concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the affirmance of the conviction of capital murder. The trial itself was eminently fair and, after careful reflection, I conclude that the infirmities which I find in the proceedings dealing with mental examination do not require a new trial of the guilt-innocence phase.
The penalty phase, however, is seriously deficient in several respects, and the death sentence should not be allowed to stand. I believe that § 565.014, RSMo 1978, enjoins upon us a special responsibility in cases in which sentence of death has been pronounced, and that it is the sense of Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) and the cases decided concurrently that state courts at all levels should give detailed scrutiny to cases in which the ultimate penalty is a possibility.
The trial judge should be something more than a wrestling referee who may break an occasional illegal hold but generally leaves the combatants to their own devices. The question is not so much whether the trial judge is to be “faulted” or “convicted of error” as whether the defendant has had a trial in which all appropriate issues have been explored and the case properly submitted to the jury on the basis of full information.
Complaint has been made about the proliferation of post-conviction remedies, especially in death sentence cases. I am particularly impressed by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s suggestion that the state Courts are fully capable of discharging their constitutional responsibility in criminal trials.1 We should accept this challenge and should take affirmative steps to make sure that the initial trial is full and fair, beyond criticism. We should take appropriate action to correct flaws in the procedure below when first we sense them rather than coming forth with holdings which actually court post-conviction review by glossing over serious deficiencies. Nor should we be too quick to look for omissions on the part of publicly financed defense counsel as occasion for declining judicial scrutiny of possibly serious errors.
1. The Mental Examination Issue
In line with the suggestions just made, I believe that this defendant was improperly refused a psychiatric examination.
The defendant is indigent and has been represented at all stages by the St. Louis Public Defender’s office. He was arraigned on June 18, 1981 and entered a plea of not guilty. At no time was there a plea of “not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect.”
Four days later the defendant filed a document entitled “motion for appointment of psychiatrist,” and another entitled, “motion to permit late filing of defense of mental disease or defect excluding responsibility.” This latter motion is anomalous. By the express language of § 552.030.2, RSMo 1978, a notice of intent to rely on a defense of mental disease or defect could have been filed, without leave of court, within ten days after arraignment.
The motion for appointment of a psychiatrist stated that the defense counsel was unable to advise her client as to whether a plea of mental disease or defect excluding responsibility should be made until a professional mental examination could be had and evaluated. The motion also contained the request that the results of the examination be available to the defendant alone unless and until such a plea should be entered.
*514There is no indication that the motion for leave was ever called up, brought to the court’s attention, or ruled on. The first motion for appointment of a psychiatrist was overruled by Judge McGuire on July 1, 1981. There is nothing in the record as to the proceedings on this motion, other than the ruling, and no explanation of the court’s reason for its action. It appears from later proceedings that the defendant had the opportunity to present evidence in support of this motion and presented none.
On July 20,1981, a second motion seeking appointment of a psychiatrist was filed. This motion was similar to the previous one, but recited that the defendant had been less cooperative in dealings with his counsel than earlier. This motion was also overruled, on August 12, 1981, by Judge McGuire, without prejudice.
A third motion was filed January 25, 1982, before the judge who presided at the trial. This motion, for the first time, contained the statement that psychiatric evidence was needed for use at the penalty phase of the trial in the event of a conviction of capital murder. Counsel also adduced, during argument on the motion, the military records of the defendant, including a report of a suicide attempt in 1967 while in Vietnam. The court again overruled the motion, without taking note of the newly suggested' need for psychiatric evidence, stating “that’s been denied two times before,” and commenting on the lack of supporting evidence.
A fourth motion was filed on February 16,1982 just before trial began. Counsel, in response to the trial judge’s question, stated that she was not relying on the defense of mental disease or defect excluding responsibility because, in the absence of psychiatric information, she had no basis for determining whether the defense had merit. Counsel also mentioned the importance of psychiatric information at the penalty phase of the trial. The motion was again denied and the trial began forthwith without the indigent defendant’s having had any psychiatric examination.
The state’s justification for the court’s failure to appoint a psychiatrist is purely procedural. It is asserted that § 552.030.4 gives no authority for such an examination unless the defendant either enters a plea of “not guilty by reason of mental disease or mental defect excluding responsibility,” or files a notice of intent to rely on that defense, in accordance with § 552.030.2. The state goes on to argue that the filing of June 22, 1981 should not be treated as an appropriate notice, because it is cast in the form of a request for leave and was never called up as a motion or brought to the court’s attention. The state’s conclusion is that the defendant was not entitled to the examination because his counsel failed to take the required steps to obtain it.
