise-induced *473confessions were per se inadmissible. In both cases, it held that a confession induced by substantial threats of harm and significant promises of leniency was inadmissible. But, in both instances, it declined to point out that, under Bram, either the promises or the threats would have provided a basis for its ruling.
In the meantime, state courts, chafing under the constraints of this rule, found ways around it. Some required, before they would exclude a statement, that the promise be specific and direct, State v. Brown, 217 Kan. 595, 538 P.2d 631, 637 (1975); Hernandez v. State, 952 S.W.2d 59, 67 (Tex.App.1997), or that it only affect a collateral matter, State v. Hardee, 83 N.C. 619, 623-24 (1880); State v. Tatro, 50 Vt. 483, 490 (1878), or that it be one that was likely to induce a false confession, Fisher v. State, 379 S.W.2d 900, 903 (Tex.Crim.App.1964); Hardee, 83 N.C. at 623-24; Tatro, 50 Vt. at 490, or that it be shown that it overbore the will of the accused. Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598, 608 (3d Cir.1986). Others simply limited the very definition of a promise. See Brown v. State, 545 So.2d 106, 112 (Ala.Crim.App.1988); Moore v. State, 493 So.2d 1301, 1303 (Miss.1986).
Ultimately, the Supreme Court formally abandoned the Bram rule in Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991). In the post -Miranda world of 1991, the Fulminante Court rejected the notion that all promises that induce an inculpatory statement render that statement inadmissible and held that a promise was just one factor to be considered, among many, in a “totality of the circumstances” analysis of a statement’s voluntariness. Id. But even before this occurred, a new consensus among federal and state courts was emerging; that consensus favored a totality of the circumstances test. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 516-17, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 10 L.Ed.2d 513 (1963); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 561, 74 S.Ct. 716, 98 L.Ed. 948 (1954); Ashdown v. Utah, 357 U.S. 426, 430-31, 78 S.Ct. 1354, 2 L.Ed.2d 1443 (1958); People v. Mounts, 784 P.2d 792, 797 (Colo.1990); People v. Wright, 127 Ill.App.3d 747, 82 Ill.Dec. 817, 469 N.E.2d 351, 354 (1984); Drew v. State, 503 N.E.2d *474613, 617 (Ind.1987); State v. Wilson, 719 S.W.2d 28, 32 (Mo.App.1986); People v. Montez, 167 A.D.2d 356, 561 N.Y.S.2d 494, 496 (NY.App.Div.1990); Pontow v. State, 58 Wis.2d 135, 205 N.W.2d 775, 778 (1973).
The Nicholson rule, however, still prevails in Maryland, notwithstanding the protections now afforded an accused and the incongruities engendered by its application. For example, Maryland law holds that a statement obtained by trickery and deception is not necessarily involuntary, Winder, 362 Md. at 305, 765 A.2d 97; Ball v. State, 347 Md. 156, 178, 699 A.2d 1170 (1997); Kier v. State, 213 Md. 556, 562, 132 A.2d 494 (1957), while a statement obtained by a good-faith promise is. To put a finer point on it, Maryland law presently excludes, as involuntary, a statement made in exchange for a desired benefit while it admits, as voluntary, a statement obtained by trickery for which the accused receives no benefit at all.
No distinction is made in Maryland between proper and improper promises. A bona fide promise to assist a suspect in return for his or her assistance in investigating or prosecuting a crime is treated the same as an empty, misleading, or deceptive promise. All promises are suspect, no matter what benefits they bestow or how earnestly they are sought by the accused. This is unfortunate for the State, the accused, and the administration of justice. It discourages police from offering a benefit and prevents the defendant from receiving one. It needlessly hampers investigation and ultimately suppresses evidence critical to any decision judge or jury must make as to guilt or innocence.
Both the untrustworthiness and the involuntariness of such statements have been cited as justification for this rule. Winder v. State, 362 Md. 275, 306, 765 A.2d 97 (2001); Ball, 347 Md. at 175, 699 A.2d 1170; Reynolds v. State, 327 Md. 494, 505, 610 A.2d 782 (1992); Hoey v. State, 311 Md. 473, 483, 536 A.2d 622 (1988); Wright v. State, 307 Md. 552, 580, 515 A.2d 1157 (1986); Hillard v. State, 286 Md. 145, 151, 406 A.2d 415 (1979). There is of course an important distinction between *475the two rationales. A statement can be involuntary but trustworthy or, obversely, untrustworthy but voluntary.
