concurring and dissenting.
I agree with the Court today that Senate Bill 7 establishes an efficient system of public schools.1 I also agree with the Court’s analysis that equalized funding is required only to the point that efficiency is achieved and that unequalized supplementation thereafter. is constitutionally permissible. I further agree that the efficiency clause of article VII, section 1 contains a qualitative component and that efficiency must be measured not only by financial efficiency but also by its qualitative component. Therefore, I join in Parts I, II, and III of the Court’s opinion. In my view, school facilities are an integral part of an efficient system of public schools. Thus, I firmly agree that the Court in Part V of its opinion is correct to apply the constitutional analysis to Senate Bill 7 in its entirety. The trial court erred in segregating its analysis of facilities and in enjoining the issuance of bonds by local districts.2
Yet while I agree that Senate Bill 7 is constitutionally efficient under article VII, section 1, I cannot join in that part of the Court’s judgment upholding Senate Bill 7 because I find other constitutional infirmities in the legislation. In achieving efficiency, the State has so expanded its reliance on local property taxes to fund the entire public school system that the State has abdicated its constitutional duty to make suitable provision for public schools in violation of article VII, section 1 and has enacted a state ad valorem tax prohibited by article VIII, section 1-e. Consequently, I dissent.
I. Historical Failings
The principal education clause of our Constitution mandates that the State establish and make suitable provision for our public schools:
*485A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preservation of the liberties and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature of the State to establish and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools.
Tex. Const, art. VII, § 1 (emphasis added). Despite the direct constitutional mandate of article VII, section 1, the State has an unfortunate history of failing to live up to its constitutional responsibilities. Senate Bill 7 is another chapter in that ill-distinguished history.
The burden placed on the State to provide for public education derives from the Constitution of the Republic of Texas of 1836:
It shall be the duty of Congress, as soon as circumstances will permit, to provide by law a general system of education.
Constitution of the Republic of Texas, General Provisions § 5 (1836), reprinted in Tex. Const, app. 482, 490 (Vernon 1993). Although over four million acres of land were set aside by the Legislature at that time to establish a primary school system, the Legislature never established any state-wide educational system. Stewaet & Claex, The Constitution and Government of Texas 103 (1933); Stern, Comment, Judicial Promulgation of Legislative Policy: Efficiency at the Expense of Democracy, 45 Sw.L.J. 977, 981 (1991).
When Texas joined the Union in 1845, Texans adopted a new state constitution with a stronger education clause that called for preserving liberties through education:
A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature of this State to make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of public schools.
Tex. Const. of 1845, art. X, § 1, reprinted in Tex. Const, app. at 521. Again, the Legislature did not follow through on its constitutional obligations to public education and failed, until 1854, to establish a permanent school fund as required by article X, section 2 of the 1845 Constitution. Stern, supra, at 981. Even then, the first money invested in the permanent school fund, two million dollars, was subsequently loaned to the railroads. See FunKhouser, Education in Texas: Policies, Practices, and Perspectives 175 (6th Ed.1992); Journal of the Secession Convention of 1861, at 160 (1912); Stern, supra, at 982. The loans were not repaid. Stern, supra, at 982.
Texans adopted our current Constitution after Reconstruction in 1876. Once more, Texans placed the burden on the State’s Legislature to provide for the public schools. This time it was mandated that the State provide for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools.3 Tex. Const, art. VII, § 1.
Our current Constitution initially provided for only state funding of public education on a per student basis. Tex.Const. art. VII, § 5. Interestingly, it did not permit local entities to levy local taxes for the support of the public schools.4 City of Fort Worth v. Davis, 57 Tex. 225, 232 (1882). The State’s funding remained inadequate, however, and by 1883 Texans adopted an amendment to the Constitution that authorized the creation of local school districts and permitted all school districts to levy an “additional” property tax for the support of public schools.5 Tex.Const. art. VII, § 3. Since that time, *486the State has steadily shifted its constitutional obligation to provide for public schools to local property taxes and, as a result, has not only abdicated its constitutional responsibilities, but has struggled with equalizing the disparities created by that system.6
The State’s lackluster commitment to provide for the public schools is borne out by the numbers. Under the first comprehensive attempt at school finance reform in 1949, the Legislature established the Minimum Foundation Program, the predecessor of our current Foundation School Program, envisioning a guaranteed amount of resources per student with the State funding 80% and local taxes funding only 20%. Edgewood III, 826 5.W.2d at 495. Under this system, however, local districts were not required to raise any local funds to receive state funding for education. Id. at 496. By the mid-1980’s, state funding of the total educational costs had dwindled to only 42%, with local property taxes accounting for 50% and the remainder of funding provided by other outside sources. Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 392.
