concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the affirmance of the conviction and denial of postconviction relief. I cannot, however, join the principal opinion in its summary recitation of case law relied *607on in attempting to exercise our proportionality review function. The majority has again evaded the task of “independent review” under § 565.035, RSMo 1986. This Court too long has indulged the practice of scanning the reporters for cases presenting one or more of the same statutory aggravating circumstances, following which there is a string of citations and a routine affirmance. See State v. Powell, 798 S.W.2d 709, 718 (Mo. banc 1990) (Blackmar, C.J., dissenting).
In more than ten years of litigation under our revised death penalty statute the Court has failed to enunciate standards for the exercise of its statutorily mandated proportionality review. See State v. Holmes, 609 S.W.2d 132, 139 (Mo. banc 1980) (Seiler, J. concurring).1 In the absence of standards, the Court relies only on the bare language defining aggravating circumstances as the sole criterion for comparing one death penalty case to another. It is quite appropriate to begin proportionality review with the statutory language defining the aggravating circumstances. I am unable, however, to sanction the principal opinion’s merely detailing the aggravating circumstance, reciting the supporting evidence, and concluding that, if the jury found the circumstance, the death penalty must be appropriate.
The evils of this habit are ably demonstrated here. The principal opinion follows the lead of the state’s brief in grasping to support the charged aggravating circumstances, and, accordingly, the sentence of death. A review of the evidence adduced in support of the aggravating circumstances is in order.
The trial court submitted statutory aggravating circumstances (§§ 565.032.2(4) and (12), RSMo 1986) as follows:
4) That defendant murdered Susan Davis for the purpose of the defendant receiving money or any other thing of monetary value from Susan Davis or another;
12) The defendant murdered Susan Davis because she was a witness in a pending prosecution of the defendant for the offense of assault in the third degree and violation of an order of protection.
When considering whether the evidence supports the aggravating circumstances, the Court lays the foundation to decide whether to uphold the ultimate penalty. It follows that each and every element of the aggravating circumstances relied upon must be established by evidence sufficient to support a jury finding beyond reasonable doubt. State v. Battle, 661 S.W.2d 487, 493 (Mo. banc 1983), cert. denied 466 U.S. 993, 104 S.Ct. 2375, 80 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984).
The first aggravating circumstance (sub-paragraph 4) is not established by the evidence. In order to submit this circumstance the evidence must show affirmatively that receipt of a thing of value was the purpose of the murder, and not a mere incident of the defendant’s conduct. Particularly misleading is the majority’s analysis of the significance of the trust fund. It is quite likely that the jury misunderstood the juxtaposition of the trust fund evidence with the statutory elements in 565.032.2(4). The language of the statute requires that the killing be done for the purpose of receiving value.
Defendant admitted, as the principal opinion states, that he knew the terms of the trust. He knew that Susan’s mother was the income beneficiary. The children could not have received their proportionate share of the corpus until the death of Susan’s parents. The majority concludes that, because Ralph would become the sole parent, he would therefore exercise dominion over his children and the trust fund. This is a reaching conclusion, indeed. Ralph had no access to the trust fund. *608Only at the death of Susan’s parents would the children become beneficiaries. Susan’s mother testified that the trust was designed to protect the children. Thus a benefit to the defendant has no tangible foundation.
Also of doubtful substance is the principal opinion’s reliance on evidence that the defendant came into possession of Susan’s diamond ring. The suggestion that Ralph killed Susan so as to obtain the ring is highly speculative. There is no evidence that Susan was wearing the ring when she disappeared. Nor is there evidence that defendant removed the ring from her at any time. The defendant never realized value for the ring, and so the showing of his needs is hardly persuasive. He rather kept the ring in an envelope in his desk for several years.
Evidence at trial established that two checks were written on Susan’s personal checking account and that Susan’s signature was forged. The evidence did not show that defendant forged the checks. The suggestion that his purpose was to kill for the account is based on an inference too tenuous to support. At best the evidence shows that, following Susan’s disappearance, defendant discovered the checkbook and thereafter sought to draw from the account.
If we are to adopt statutory aggravating circumstances as the measure by which to assess proportionality, we must strictly adhere to the elements set forth in the statute. The evidence must support the circumstance. It is not sufficient to show that the defendant was guilty of a heinous crime unless the evidence supports the circumstances submitted to the jury. The majority appears to hold that it is sufficient to show that the defendant obtained something of value after the death, without a showing of cause and effect. Only by speculation can it be said that the ring, trust fund, or checking account, considered singularly or together, supplied the motivation behind defendant killing Susan.2
The principal opinion cites seven cases for the proposition that this case is similar to other cases where the jury has found that defendant’s purpose was to kill for a thing of value. Each of these cases but one demonstrate the proper occasion for the aggravating circumstance wherein the defendant kills for money or a thing of value.3 The cases also demonstrate that the Court transgresses Godfrey v. Georgia, supra, in holding that substantial evidence supports § 565.032.2(4). In both State v. Bannister, 680 S.W.2d 141 (Mo. banc 1984), and State v. Blair, 638 S.W.2d 739 (Mo. banc 1982), the defendant was a hired hit man. But for the killing price, the crime would not have occurred. The defendant in State v. Laws, 661 S.W.2d 526 (Mo. banc 1983), executed a “get rich quick scheme,” deciding to rob the elderly because of his belief that old people are afraid of banks, and thus keep their valuables at home. Similarly, in State v. Byrd, 676 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. banc 1984), the defendant’s primary goal was to rob a cafeteria. He shot and killed four employees in satisfying his mission. Finally, in both State v. McDonald, 661 S.W.2d 497 (Mo. banc 1983), and State v. Pollard, 735 S.W.2d 345 (Mo. banc 1987), the evidence showed that the defendant’s purpose was robbery and that defendant was lying in wait. These are the cases in which substantial evidence warrants the submission of the aggravating circumstance “killing for a thing of value.”
