dissenting.
We granted several grounds in appellant’s petition for discretionary review. Specifically, those granted grounds ask:
1. Did the court of appeals err in holding that Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. Art. 21.02 (Vernon 1989) allows the State to convict a defendant based on an extraneous offense identified through a pretrial 404(B) motion[?]
1A. Did the court of appeals, sub silentio, extinguish the concept of extraneous offenses in the State of Texas[?]
3. Did the court of appeals err in holding that Art. 21.02 takes precedence over Art. I § 10 of the Texas Constitution!?]
3A. Did the court of appeals err in holding that the petitioner’s convictions rest on unindicted extraneous acts[?]
The majority, unimpressed by his “account of the facts” and allegations of constitutional wrongdoing, overrules all of appellant’s grounds. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s approach and conclusions.
The crux of all of these granted grounds is that the evidence presented at trial varied from the indictment allegations, thus rendering the evidence insufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict of guilt; and that that variance was caused by the State specifying in its pretrial Notice of Intent to Introduce Extraneous Offenses that certain offenses were “extraneous” and thus not the offenses alleged in the indictment.1 To review these grounds, one must look at the offenses alleged in the indictment, the offenses declared “extraneous” by the State’s Notice, and the evidence introduced at trial.
I.
INDICTMENT ALLEGATIONS
The indictment contained two counts. The first count alleged that appellant committed *260aggravated sexual assault “by inserting Ms finger into the female sexual organ of [the named complainant],” who was younger than 14 years of age, on or about the 31st day of August 1988. Count two alleged that appellant committed indecency with a child by “engaging] in sexual contact by touching the breast of [the same named complainant],” who was younger than 17 years of age, on or about the 31st day of August 1988. The indictment is file-stamped December 5, 1989.
Thus the indictment alleged:
1) aggravated sexual assault by appellant inserting his finger into the female sexual organ of the complainant; and
2) indecency with a cMld by appellant touching the breast of the complainant.
II.
STATE’S NOTICE OF EXTRANEOUS OFFENSES
Pursuant to Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 404(b), appellant filed a “Defendant Request For Notice of State’s Intention to Introduce Evidence of Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts.” It specifically requested that the State give reasonable notice in advance of trial of its intent to introduce in its case-in-chief “evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts other than that arising in the transaction for which the Defendant stands indicted.” (emphasis added) This instrument is file-stamped January 21, 1992. The trial court signed the attached order granting that motion.
On May 11, 1993, the trial court conducted an arraignment and pretrial hearing. As to the Request for Notice, the prosecutor indicated that she had continual sexual conduct by appellant, and that he was indicted using the last date he had contact with the child because the child had been molested from ages 7 to 14, and she took the last date where the child was 14. The prosecutor also indicated that she intended to “go into the two dates, but they’re not going to be on that date[,]” “[t]hey are going to be back when she was younger, since 10 years is what our framework is in worMng with that last date alleged.” The prosecutor also said that she did not intend to go into the continuing scheme from 7 to 14 years of age, but rather intended to go into:
two instances that the child remembers most readily in her mind, going into the one instance of the touching of her breasts, there’s other acts involved during that one; and then there’s another instance involving the penetration with the fingers and the acts surrounding that. And the dates of those are going to be within 10 years of that date alleged. Those are the two I intend to go into and what involved those two acts, but as far as the continuing from seven to 14, I’m not intending to bring in all that because I think the recent case law prohibits me to at my ease in cMef.
Appellant complained that if it’s not August 31, 1988, then he was hardly on notice of when the specific date would be. The prosecutor commented that appellant had seen the CPS records, and some of the complainant’s written statements. When asked by the trial court if she planned to go on that August of 1988, the prosecutor responded negatively and said that she intended to go on when the complainant was 10 or 11 years old, pointing out that the law allowed her to go into within 10 years of the date of the indictment. The trial court then expressed some concern about notice.
Upon further discussion, the prosecutor indicated that the statements “also correspond with the continuing penetration.” When the trial court responded that she did not allege that, the prosecutor retorted that she did allege that because when alleging a certain date she’s actually alleging within 10 years of that date. The trial court then indicated that because the indictment alleged a certain date, and not continuing acts, and there were statements that show those certain dates, on or about August of 1988, then the State was going to be tied to that. The prosecutor then responded that if she gave appellant notice now and a continuance, then she could “go into the 10 and 11 years of age.” The trial court agreed.