Senate Bill 7 is merely the same song, second verse. As has been the case for nearly 150 years, the State again has failed to adequately provide for the State’s public schools. The evidence is undisputed that the State’s Tier 1 funding, the $2,300 basic allotment, is insufficient for districts to provide a basic program of education that meets accreditation and other legal standards. See Tex.Educ.Code § 16.002(b).7 Not only is' it insufficient, but the basic allotment under Senate Bill 7 is less than was provided under Senate Bill 351. At every turn, the Legislature appears to be going backward and not forward.
More troublesome than the State’s failure to adequately fund a basic program of education, however, is the State’s reliance on and manipulation of local property taxes under the current system. Under Senate Bill 7, local property taxes continue to be the cornerstone of the State’s educational financing system with the State contributing only 43% of the funding for our public schools. Unlike prior financing schemes, Senate Bill 7 attempts to mask the State’s failure to adequately fund education by increasing the system’s reliance on local property taxes and then capturing those dollars under the guise of state funding. This unprecedented reliance on local property taxes under Senate Bill 7 renders the school finance system unconstitutional.
II. Unsuitability
The Court today reconfirms that suitability under article VII, section 1 is a justiciable *487issue. 893 S.W.2d at 469-70; Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 394. However, the Court effectively precludes any judicial review of suitability by giving the Legislature the virtually unfettered discretion to implement school financing schemes. The Court notes only that if the Legislature “substantially defaulted on” its responsibility to provide for education would the suitability clause be violated. 893 S.W.2d at 470. Because state funding has increased from $4.9 billion in 1988-89 to $7.2 billion in 1993-94, the Court refuses to otherwise examine the suitability of Senate Bill 7 in light of the constitutional mandate of article VII, section 1. Apparently, the Court believes there would be some point at which the total state dollars are so inadequate as to amount to a “substantial default” of the State’s responsibility to fund education, but the Court does not indicate what that point is. Assuming that the State will always spend billions of dollars on education, today’s decision renders the suitability clause meaningless.
By reducing the constitutional standard of suitability to total dollars spent, the Court has not only rendered that provision meaningless, but has also misconstrued the object of our review. The duty to establish and suitably provide for an efficient system of public schools is committed by the Constitution to the Legislature. Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d at 489. Our role is to determine whether the Legislature has complied with that duty. Id. Thus, our responsibility is to review the financing scheme in its entirety and determine whether the State has fulfilled its constitutionally mandated duty to suitably provide for the system of public schools. The Court’s analysis of suitability, focusing solely on total dollars spent, ignores the substantive provisions of the financing scheme enacted under Senate Bill 7.
Suitability, we have said, is an elastic term, depending upon the necessities of changing times or conditions. Mumme v. Marrs, 120 Tex. 383, 40 S.W.2d 31, 36 (1931). The constitutional obligation to suitably provide for public schools leaves to the Legislature the right to determine what is suitable; its determination will not be reviewed by the courts if the act has a real relation to the subject and object of the Constitution. Id. This standard of suitability gives the Legislature broad discretion, but limits that discretion by requiring a real relationship between the finance system and the subject and object of the Constitution. The Court cites to Mum-me in passing but otherwise ignores this standard without explanation.
To determine suitability first requires us to identify the basic educational program prescribed by the State as “essential” to the “general diffusion of knowledge.” We must then examine the scheme established by the State under Senate Bill 7 to suitably provide for the basic education program and determine if the financing system has a real relationship to the constitutional mandate. Reviewed accordingly, the financing scheme enacted under Senate Bill 7 fails to satisfy the suitability clause of article VII, section 1 because it shifts the burden to provide for the State’s public school system to local taxpayers.
The basic program of education prescribed by the State as essential is represented by Tier 1. Tier 1 purportedly guarantees sufficient financing for all school districts to provide a basic program of education that meets accreditation and other legal standards. Tex.EduC.Code § 16.002(b). Tier 2, the Guaranteed Yield Program, is designed to provide all districts with substantially equal access to funds to provide an enriched program and additional funds for facilities. Id. § 16.002(b). Unlike Tier 1, the State has provided Tier 2 funding to give all districts the opportunity to supplement the basic program at a level of its own choosing and to provide access to additional funds for facilities. Id. § 16.301.