The more compelling rationale, I believe, is the potential untrustworthiness of a promise-induced confession, particularly when promises are really threats. See, e.g., Winder, 362 Md. at 294, 765 A.2d 97(where the police promised to protect the defendant from angry citizens if he cooperated, implying that they would otherwise not), or when the promises are combined with threats. See, e.g., Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 287-88, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302; Ball, 347 Md. at 174, 699 A.2d 1170. But it is difficult to conceive how, standing alone, a good faith promise to bestow a desired benefit that induces a suspect to cooperate with police is necessarily involuntary. “Induce” is a morally neutral word; it does not imply either wrongdoing or deception. To persuade someone to do something, by offering an inducement, does not necessarily affect the voluntariness of what is done. In contract law, we call the inducement—“consideration.” It is the basis of contracts, and it does not render a contract involuntary— but, in fact, enforceable.
With the adoption of Maryland Rule 4-243,6 Maryland drew a bright line between stationhouse promises and plea agree*476ments, permitting confessions secured by the latter to be admitted into evidence. Unfortunately, the “plea agreement” exception to Maryland’s rule excluding all promise-induced confessions has its own broad exception. Statements made pursuant to such a plea agreement are inadmissible if, for any reason, the State rescinds the agreement. Allgood v. State, 309 Md. 58, 522 A.2d 917 (1987). That rule applies even where the State rescinds the agreement because the defendant has breached it. The “rescission” test for determining the admissibility of post-plea agreement statements even applies where the defendant has been forewarned that his statements would be used against him if he breached the agreement.
The selection of that single criterion for determining the admissibility of a post-plea agreement statement—particularly, something as arbitrary as the identity of the rescinder—is unfortunate. It means no matter how flagrantly the defendant violates the plea agreement, the State’s only recourse is to rescind it and forgo the use of any statement he has given. Even if he grossly misrepresents the extent of his participation in the crime under investigation, as occurred here, potentially committing two crimes in the process of doing so (obstruction of justice6 7 and giving a false statement to a police officer8), the State cannot introduce the statement in its case*477in-chief, regardless of what the plea agreement provides. This unnecessarily undermines the integrity of the legal process, by gratuitously suppressing important evidence. And it does so without serving any countervailing public policy.
On the other hand, if the defendant rescinds the agreement, without having ever violated it, his statements are admissible, if his plea agreement so states. Wright v. State, 307 Md. 552, 515 A.2d 1157 (1986). Thus, the statements of say a perjurious defendant are excluded, simply because the State, with substantial justification, as here, rescinded the plea agreement, while the statements of a defendant, who withdraws his plea, because of a change of heart, receives no such protection. The result is an invitation to those who wish to withdraw their plea to first breach their plea agreement so completely and unconscionably that the State feels compelled to rescind it.
If there is one factor to be considered in determining whether to permit the introduction of an inculpatory statement, as authorized by the plea agreement, it is who breached the agreement. That approach is consistent with basic principles of contract law, which places the blame for an agreement’s dissolution on the breaching party and not on the party who rescinds the contract because of that breach. United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 300 (4th Cir.1986). And, that is, after all what a plea agreement is—a contract. A contract, which the Supreme Court observed, is between two parties, “which arguably possess relatively equal bargaining power.” Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 809, 90 S.Ct. 1458, 25 L.Ed.2d 785 (1974).
That a plea agreement typically involves the waiver of certain constitutional rights should not alter, at least in this instance, our approach. Constitutional rights, like other rights, can be waived. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, *478397, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993)(a criminal defendant waived three rights when he plead guilty: the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, and the right to confront his accusers); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976)(a claim of error was waived where a criminal defendant was tried in jail clothes); Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 244, 93 S.Ct. 1577, 36 L.Ed.2d 216 (1973)(objection to the racial composition of a grand jury, which was unconstitutionally discriminatory, was waived in federal proceedings). And just as in any other contract, the court should be permitted to enforce a provision of the contract, which the parties have agreed can be invoked in the event of a breach. In other words, if the agreement is found by a court to have been materially breached by the defendant, then the court should be able to allow the introduction of any inculpatory statement, whose introduction has been authorized by that plea agreement in the event of a breach.