After a short recess, the prosecutor then described two incidents which the complainant recalled vividly when she was 10 or 11 years old; one of which involved appellant rubbing her -with Vaseline and penetrating *261her anus digitally, and the other involving appellant watching a porno movie with her and making her touch his penis, masturbate him, and him fondling her breasts as she was laying on the couch. The prosecutor also mentioned that there was “a lot of other sexual conduct that took place throughout this child’s life from the time she was seven to the time she was 14 years of age, including full-scale intercourse, oral sex of every manner and means.” The trial court then ruled that as the case is indicted, because of the outcry statement and the statement made to the DHS representative, the notice given by the indictment is limited to such a degree that the events that occurred in August of 1988 would be more likely to have been relied upon by appellant in preparing a defense, and that the prosecution was instructed to give notice, as was just given, as to incidents that would be relied upon by the State in trying the case, and that the trial court would allow those incidents to be proved as long as they were within the limitation period based upon the date of the indictment. It did grant a continuance because appellant claimed he had not had an opportunity to prepare for those incidents.
On January 25, 1994, the State filed its “State’s Notice of Intent to Introduce Extraneous Offenses.” It stated that it gives further notice of its “intent to introduce evidence of extraneous offenses in both the guilt and innocence and punishment phase of the trial.” The Notice further indicated that “[t]he State may elect to introduce evidence of all of the following offenses committed by this Defendant[.]” It thereafter recited seven specific listings:
(1) 1981-1982, at 3139 Ray Drive in Hal-tom City, repeated instances where defendant inserted his fingers into [named com-plainantl’s vagina, fondling of [named complainant’s vagina and instances where defendant had [her] touch his penis.
(2) On or about 1986—1987, at 3139 Ray Drive in Haltom City, in the defendant’s bedroom, anal penetration of [named complainant] with his penis, anal penetration of [named complainant] with his fingers.
(3) On or about 1986, at 3139 Ray Drive in Haltom City, while defendant forced [named complainant] to watch a pornographic movie, defendant forced [named complainant] to masturbate his penis, defendant penetrated the vagina of [named complainant] with his fingers, defendant forced [named complainant] to perform oral sex on him.
(4) 1982 thru 1987, at 3139 Ray Drive in Haltom City, repeated instances where defendant touched [named complainant]’s vagina with his tongue and inserted his tongue into her vagina.
(5) 1982 thru 1987, at 3139 Ray Drive in Haltom City, repeated instances where defendant penetrated [named complainant's vagina with his fingers and fondled [named complainant’s breasts.
(6) 12-87 thru 7-4-88, in Leveland [sic], Texas, repeated instance [sic] of fondling, vaginal penetration by Defendant with his fingers, oral sex performed by Defendant on [named complainant] and instance where defendant had [named complainant] touch his penis.
(7) 7-4-88 to 8-88, at 4429 Knowledge in Haltom City, defendant penetrated [named complainant’s vagina with his penis.
The bench trial before the court began on January 26,1994.
III.
EVIDENCE AT TRIAL
In a bench trial before the court, at guilt/innocence the State presented two witnesses, the complainant and her older brother, and cross-examined appellant. The complainant testified that her date of birth was April 10, 1975. The State elicited testimony from her regarding an incident that occurred in 1986 or 1987 when she was in “[a]bout the fifth” grade at the age of “[e]leven, maybe.” She indicated that this occurred at their house on Race [sic] Street in Haltom City. She testified that this incident involved her watching portions of a pornographic videotape movie with appellant, and appellant pushing her down so that her mouth was on his penis. Appellant’s extraneous offense objections were overruled. The complainant also testified that this incident involved appellant touching and inserting his finger into *262her personal area, i.e. her female sexual organ, and rubbing on her breast underneath her clothing.
The State also elicited testimony from the complainant regarding another incident occurring “about 1986, 1987” on Race [sic] Street in Tarrant County in her mother’s and appellant’s bedroom, when she was “[a]bout the same age, eleven.” This incident involved appellant rubbing Vaseline into her anus and inserting his fingers into her vagina. In arguing over appellant’s extraneous offense objection to this evidence, the prosecutor stated that this pertained to the aggravated sexual assault count, while the previous evidence with the videotape movie went to the fondling of the breast count.