The conduct of defense counsel is indeed puzzling. It is difficult to see how the defendant could possibly be harmed if notice of intent to rely on the mental defense were given. The notice could be withdrawn at any time, and, if withdrawn, would not prejudice the defendant in the subsequent proceedings. In contrast to the situation in civil cases, a criminal defendant is entitled to tender any recognized plea in order to lay the foundation for defense, and counsel does not vouch for the factual accuracy of the plea. So, by the simple expedient of making the appropriate plea or giving notice, defense counsel could have obtained the requested examination and could have had the benefit of the information it contained during both phases of the trial. Had the examination disclosed no mental problem there would be no prejudice.2
State ex rel. Jordon v. Mehan, 597 S.W.2d 724 (Mo.App.1980) rejected a claim for confidential treatment of the psychiatric information, holding that the sense of §§ 552.-020 and 552.030 is that reports ordered pursuant to those sections are to be available to *515both parties. The court specifically rejected the claim that a defendant is entitled to a confidential evaluation in order to decide whether to use the mental defense, but recognized the defendant’s problem and suggested the use of the public defender’s funds, citing § 600.040 and § 600.150, RSMo 1978. The present motions cited these sections also, but the record is silent as to the availability of funds.
The entire responsibility for the absence of a psychiatric evaluation should not be placed on the defendant, or on his counsel. It would have been far better if one of the judges to whom the successive motions were presented had assumed a more active role when the motions were presented. The courts should lean over backwards to provide psychiatric evaluation for an indigent defendant held to answer capital charges. The court’s powers under Chapter 552 are not so circumscribed as the state would have it. Section 552.020 clearly authorizes the court to act on its own motion. Even though that section deals with the determination of fitness to stand trial, the report of an examination is expressly required to include the examiner’s conclusion as to the presence of a mental disease or defect excluding responsibility. Counsel’s representations of problems of communication with the defendant, as contained in the second motion, suggest that an inquiry into capacity was imperative. It would have been far better if the responsible judge, at some time before trial, had called counsel before him to explore the entire matter of mental examination and the motions and papers on file. The intention behind the “request to permit late filing” could have been probed. If counsel stood on the request for confidential treatment, and said that she did not want the examination without this proviso, the record would at least be clarified, and inquiry might have been made as to the availability of funds under § 600.040 or § 600.150, as suggested by the Court of Appeals in Jordon, supra. A notice of intent in proper form might have been suggested. If counsel had some devious purpose in proceeding as she did, this too could have been smoked out and appropriate action taken.
The trial judge suggested that the earlier motions had been denied because of “lack of evidence” to justify the examinations. It is the sense of the statutes that requests for examination should be freely granted on the basis of counsel’s representations. There are, furthermore, circumstances suggesting that an examination was appropriate in this case. It is entirely proper for the prosecutor to argue to the jury that events 15 years ago in Vietnam are too remote to permit a conclusion as to the defendant’s mental capacity, but a publicly appointed lawyer who is not trained in psychiatry would nevertheless be concerned about the defendant’s prior psychiatric history, and would want expert advice and guidance. Evidence of drug use or dependency might suggest further inquiry even though not necessarily indicating mental disease or defect. Counsel’s representations of problems of communication with the defendant should also be a matter for serious concern, as these raise questions of capacity to stand trial. The suggestion that evidence is required before the court may or must order a psychiatric examination is circular. It is not reasonable to assume that all persons suffering from mental disease or defect exhibit objective manifestations, so that mental examination may not be had unless the need is demonstrated by lay evidence. The very irrationality of the defendant’s act and the absence of reasonable expectation of gain from his conduct are circumstances indicating that the possibility of mental disease or defect should be explored.
The defendant is also on solid ground in suggesting that psychiatric evaluation may be important for the penalty phase of the trial, even if there is no substantial claim of mental disease or defect excluding responsibility. Section 565.012.3(2), RSMo 1978 provides that the defendant may show as a mitigating circumstance “[t]he capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.” The presence of this circumstance demonstrates the need for *516expert guidance in preparing a defense. Other evidence of. mental problems is also freely admissible at the punishment phase. See State v. McIlvoy, 629 S.W.2d 333 (Mo. banc 1982). The statutes provide adequate grounds for affording such an examination as an essential step in preparation for trial of a capital murder case. Assistance of this kind is probably required as a matter of due process of law, even in the absence of explicit statutory provision.
The state cites two divisional cases: State v. Haley, 603 S.W.2d 512 (Mo.1980) and State v. Ingram, 607 S.W.2d 438 (Mo.1980). Both of these cases were decided on the basis that the defendant waited until trial was imminent before making known any circumstances which might show that a mental examination was appropriate. In each case the court held that the record did not show substantial facts indicating the presence of mental disease or mental defect. For the reasons just stated they do not control the present situation, in which the need for a mental examination was suggested at an early stage.
