concurring.
Although this cause is before us on State’s petition for discretionary review, the opinion of the Court finds “it is necessary for us to address what was the appellant’s seventh ground of error” in the Dallas Court of Appeals.* I object.
The review power and authority of this Court pertains solely to a decision of a court of appeals, and its jurisdiction is invoked by a petition for discretionary review filed by an aggrieved party. Article V, § 5; Articles 4.04, § 2, 44.01 and 44.45, V.A.C.C.P. Our concern is with the impact on existing law of the reason given by a court of appeals for its decision on one or more grounds of error. Article 44.24(c) and (d), id., and Tex.R.App.Pro. Rules 200 and 202(d)(5).
When the court of appeals sustains a ground of error and reverses a judgment of conviction, the State may petition the Court to review that decision on its own. motion. Article 44.01. supra; Todd v. State, 661 S.W.2d 116 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). However, only an appellant would be properly distressed that a court of appeals failed to address a particular ground of error, and he is entitled to file a petition within ten *496days after the State has timely filed its own. Tex.R.App.Pro. Rule 202(c). Even then this Court will not treat the merits of a ground of error not decided by the court of appeals. Lambrecht v. State, 681 S.W.2d 614, 616 (Tex.Cr.App.1984). We do not write advisory opinions. Warren v. State, 652 S.W.2d 779 (Tex.Cr.App.1983).
In the instant cause the majority informs that the Dallas Court of Appeals “did not expressly address” appellant’s seventh ground of error. Appellant has not filed a petition for discretionary review nor in any other way attempted to raise the complaint that the indictment fails to allege an offense under Article 5472e, V.A.C.S. Nevertheless the majority would have the Court render an advisory opinion that the indictment is void “for failure to plead therein the exception in the statute, i.e., that the appellant did not use the trust funds he was accused of misapplying to pay reasonable overhead expenses.” Slip Opinion, p. 4.
In my judgment the review power and authority of the Court has not been properly invoked with respect to appellant’s seventh ground of error, and the majority causes the Court to abuse its sound judicial discretion in the premises.
Otherwise, though, I agree that the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment of conviction and, therefore, join the judgment of the Court.
CAMPBELL, J., joins this opinionA11 emphasis is mine throughout unless otherwise indicated.