Tier 1 represents the constitutionally minimum basic education program required by article VII, section 1 of the Constitution. Rather than fund what it has stated is the basic minimum educational program, however, the State has left Tier 1 to be funded first by local districts through local property taxes. Specifically, to receive any state funds under the Foundation School Program, all local districts must levy a Tier 1 tax of at least $.86 to attempt to raise the basic allotment of $2,300 per weighted student. Tex. *488Eduo.Code § 16.252(a), (d). Thus, in all districts, the local district must generate and spend its local tax dollars first to fund the basic program of education that the State is required to provide by statute and article VII, section 1 of the Constitution. The State will supplement local tax revenues to the extent that a district is unable to raise the Tier 1 basic allotment by taxing at $.86 per $100 valuation. Id. § 16.252(a). If a district is able to raise the funds for the basic education program envisioned under Tier 1 through its own local tax effort, it receives no Tier 1 funds.8
Tier 2 similarly is premised on significant local tax effort. Under Senate Bill 7, the State will guarantee a yield of $20.55 per student for each penny of additional local tax effort over $.86. Id. § 16.302. In essence, the State funds Tier 2 only to the extent that a local district is unable to generate a yield of $20.55 per student for each penny of tax effort. Moreover, it is undisputed that $3,000 to $3,500 is needed to meet accreditation and other legal standards. Accordingly, most districts must tax at well over $.86 to generate Tier 2 funds simply to meet their Tier 1 needs.9
The system adopted under Senate Bill 7 thus has turned the school finance system envisioned under our Constitution on its head. Our Constitution has imposed a mandatory duty on the State to suitably provide for the system of public schools and only permits local property taxes to supplement state funding. Tex. Const, art. VII, §§ 1, 3. Senate Bill 7 shifts that burden to local property taxpayers to provide for the public schools within their district through local tax dollars with state dollars supplementing only where the local districts cannot raise their Tier 1 and Tier 2 funds. By divesting the State of the obligation to make suitable provision, Senate Bill 7 bears no real relationship to the object of article VII, section 1. The State may not discharge its constitutionally mandated duty to suitably provide for the State’s public schools by passing off its obligation to local districts and local property taxpayers.
Although it is significant that under Senate Bill 7 state funding accounts for only 43% of total education dollars, the exact percentage split between state and local funding is not determinative of constitutional suitability under article VII, section 1. The Court has stated before, and correctly so, that the Constitution contains no requirement that public education be funded solely by state revenue and that local property tax revenues may play a role in financing an efficient system of public schools. Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d at 503; Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 500; Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 398. Accordingly, our Constitution permits joint state and local funding. Just as it is improper to measure suitability by looking solely at total state dollars spent, it would also be improper to evaluate suitability based solely on the percentage split between state and local funding. What is at issue is the substantive structure of the financing scheme adopted under Senate Bill 7. And that scheme abdicates the State’s constitutional duty to provide for a basic educational program and impermissibly shifts the burden to local taxpayers.
The State’s over-reliance on local property taxes under Senate Bill 7 is made more blatantly obvious through the capture 10 pro*489visions of Chapter 36. Tex.Educ.Code §§ 36.001-004. Through these provisions, the State forces up local property tax rates so that the State may capture the local districts’ “excess” taxable wealth and revenues and distribute the funds brought into the system as state dollars.11 Senate Bill 7 operates to bring into the system $400 million to $600 million12 each year in local property tax revenues to be distributed throughout the State to achieve fiscal neutrality under the efficiency clause of article VII, section 1. In other words, the mechanism adopted by the State to discharge its constitutional obligation to establish an efficient system of education is one that is wholly dependent upon local property tax wealth and tax revenues. The State’s manipulation of local property tax wealth and tax revenues under the guise of state funding should not be countenanced by the Court.
