concurring.
I concur in the result which the majority has reached and generally agree with its reasoning. I write separately to emphasize that today’s decision, by endorsing the “reasonably debatable” standard of arbitral power, leaves unchanged the traditional limitations regarding judicial review of public employee grievance arbitration. Specifically, I wish to explain in greater detail why the majority has rejected the Township’s contention that arbitration in the public sector should be scrutinized for substantial credible evidence present in the record.
I
Before turning to the substantive issue involved, it may be instructive to briefly summarize the nature of grievance arbitration. Grievance arbitration is a mechanism for resolving disputes concerning the interpretation, application or violation of an existing collective agreement. See N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3; New Jersey State Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n Local 29 v. *225Town of Irvington, 80 N.J. 271 (1979). The arbitrator performs only two tasks: contract interpretation and factfinding. As such, grievance, as opposed to interest, arbitration does not involve a delegation of legislative power to the arbitrator. Rather, it merely constitutes a substitution by consent of the parties of an arbitral tribunal for the ordinary judicial process. That is, the parties voluntarily agree to have an arbitrator settle their disputes rather than bring a breach of contract action. See, e. g., Carpenter v. Bloomer, 54 N.J.Super. 157, 162 (App.Div. 1959); Anco Products v. T V Products Corp., 23 N.J.Super. 116, 123 (1952); Mount St. Mary’s Hosp. v. Catherwood, 26 N.Y.2d 493, 509, 311 N.Y.S.2d 863, 260 N.E.2d 508, 517 (Ct.App.1970) (grievance arbitration called quasi-judicial).
The advantage inherent in arbitration, from the viewpoint of the parties, is that it allows for “the final disposition, in a speedy, inexpensive, expeditious, and perhaps less formal manner, of the controversial differences between [them].” Carpenter v. Bloomer, supra, 54 N.J.Super. at 162. See, e. g., IMO Arbitration between Wilmer Grover, Jr., et al., 80 N.J. 221, 233 (1979) (Pashman, J., dissenting); N. J. Manu. Ins. Co. v. Haran, 128 N.J.Super., 265, 269 (App.Div.1974); Eastern Eng. Co. v. Ocean City, 11 N.J.Misc. 508, 510-511 (Sup.Ct.1933); Utah Const. Co. v. Western Pac. Ry. Co., 174 Cal. 156, 159-160, 162 P. 631, 632-633 (Sup.Ct.1917); McRae v. Superior Court, 221 Cal. App.2d 166, 170, 34 Cal.Rptr. 346, 349 (Dist.Ct.1963); Gaer Bros. Ins. v. Mott, 144 Conn. 303, 130 A.2d 804 (Sup.Ct.E.1957); First Nat. Bank v. Clay, 2 N.W.2d 85 (Iowa Sup.Ct.1942); Wilson v. Gregg, 208 Okl. 291, 255 P.2d 517 (Sup.Ct.1953); in re Smith, 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 625 (Sup.Ct.1955), app. dism., 350 U.S. 858, 76 S.Ct. 105, 100 L.Ed. 762 (1955); 5 Am.Jur.2d “Arbitration,” § 1 at 518-519. The parties to a voluntary arbitration agreement are normally free to provide their own method of selecting the arbitrator or arbitrators to be employed. They are thus able to choose an individual whose judgment they respect and who may have special training or expertise in the area in controversy.
*226In order to effectuate the goal of providing an alternate forum for the speedy resolution of disputes, judicial interference with the arbitrator’s role has been strictly limited. The grounds for vacating an arbitral award have been exclusively restricted to those set out in the pertinent statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8.1 See, e. g., Deakman v. Odd Fellows Hall Ass’n, Inc., 110 N.J.L. 304 (E & A 1933); Ukrainian Nat. Urb. Ren. Corp. v. Joseph L. Muscarelle, Inc., 151 N.J.Super. 386, 397 (App.Div.), certif. den., 75 N.J. 529 (1977); Local Union 560 v. Eazor Express, Inc., 95 N.J.Super. 219, 227 (App.Div.1967); Harsen v. Board of Ed. of W. Milford Tp., 132 N.J.Super. 365, 371 (Law Div.1975). Nowhere are courts authorized to vacate arbitral awards merely because the arbitrator’s decision is not based upon “substantial credible evidence” present in the record. Quite the contrary, we have emphasized that it is the arbitrator who is to be the judge of the facts and his contractual interpretation is to be upheld if the language is open to reasonable debate. See, e. g., Daly v. Komline-Sanderson Eng. Corp., 40 N.J. 175, 178 (1963); Ukrainian Nat. Urb. Ren. Corp. v. Joseph L. Muscarelle, Inc., supra, 151 N.J.Super. at 398; Standard Oil Dev. Co. Emp. Union v. Esso Research Eng. Co., 38 N.J.Super. 106, 119 (App.Div.1955); Harsen v. Board of Ed. of W. Milford Tp., supra, 132 N.J.Super. at 374. This is because it is the arbitrator’s judgment for which *227the parties have contracted. See, e. g., Anco Products v. TV Products Corp., 23 N.J.Super. 116, 123 (1952); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 1362, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424, 1429 (1960).