Appellant testified and denied doing those things to her. The complainant’s brother did not testify as to the specifics of any sexual assault or indecency committed on the complainant.
IV.
CORRELATION BETWEEN ALLEGATIONS, NOTICE, AND PROOF
As discussed above, the indictment alleged two specific offenses: 1) aggravated sexual assault by inserting appellant’s finger into the female sexual organ of the complainant; and 2) indecency with a child by touching the breast of the complainant. Both offenses were alleged to have occurred “on or about the 31st day of August 1988[.]”
The State’s Notice of its “intent to introduce evidence of extraneous offenses” listed several incidents of both aggravated sexual assault and indecency with a child. Several of those notice listings involve aggravated sexual assault by insertion or penetration. # 1 alleges as an extraneous offense in 1981-1982 appellant inserting his fingers into the complainant’s vagina. # 3 alleges as an extraneous offense that appellant penetrated the complainant’s vagina with his fingers on or about 1986. # 5 alleges, from 1982 thru 1987, repeated instances of extraneous offenses where appellant penetrated the complainant’s vagina with his fingers. # 6 alleges an extraneous offense of vaginal penetration by appellant with his fingers, but that extraneous offense occurred in “Leveland” [sic], though Levelland is in Hockley County rather than Tarrant County. All of these allegations, other than # 6, aver that they occurred at Ray Drive in Haltom City. These offenses included in the State’s Notice of Intent to Introduce Extraneous Offenses all correspond to the allegation of aggravated sexual assault by inserting appellant’s finger into the complainant’s sexual organ.
The State’s Notice of its “intent to introduce evidence of extraneous offenses” also listed extraneous offenses corresponding to the allegation of indecency with a child by touching the complainant’s breast. # 5 alleges from 1982 thru 1987, repeated instances where appellant fondled the complainant’s breasts at Ray Drive in Haltom City.
Since these allegations are included in the State’s Notice of Intent to Introduce Extraneous Offenses, in which the State gave further notice of its “intent to introduce evidence of extraneous offenses[,]” obviously they are “extraneous” to the two offenses alleged in the indictment. An “extraneous” offense is an offense other than the offense alleged in the indictment. We have recently stated, “An extraneous offense is defined as any act of misconduct, whether resulting in prosecution or not, that is not shonm in the charging papers.” Rankin v. State, 953 S.W.2d 740, 741 (Tex.Cr.App.1996) (rehearing pending) [emphasis in original]. In the not so distant past, this Court similarly stated, “An extraneous offense is one that is extra, beyond, or foreign to the offense for which the party is on trial.” Ridinger v. State, 146 Tex.Crim. 286, 174 S.W.2d 319, 320 (1943).
Therefore, all of the offenses listed in the State’s Notice of Intent to Introduce Extraneous Offenses, in which the State gave notice of its “intent to introduce evidence of extraneous offenses[,]” are “extraneous,” i.e. are not shown in the charging papers and are extra, beyond, or foreign to the offenses for which appellant was on trial.
*263V.
ANALYSIS
As noted above, several of the listings in the State’s Notice involve aggravated sexual assault by insertion or penetration of appellant’s fingers into the complainant’s vagina, which corresponds to the aggravated sexual assault allegation of “inserting his finger into the female sexual organ of [the named complainant]” in the indictment. Specifically, the Notice’s listing #3 (the incident involving watching a pornographic videotape movie at Ray Drive in Haltom City on or about 1986, with appellant penetrating the complainant’s vagina with his fingers and fondling her breasts) comports with the above-discussed testimony at trial. Also the Notice’s listing #2 (involving anal penetration by appellant in his bedroom) seems to correspond with the above-discussed testimony about Vaseline in the bedroom, though #2 does not mention inserting his fingers into her vagina. And the Notice’s listing # 5 designates as extraneous offenses in “1982 thru 1987” repeated instances of appellant penetrating the complainant’s vagina with his fingers and fondling her breasts at Ray Drive in Haltom City.
Since the State’s Notice gave actual notification that the offenses which were testified to at trial were “extraneous” offenses, i.e. were not shown in the charging papers and are extra, beyond, or foreign to the offenses for which appellant was on trial, then those offenses obviously were not the offenses alleged in the indictment. All of the evidence of penetration and fondling as alleged in the indictment were included in the State’s extraneous offenses Notice.