Because the State has abdicated its constitutional duty to establish and to suitably provide for an efficient system of public schools to the local districts, I would hold that Senate Bill 7 violates article VII, section 1 of the Texas Constitution.13
III. State Ad Valorem Tax
The State’s reliance on local property taxes in Senate Bill 7 leads to a second insurmountable constitutional obstacle: article VIII, section 1-e. The reliance on local property taxes is so great that Senate Bill 7 amounts to nothing more than a transparent attempt to circumvent the prohibition against a state ad valorem tax. See Tex. Const, art. VIII, § 1-e. Senate Bill 7 creates a state ad valorem tax and the Court errs in concluding otherwise.
Under Senate Bill 7 the State so completely controls the levy, assessment, and disbursement of tax revenue as to leave local districts virtually no meaningful discretion in deciding whether to tax or at what rate to tax. Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d at 502. The State mandates that all districts levy a tax of at least $.86 per hundred valuation to participate at all in the Foundation School Program and must tax at that rate to attempt to raise their own Tier 1 basic allotment funds. Tex. Eduo.Code § 16.252. The State sets the maximum tax rate at $1.50. Id. § 20.04(d). And as conceded by the State, the entire financing system devised under Senate Bill 7 to achieve a constitutionally efficient educational system is to force all districts to tax at the maximum rate of $1.50. Further, in reaching the ultimate and maximum tax rate of $1.50, local district discretion is severely restricted by mandatory roll back provisions requiring roll back elections for any tax increase of more than $.06. Tex.Tax Code § 26.08. There can be no question that the *490tax is mandatory and that local districts have no meaningful discretion in deciding whether to levy the tax or at what rate to tax.
Not only does the State control the levy and assessment of taxes but it also controls the disbursement of the tax revenues. The Court addresses this aspect of Senate Bill 7 with the unsupported conclusion that Senate Bill 7 does not “prescribe the distribution of proceeds.” 893 S.W.2d at 471. This is incorrect. Local tax revenues must be allocated first to cover the district’s local fund assignment. Tex.Edu&Code §§ 16.251(a), (b); .252(d); .254(a), (c). Any “excess” wealth, either in the form of taxable wealth or actual tax revenues generated from local tax effort, is distributed throughout the State under the capture provisions of Chapter 36. Id. §§ 36.001-004. The fact that districts have various options to achieve the equalized wealth level does not make the tax any less of a mandatory state property tax. Rather, the options for reducing “excess” wealth simply illustrate the extent of the State’s control and the rather elaborate scheme the State has contrived for capturing and distributing local tax revenue.
The Court stretches to avoid the conclusion that Senate Bill 7 imposes a state ad valorem tax by erroneously concluding that local districts have some discretion to tax at a rate less than $1.50. There is certainly no dispute among the parties that Senate Bill 7 contemplates full implementation with all districts taxing at $1.50 as soon as possible. This certainty is simply the result of the economic incentives built into Senate Bill 7. Property poor districts will tax at $1.50 to obtain the full benefit of the guaranteed yield.14 Since every penny of tax effort up to $1.50 by these districts generates $20.55 from the State, they will tax at $1.50 as soon as they can. Likewise, wealthy districts, losing a portion of their tax base due to the $280,000 cap, will be forced to raise their tax rate to $1.50 simply to maintain the revenue necessary to support their existing educational programming. There can be no real question that Senate Bill 7 requires all districts to tax at $1.50.
The State does not even attempt to defend Senate Bill 7 on the grounds that districts have discretion to tax at some rate less than $1.50. Rather, all of the State’s evidence at trial conceded and assumed that Senate Bill 7 would force all districts to tax at $1.50 at full implementation. While Senate Bill 7 may not set out expressly that all districts must tax at $1.50, the system enacted under Senate Bill 7 nevertheless requires all districts to tax at that level. In failing to recognize the economic realities to which the parties have acceded, the Court engages in a fiction that elevates form over substance.
The fact that article 2784g permits some districts to tax at rates up to $2.00 does not save Senate Bill 7 under article VIII, section 1-e. The Court must and does concede this point. The Court concludes that the $1.50 cap under section 20.09 of the Education Code is so significant, regardless of article 2784g, that if districts are forced to tax at $1.50 to achieve accreditation and other legal standards, the floor for the tax rate becomes a ceiling and divests local districts of discretion in setting their rate. 893 S.W.2d at 471. In this circumstance, the Court admits that “the conclusion that the Legislature had set a statewide ad valorem tax would appear to be unavoidable.” Id.