Nor does the evidence in this case support the jury’s finding that defendant killed *609Susan because she was a potential witness in three misdemeanor charges pending against him. Section 565.032.2(12) can be satisfied only by a showing that the defendant made a conscious decision to do away with his victim so as to impede prosecution. The majority points to nothing suggesting that defendant killed Susan simply to avoid two charges of third degree assault and one for violation of a protective order. None of the cases cited in support of this proposition involved misdemeanor charges.4
Finally, I am startled by the State’s argument that defendant was required to disclose the location of the body, lest he be labeled “cynical” and “remorseless,” and thus condemned to death. This is an incredible theory, fraught with danger. Common sense teaches that to require the defendant to locate a body during the penalty phase is to trample the right of defendant to maintain his innocence. There is diminished use for appeals, postconviction proceedings, or even habeas corpus if the defendant must somehow admit his guilt in pointing to the body. This concept bootstraps the defendant into an untenable position and it offends the Constitution.
Even if one or both of the aggravating circumstances relied on is minimally supported, there is still no substantial effort at proportionality review. The importance the legislature placed on proportionality review is demonstrated by the provision in the statute for an officer of this Court who has the duty of studying the records of death sentence cases so as to aid our review. § 565.035.6, RSMo 1986. Yet we do not go into the particular facts of the several cases in any depth. We rather seem to apply the same presumption of correctness to a death verdict that we do in other criminal cases, and in civil cases. The legislature contemplated a further review by us.
Since the first affirmance of a death sentence in 1980, this Court has mitigated only one sentence, while affirming sixty-nine. By contrast Georgia, from whom we have borrowed so heavily, has reduced some seven death sentences. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 71, 104 S.Ct. 871, 890, 79 L.Ed.2d 29 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Baldus, Pulaski, Woodworth, and Kyle, Identifying Comparatively Excessive Sentences of Death: A Quantative Approach, 33 Stan.L.Rev. 1, 2-3 (1980). I doubt that our death cases are so much more polarized than Georgia’s.
Because of the speculative support for the aggravating circumstances relied on, and the absence of proportionality review, I am unable to concur in the affirmance of the death sentence.
. The General Assembly in enacting statutory proportionality review was attempting to comply with the constitutional requirement that the risk of arbitrary and capricious application of the death penalty be minimized. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980). It borrowed heavily from the Georgia statutes sustained in Gregg. See also State v. Smith, 649 S.W.2d 417, 435 (Mo. banc 1983), State v. LaRette, 648 S.W.2d 96, 107 (Mo. banc 1983) and State v. Hudgins, 612 S.W.2d 769, 770 (Mo. banc 1981).
. I also wonder whether the majority would believe that defendant killed his wife to obtain her automobile. After all, it was a thing of value. This proposition is no less likely than that of the principal opinion.
. In State v. Grubbs, 724 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. banc 1987) the State submitted three aggravating circumstances. The evidence unequivocally supported § 565.032.2(7) in that the murder was outrageously vile and involved torture. The evidence did not support §§ 565.032.2(4) and (10). The evidence showed that after the murder, defendant took thirty dollars and some food stamps and that he wore gloves while inside the victim’s residence. This evidence does not show that the murder was committed so as to receive a thing of value or to avoid lawful arrest. Id. at 502 (Blackmar, J., concurring).
. State v. Petary, 781 S.W.2d 534 (Mo. banc 1989), vacated and remanded — U.S. —, 110 S.Ct. 1800, 108 L.Ed.2d 931 (1990), reaffirmed 790 S.W.2d 243 (Mo. banc) cert. denied — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 443, 112 L.Ed.2d 426 (1990) (kidnapping victim); State v. Boliek, 706 S.W.2d 847 (Mo. banc), cert. denied 479 U.S. 903, 107 S.Ct. 302, 93 L.Ed.2d 276 (1986) (robbery victim). State v. Gilmore (II), 661 S.W.2d 519 (Mo. banc 1983), cert. denied 466 U.S. 945, 104 S.Ct. 1931, 80 L.Ed.2d 476 (1984) (burglary victim). State v. Wilkins, 736 S.W.2d 409 (Mo. banc 1987), aff’d sub nom. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 2969, 106 L.Ed.2d 306 (1989) (robbery victim).