The majority states, “Labeling an offense ‘extraneous’ for purposes of notice does not transform the character of the offense.” Sledge v. State, 953 S.W.2d 253, 256 (Tex.Cr. App. 1997). However, if the indictment alleges one thing, and the extraneous offense notice alleges something else, then obviously the parties are on notice that the indictment allegations are the offenses that are being tried and which guilt/innocence will be determined and the extraneous offenses are something other than the offenses being tried.
It is well-settled that the purpose of an indictment is to give the defendant notice of the specific offense with which he is charged and to enable the court, upon conviction, to pronounce the proper judgment, and to enable the accused to plead the judgment that may be given upon it in bar of any further prosecution for the same offense. Lehman v. State, 792 S.W.2d 82, 84 (Tex.Cr.App.1990); and see Articles 21.11 and 21.04, V.A.C.C.P. And it goes without saying that the purpose of a “Notice of Intent to Introduce Extraneous Offenses” is to provide notification of intent to introduce extraneous offenses, i.e. offenses other than those alleged in the indictment. And in this case, that is precisely what the State did with its Notice. Unfortunately when it came time for trial, the State chose to only present evidence which corresponded with its designated extraneous offenses. The same specific offenses can not be both extraneous and named in the indictment. There is no overlap between the indictment allegations and the extraneous offenses Notice; yet there is an overlap between the evidence presented by the State and the offenses in the State’s extraneous offense Notice.
The majority also states that the specific acts alleged in the indictment, digital penetration of the complainant’s sexual organ and fondling of the complainant’s breasts, are not listed in the State’s written Notice. Sledge v. State, 953 S.W.2d at 256. However, as clearly shown above, the State’s Notice does indeed include specific listings of digital penetration of the complainant’s sexual organ, i.e. vagina, and touching, i.e. fondling, the complainant’s breasts on Ray Drive in Haltom City.
VI.
CONCLUSION
Though Article 21.02(6), V.A.C.C.P., requires simply that the time mentioned in an indictment “must be some date anterior to the presentment of the indictment, and not so remote that the prosecution of the offense is barred by limitation[,]” and this Court has found evidence to be sufficient to prove “on or about” the date alleged if it the actual date *264of occurrence merely falls within that limitation period, appellant’s complaints go to whether there was evidence at all of offenses other than those, designated in the State’s extraneous offense Notice.2 Regardless of the “on or about” August 31,1988 allegation, the evidence at trial described offenses corresponding to those designated as extraneous in the State’s Notice. Regardless of the admissibility of the extraneous offenses, and of what was said at the above-discussed pretrial hearing, the written “State’s Notice of Intent to Introduce Extraneous Offensesf,]” which was filed just the day before the trial began, provided specific notice distinguishing “extraneous” offenses from the offenses alleged in the indictment.
Accordingly, I believe the court of appeals erred in its analysis of appellant’s point of error claiming insufficient evidence to prove the indictment allegations. Accordingly I believe that this cause should be remanded to the court of appeals for reanalysis in line with the State’s written Notice designating “extraneous” offenses. Because the majority does not do so, I respectfully dissent.
BAIRD, J., joins.. Interestingly, appellant’s second ground for review, which we did not grant, asked,
Did the court of appeals err in holding that the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain the petitioner’s convictions for aggravated sexual assault and sexual assault!?]
However, as noted above, the crux of appellant's claims in the grounds that have been granted, particularly numbers 1 and 3-A, is that he was convicted of acts that had been identified as extraneous offenses rather than the offenses alleged in the indictment.
. The majority opinion states that the "on or about” date allegation in the indictment is "often used in cases involving sexual assault of a child.” Sledge v. State, supra, op. at 254. That is certainly true, but somewhat misleading. As we all know, such an "on or about” allegation is used in virtually every indictment, for both property crimes, such as theft, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, burglary, and crimes against persons, such as murder, assault, and sexual assault. But to imply that the "on or about” allegation is reserved exclusively for use in cases alleging sexual assault of a child is disingenuous to say the least. Such allegation is used in all types of cases; thus our holding today will affect allegations in all types of cases.
I also note that in spite of the above-detailed testimony, the judgment states that the “Offense Date” for both offenses was August 31, 1988.