And finally, although I do concur in the result reached by the majority, I also disagree with the policy analysis it offers to justify its application of the “rescission rule.” The majority contends that the “rescission” rule is necessary because it encourages plea bargaining. If the State can rescind an agreement and then introduce the defendant’s inculpatory statement, pursuant to its terms, it will have a “chilling effect on a defendant’s willingness to enter plea bargains,” the majority insists. This is an interesting twist of logic. It seems to me that the only people who will be dissuaded by the State’s right to introduce their statements in the event that they materially breach their plea agreements are those who do not intend to abide by their plea agreements in the first place. And if such people are dissuaded from entering into a plea agreement, suffice it to say, that is a good thing.
Moreover, I question whether it is appropriate for this Court to, in effect, strike a provision of a plea agreement on the grounds that it may discourage future defendants from entering plea agreements. The State’s Attorney Office has far more experience in this area and knowledge as to what encourages or discourages defendants from entering into such *479agreements. If any provision of a standard plea agreement proves counter-productive, that office will know it first and presumably make the necessary changes.
. In Stokes, the Court of Appeals observed, ‘‘[t]he principle of Maryland criminal law which excludes an inculpatory statement induced by 'any promise of favor or threat of punishment,' ... is, perhaps, more extensive than those of other jurisdictions.” Stokes, 289 Md. at 160, 423 A.2d 552 (quoting Hillard v. State, 286 Md. 145, 154, 406 A.2d 415 (1979)).
. In Nicholson, the Court stated that ''if the confession of the appellant had been induced by any threat of harm, or promise of worldly advantage ... it ought to be excluded.” Nicholson, 38 Md. at 153.
. See, e.g., Gates v. State, 14 Ill. 433, 436 (1853); Redd v. State, 69 Ala. 255, 259 (1881); People v. Robertson, 1 Wheeler’s Criminal Law Cases 66, 66-69 (N.Y. City Recorder’s Ct. 1822).
. See, e.g., United States v. Cooper, 25 F.Cas. 629, 630 (W.D.Va.1857); United States v. Pocklington, 27 F.Cas. 580, 580 (C.C.Dist.Col.1822); United States v. Pumphreys, 27 F.Cas. 631, 631 (C.C.Dist.Col.1802).
. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 59-60, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932)(providing indigent defendants with court appointed counsel in capital cases); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)(recognizing the right to appointed counsel in all federal criminal prosecutions); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-40, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (recognizing the right to appointed counsel in federal cases to all indigent felony defendants.).
. Maryland Rule 4-243 states in pertinent part:
(a) Conditions for Agreement.—The defendant may enter into an agreement with the State's Attorney for a plea of guilty or nolo contendere on any proper condition, including one or more of the following:
(1) That the State's Attorney will amend the charging document to charge a specified offense or add a specified offense, or will file a new charging document;
(2) That the State’s Attorney will enter a nolle prosequi pursuant to Rule 4-247(a) or move to mark certain charges against the defendant stet on the docket pursuant to Rule 4~248(a);
(3) That the State’s Attorney will agree to the entry of a judgment of acquittal on certain charges pending against the defendant;
(4) That the State will not charge the defendant with the commission of certain other offenses;
(5) That the State's Attorney will recommend, not oppose, or make no comment to the court with respect to a particular sentence, disposition, or other judicial action;
*476(6) That the parties will submit a plea agreement proposing a particular sentence, disposition, or other judicial action to a judge for consideration pursuant to section (c) of this Rule.
. Md.Code (2002), § 9-306 of the Criminal Law Article states:
I. Prohibited. A person may not, by threat, force, or corrupt means, obstruct, impede, or try to obstruct or impede the administration of justice in a court of the State.
II. Penalty. A person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 5 years or a fine not exceeding $10,000 or both.
. Md.Code (2002) § 9-501 of the Criminal Law Article states:
1) Prohibited. A person may not make, or cause to be made, a statement, report, or complaint that the person knows to be false as a whole or in material part, to a law enforcement officer of the State, of a county, municipal corporation, or other political subdivision of the State, or of the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Police *477with intent to deceive and to cause an investigation or other action to be taken as a result of the statement, report, or complaint.
2) Penalty. A person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemean- or and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding S500 or both.