Even though it would have been far preferable for the court to have ordered a mental examination, I do not believe that it is necessary to reverse the conviction of capital murder for this reason. The application was technically deficient, and there is no indication in the record that the defense would have been able to demonstrate mental disease or defect sufficient to exclude responsibility. The question whether there might be a viable defense on grounds of mental incapacity could probably be answered on the basis of an examination conducted at the present time,3 but any such procedure is foreign to this appeal. It is not necessary to set aside the conviction simply because of the highly speculative possibility that a mental capacity defense might have been feasible.
The situation is different as to the sentence of death. The request for an examination for use at the penalty stage was tendered nearly three weeks before trial. There was occasion for it. The application should have been granted. The inquiry as to mental condition at the penalty stage may range far more widely than in the trial of the issue of guilt. It is not possible to determine at this time what the jury might have done at the penalty stage, had it had the benefit of a psychiatric evaluation of the defendant. A death sentence, under these circumstances, should not be sustained.
2. The Statutory Aggravating Circumstance
The majority would affirm the death sentence in this case based on the sole aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed “for the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value by taking [Jordan’s] wallet.” The majority cites cases from two other states with statutory language identical to ours as supporting its conclusion.* Both Pulliam v. State, 236 Ga. 460, 224 S.E.2d 813 (1976), and State v. Woomer, 277 S.C. 170, 284 S.E.2d 357 (1981), (reversed on other grounds) involved the submission of multiple aggravating circumstances. The latter case did not address the issue here presented.
The majority next examines statutes with the aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain and finds that most have applied the circumstance to murders committed during the course of an armed robbery. Inasmuch as defendant fatally shot Officer Jordan in the course of robbing him, the opinion concludes that the aggravating circumstance submitted in this case was supported by substantial evidence.
The defendant’s position is that the “receiving money” aggravating circumstance was' meant to apply only to a murder for hire, the murder of an insured by a benefi*517ciary, and the murder of an ancestor by an heir to accelerate the inheritance. Such a holding would follow from a strict construction of the statutory language. As noted by the majority, two states with the more expansive “pecuniary gain” statutory language have reached this conclusion. See Ashlock v. State, 367 So.2d 560 (Ala.Cr.App. 1978) and State v. Rust, 197 Neb. 528, 250 N.W.2d 867 (1977). See also Boutwell v. State, 659 P.2d 322 (Okla.Cr.App.1983). Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) and Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980) would seem to mandate a strict construction of the statutory aggravating circumstances to ensure that the legislature intended to authorize the death sentence under a given set of circumstances.
Even if we reject defendant’s argument that the “receiving money” circumstance was not meant to apply to any murder during the course of a robbery, it does not automatically follow that every time a defendant on trial for capital murder has taken money or something of monetary value from his victim the statutory circumstance has been established. In State v. Snow, 383 A.2d 1385, 1388 (Me.1978), the court upheld a “pecuniary benefit” circumstance when the murder had occurred during a robbery. The court stated:
[A] “criminal homicide ... committed for pecuniary benefit” includes a homicide committed during a robbery, provided there is a concurrence of the mental state required for second degree homicide, death producing conduct sufficient to constitute legal cause, and the specific intent to obtain money thereby.
⅜: ‡ ⅜: ⅝ sjc ⅝
A homicide in the second degree which is committed “for” monetary gain therefore requires a showing of specific intent to obtain money by and in conjunction with the conduct and mental state necessary for second degree homicide. This temporal concurrence of mental culpability with conduct producing a prohibited result is a basic premise of Anglo-American criminal law. (Emphasis supplied).
And in Peek v. State, 395 So.2d 492, 499 (Fla.1980), the court found that a murder which preceded the theft of the victim’s automobile was not committed for pecuniary gain. The court stated: “[t]he record does not support the conclusion that Mrs. Carlson was murdered to facilitate the theft, or that appellant had any intention of profiting from his illicit acquisition.” Finally, in State v. Oliver, 302 N.C. 28, 274 S.E.2d 183, 204 (1981), the court rejected defendant’s claim that the murder of a customer at a gas station-convenience store was not for pecuniary gain because the money had already been obtained from the storekeeper. The court stated: “While the argument is plausible we reject it. The hope of pecuniary gain provided the impetus for the murder of both Watts and Hodge. This hope and the murders were inextricably intertwined.” (Emphasis supplied).
The State’s description of the events of May 16, 1981, in its brief and arguments both before this Court and to the jury do not give the impression that Samuel McDonald was intent on robbing someone and was willing to kill, if necessary, to retain the benefits. Rather, the impression is that he decided to take someone’s wallet and upon realizing that his victim was a police officer decided, because of a general dislike of authority figures or because of a fear of identification by the police officer, to fire the fatal shot. The reason for the murder does not make it any less brutal; it does, however, remove the single approved basis for inflicting the death penalty in this case.