II
The Township urges us tó depart from this well-established restrictive standard of judicial review. It contends that in any case involving a public employee, courts should be free to scrutinize the facts upon which the award is based and vacate that award if they consider the evidence insufficient. Such an approach would throw a monkey wrench into the gears of the grievance mechanism.
Under the Township’s approach, the disappointed party to an arbitrated grievance would be encouraged to seek judicial review in hopes of gaining a reversal. Thus, another layer would be added to grievance procedures in which arbitration had been envisioned as the terminal step. This new layer would, of course, be attended by additional delay and expense. Arbitration would thus be converted into a springboard to litigation rather than remaining the end to it. See, e. g., IMO Arbitration between Wilmer Grover, Jr. et ah, supra, 80 N.J. at 238 (Pashman, J., dissenting); Igoe Bros., Inc. v. Nat’l Ben Franklin Fire Ins. Co., 110 N.J.Eq. 373, 377 (E & A 1932); Ukrainian Nat. Urb. Ren. Corp. v. Joseph L. Muscarelle, Inc., supra, 151 N.J.Super. at 401; Collingswood Hosiery Mills v. American Fed. of Hosiery Workers, 31 N.J.Super. 466, 473 (App.Div.1954); Korshalla v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 154 N.J.Super. 235, 240 (Law Div.1977). It is precisely for this reason courts in other jurisdictions have uniformly held that voluntary public employee grievance arbitration is to be subjected only to the traditional level of judicial *228scrutiny. See, e. g., School Comm. of W. Springfield v. Korbut, 373 Mass. 788, 369 N.E.2d 1148 (Sup.Jud.Ct.1977); Ferndale Ed. Ass’n v. School Dist. for Ferndale, 67 Mich.App. 645, 242 N.W.2d 481 (Ct.App.1976); State v. Berthiaume, 259 N.W.2d 904 (Sup.Ct.Minn.1977); Rochester City Sch. Dist. v. Rochester Teachers Ass’n, 41 N.Y.2d 578, 362 N.E.2d 977 (Ct.App.1977); Community Coll. of Beaver Cty. v. Community Coll. of Beaver Cty., Soc. of the Fac. (PSEA/NEA), 473 Pa. 576, 375 A.2d 1267 (Sup.Ct.1977); Joint Sch. Dist. No. 10 v. Jefferson Ed. Ass’n, 78 Wis.2d 94, 253 N.W.2d 536 (Sup.Ct.1977).
The Township’s argument for our departing from precedent is unconvincing. It contends that extensive review is necessary to prevent an undue delegation of legislative authority. However, as previously noted, grievance arbitration does not involve any delegation of power but, rather, merely replaces breach of contract actions with arbitral determinations.2 Moreover, there is no reason to believe that arbitrators are any less competent than courts in discovering the intent of the parties and applying it to the facts of the particular case.
The precedents relied upon by the Township are equally unavailing. The more expansive standard of review espoused by Div. 540, Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO v. Mercer Cty. Imp. Auth., 76 N.J. 245 (1978), was predicated upon the fact that the arbitration was compelled by statute. Justice Sullivan speaking for a unanimous Court there stated that:
Because it is compulsory, principles of fairness, perhaps even due process, require that judicial review be available * * *.
Also, because the arbitration is imposed by law, the judicial oversight available should be more extensive than the limited judicial review had under N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8 to parties who voluntarily agree to submit their dispute to binding arbitration. We conclude that when * * * the arbitration process is compul*229sory, the judicial review should extend to consideration of whether the award is supported by substantial credible evidence present in the record. [Id. at 253-254 (emphasis supplied, citations omitted)]
See Mount St. Mary’s Hosp. v. Catherwood, 26 N.Y.2d 493, 311 N.Y.S.2d 863, 260 N.E.2d 508 (Ct.App.1970) (compulsory interest arbitration involves substantial interference with property rights and due process therefore requires higher levels of scrutiny). Such stricter scrutiny is not mandated where, as here, the parties have submitted to arbitration of their own accord.
Our opinion in Div. 540, moreover, was concerned with “interest” arbitration rather than the grievance mechanism here at issue. In “interest” arbitration, the arbitrator is in fact empowered to create the terms of labor contracts to which municipalities would otherwise have to give their approval. It thus does involve a delegation of municipal (legislative) power to a third party, possibly justifying more expansive judicial scrutiny. In contrast, grievance arbitration merely involves the substitution of one third party—the arbitrator—for another—the courts.3
This fundamental difference between grievance and interest arbitration also distinguishes this case from City of Atlantic City v. Laezza, 80 N.J. 255 (1979) and New Jersey State PBA, Local 29 v. Town of Irvington, 80 N.J. 271 (1979). In any event, Irvington dealt with compulsory arbitration. Moreover, in Atlantic City, which did involve voluntary arbitration, we held merely that the arbitral award would be reviewed to determine whether the arbitrator had taken into account a municipality’s. Cap Law status, see N.J.S.A. 40A:4^45.1 et seq. Surely, this is a *230far cry from the Township’s conclusion that each and every factual finding made by an arbitrator in grievance cases should be subjected to scrutiny for “substantial credible evidence.”