On the sufficiency of evidence supporting the aggravating circumstance, I also concur in the opinion of Houser, Sr. J.
3. Closing Argument
In this case, as in many others, the prosecutor engaged in improprieties while arguing that the death penalty was appropriate in this case. This case differs from most others in that defense counsel promptly and consistently objected to those arguments. *518Nevertheless, the majority finds that the trial judge did not “abuse his discretion” in allowing the arguments and that counsel should be afforded “wide latitude” in argument during a capital case. As indicated previously, I would opt for more, not less, control when a defendant’s life is at stake, but whatever control is exercised should apply equally to defense counsel and the prosecutor. The trial judge, here, exercised much more control over defense counsel than over the prosecutor.
In State v. Lewis, 443 S.W.2d 186 (Mo.1969), this Court held that a prosecutor should not attempt to belittle the jury’s duty to set defendant’s sentence by arguing the possibility of parole. No objection was made in Lewis, but the Court found plain error that warranted reversal. Although this Court has not always found references to the possibility of intervention to rise to the level of plain error, the law is that such references are improper. California v. Ramos, - U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 3446, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983), does not change the law in this respect. In Ramos, the United States Supreme Court held that a California law requiring jury instruction indicating that a sentence of life without parole could be commuted did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Court repeatedly emphasized that the instruction was a permissible choice for the state to make but that its decision was not intended to “override the contrary judgment” that the possibility of commutation was an improper consideration. 103 S.Ct. at 3459-60.
The majority dismisses each of McDonald’s claims of error as insignificant within the context of the entire argument. Taken individually, the objectionable portions of the argument might not warrant reversal; the argument, however, was rife with error. The prosecutor knew better. We should not continue to encourage improper argument by dismissing it as “harmless.”
4. Sentence Review
It is difficult to respond to the sentence review found in the principal opinion because the cases relied on for comparison are not detailed. My examination of the cases in which this Court has upheld death sentences, and in which prosecutors have sought the death penalty but juries have not agreed, persuade me that the sentence should be mitigated.
The only case to date in which we have mitigated a death sentence is State v. McIlvoy, 629 S.W.2d 333 (Mo. banc 1982), involving a killing for hire in which the defendant stalked the victim, with one dry run before the fatal shooting. McDonald’s acts, by contrast, appear to be impulsive. It is true that another jury refused to impose the death sentence on the person who hired Mcllvoy, but McDonald should also be entitled to comparison of that sentence. State v. Williams, 611 S.W.2d 26 (Mo. banc 1981). If one examines the external factors, Mcll-voy’s case seems more willful, deliberate and shocking than this one. The only possible distinction is in the mental factor, and here the denial of any kind of mental examination looms large. Mcllvoy hired private experts who testified as to his fragile psyche and weak will. The defendant should not be sentenced to death without the opportunity for similar consideration.
The defendant has a criminal record extending over many years, but the crimes are non-violent. There is no evidence of sadistic excess such as was present in some of the cases in which this Court has sustained death sentences.4 When robbery alone is the sole aggravating circumstance, juries with some regularity have declined to return death verdicts.5 I submit that the *519sentence of death was excessive and disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.
For the plural reasons assigned, and those adduced by Judge Houser, I would affirm the judgment but would set aside the death sentence.
. O’Connor, “Trends in the Relationship Between the Federal and State Courts from the Perspective of a State Judge,” 22 Wm. & Mary L.R. 801 (1981).
. If the prosecution received reports of any examination as provided in §§ 552.020, 552.-030, RSMo 1978, and State v. Carter, 641 S.W.2d 54 (Mo. banc 1982), the information could not be used to the defendant’s disadvantage unless a claim of mental disease or defect was actually presented to the jury.
. The situation is not at all like Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975), holding that an immediate inquiry as to a defendant’s capacity to waive his right to be present at trial was essential when the defendant disabled himself during trial by a suicide attempt.
. State v. Smith, 649 S.W.2d 417 (Mo. banc 1983); State v. LaRette, 648 S.W.2d 96 (Mo. banc 1983); State v. Stokes, 638 S.W.2d 715 (Mo. banc 1982); State v. Mercer, 618 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. banc 1981).
. State v. Turner, 623 S.W.2d 4 (Mo. banc 1981); State v. Baskerville, 616 S.W.2d 839 (Mo.1981), multiple killing by 19-year-old offender during course of robbery; State v. Mitchell, 611 S.W.2d 223 (Mo. banc 1981); State v. Royal, 610 S.W.2d 946 (Mo. banc 1981). Where death sentences have been ap*519proved for murder in the course of a robbery, other aggravating circumstances have been present. See State v. Baker, 636 S.W.2d 902 (Mo. banc 1982) — killing of police officer on duty; State v. Stokes, supra; State v. Newlon, supra — “outrageously or wantonly vile, ...”