Finally, any reliance upon Ridgefield Park Ed. Ass’n v. Ridgefield Park Bd. of Ed., 78 N.J. 144 (1978) is wholly misplaced. That case did not in any way call into question the standard of review to be applied to public employee arbitration. Instead, we held merely that certain decisions—those that were entrusted by law to governmental officials—could not be bargained away by a municipality. Here, however, no managerial prerogatives are involved and hence there is not delegation problem.
This is not to say that public employee bargaining must, in all respects, be viewed as identical to private sector negotiations. As the majority recognizes, our cases establish quite the contrary. Thus, the range of subjects over which public employers and employees may negotiate is more circumscribed than those open to private individuals. See Board of Ed. of Bernards v. Bernards Tp. Ed. Ass’n, 79 N.J. 311 (1979); State v. State Supervisory Emp. Ass’n, 78 N.J. 54 (1978); Ridgefieid Park Ed. Ass’n v. Ridgefield Park Bd. of Ed., 78 N.J. 144 (1978). And, of course, any arbitral award rendered pursuant to such illegally delegated authority is ineffective. Ridgefield Park, supra. See School Comm. of W. Springfield v. Korbut, 369 N.E.2d 1148, 373 Mass. 788 (Sup.Jud.Ct.1977); Binghamton Civ. Serv. Forum v. City of Binghamton, 44 N.Y.2d 23, 403 N.Y.S.2d 482, 374 N.E.2d 380 (Ct.App.1978). Public employee arbitration awards are thus more extensively reviewed for arbitrability than are their private counterparts.
Similarly, even within the sphere of proper bargaining subjects, public employers and employee representatives are subject to greater restraint than is private industry. The relationships between public employers and their employees are, in many respects, closely regulated by both statute and public policy. Negotiated agreements contravening such legislative enact*231ments or contrary to strong public policy are of no force and effect. State Supervisory Emp. Ass’n, supra. An arbitral interpretation reaching the same result would likewise be impeachable. See Bernards Tp. Ed. Ass’n, supra; Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Comm’n v. Teamsters Local No. 563, 75 Wis.2d 602, 250 N.W.2d 696 (Sup.Ct.1977). Such restrictions upon private sector bargaining are comparatively rare.
Finally, particular legislative acts may mandate—either expressly or by implication—that an arbitrator consider certain factors in reaching his determination. In such cases we will review the award to the extent necessary to ensure that the arbitrator did in fact take into account those statutorily required considerations. Cf. City of Atlantic City v. Laezza, supra; Div. 540, supra.
Nothing in these cases, however, sanctions or even suggests the wide ranging factual scrutiny which the Township would have us apply. Under its approach a judge would, for example, review as to factual accuracy an arbitrator’s determination that employee Smith was not ten minutes late on a specified date. I can hardly imagine a procedure which more clearly intrudes upon the arbitrator’s role. Such a break from traditional noninterference with the arbitral domain should—-if it is to be done at all—be accomplished by direction of the Legislature; it should not be “legislatively” imposed by this Court.
The majority today correctly rejects any such broad standard of judicial review. Instead, it quite properly assesses the award’s validity according to the “reasonably debatable” standard. See ante at 220-221. We thus reaffirm the traditional approach to the question of arbitral power. Except as noted above, see supra at 217-219, public sector arbitration is subject to the same level of judicial scrutiny as is its private counterpart—that is, courts may vacate such an award only where the statutory grounds are met. Although the majority does not *232fully explicate its reasoning, it is clear that it recognizes this rule and properly applies it to the facts at hand. I therefore concur.
Justice HANDLER joins in this concurring opinion. PASHMAN and HANDLER, JJ., concurring in the result. For modificationChief Justice HUGHES and Justices MOUNTAIN, JACOBS, PASHMAN, CLIFFORD, SCHREIBER and HANDLER—7. Opposed —None.That statute provides, in pertinent part:
The court shall vacate the award in any of the following cases:
a. Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means;
b. Where there was either evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or any thereof;
c. Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause being shown therefor, or in refusing to hear evidence, pertinent and material to the controversy, or of any other misbehaviors prejudicial to the rights of any party;
d. Where the arbitrators exceeded or so imperfectly executed their powers that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
In this respect, grievance arbitration differs from “interest” arbitration. See infra at 229.
The majority suggests that grievance and interest arbitration both involve a similar grant of power. (At 226 n. 1) It does so without any reasoned discussion. As demonstrated in this opinion, the majority’s conclusion in this regard is simply incorrect.