Moreover, simply because some districts have some discretion in setting their rates, even rates as high as $2.00, does not change the inevitable conclusion that Senate Bill 7 enacts a state property tax. Senate Bill 7 is wholly dependent upon local districts raising and contributing their local property taxes to fund in the first instance the State’s obligation to make suitable provision for primary education. In capping districts’ wealth at $280,000, Senate Bill 7 distributes local property taxes and local property tax wealth throughout the State to fund the State’s constitutional obligation to make this educational system efficient. The forced levy, at whatever tax rate, and distribution of local taxes or *491property tax wealth outside the district in satisfaction of the State’s constitutional obligation to provide for public schools amounts to an unconstitutional state ad valorem tax.15
Although scarcely mentioned by the Court, the State’s primary argument that the tax is not a state ad valorem tax is that participation in the Foundation School Program is not mandatory, and therefore, a local district need not levy any tax if it does not want to receive state funds for education. Perhaps the Court ignores this argument because it has so little merit.
The State cannot legitimately argue that Edgewood I.S.D. has any choice in deciding whether to participate in the Foundation School Program. Edgewood, with a taxable wealth per student of only $25,873, can generate only $2.59 per penny of local tax effort. Taxing at $.86, Edgewood can generate only $222.74 per student; taxing at the maximum $1.50, they can generate only $388.50 per student. When $3,000 to $3,500 is needed per student to meet the Tier 1 accreditation and other legal standards, it is clear that Edgewood must participate in the Foundation School Program and must levy the requisite taxes to provide the basic education to its students.16
Moreover, the State clearly views the local tax as mandatory as it concedes that fiscal neutrality is achieved only at all districts taxing at $1.50. If, as the State suggests, participation in the Foundation School Program were voluntary, those 104 school districts funding the equalization component of Senate Bill 7 could simply opt out of the Foundation School Program and take their $400 to $600 million in local tax revenues with them. Senate Bill 7 fails its essential purpose if the local tax is not mandatory.
Senate Bill 7 varies little from its predecessor Senate Bill 351. Senate Bill 7 has simply exchanged County Education Districts for local school districts, but with local tax revenues redistributed state-wide instead of county-wide. Senate Bill 7 mandates that districts levy a tax at a given rate, limits the local districts’ discretion to increase that rate to $.06 per year, caps the maximum rate at $1.50, envisions full implementation only when all districts are taxing at $1.50, and prescribes the distribution of the proceeds through the local fund assignment and capture provisions. Under Senate Bill 7, the State’s control over the levy, assessment, and distribution of local taxes is so great as to divest local districts of any meaningful discretion. Like its predecessor, Senate Bill 7 adopts a state ad valorem tax and violates article VIII, section 1-e.
IV. Conclusion
Although Senate Bill 7 actually closes the educational funding gap17 throughout the State, it does so at the expense of other constitutional provisions. We cannot shrink from our constitutional obligations and when, as here, there are several constitutional provisions at issue, we should be loathe to toler*492ate a violation of one provision in preference of another, no matter how lofty the goals of the legislation. The Legislature must establish and make suitable provision for the maintenance and support of an efficient system of public free schools and must do so without enacting a constitutionally prohibited state ad valorem tax. As long as the Legislature continues its inordinate reliance on local property taxes as the primary funding mechanism, the constitutional tensions will remain unresolved. Reliance on local property tax revenues challenges the efficiency of the system because of local wealth disparities. Ameliorating local wealth disparities through a system of mandatory local taxes and capture affronts the prohibition against state ad valorem taxes. The systemic change called for in Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 397, remains elusive.
Why the Court today chooses to reject its prior calls for systemic change and accepts as constitutional what we said was unconstitutional only three years ago is unclear. The Court’s action appears to be nothing more than an expression of frustration at its inability to extricate itself from this litigation. While I too find it unfortunate that after over ten years of litigation in Texas Courts we are no closer to a constitutional system of public education that provides for a general diffusion of knowledge, I am unwilling to sacrifice other of this State’s citizens’ constitutional rights to achieve efficiency in our schools.
[[Image here]]
Senate Bill 7 violates both article VII, section 1 and article VIII, section 1-e of the Texas Constitution. I would hold Senate Bill 7 unconstitutional in its entirety and would reverse the judgment of the trial court holding otherwise.
. I believe a credible argument can be made that the determination of what is an efficient, suitable educational system is a political question that this Court is ill-equipped to answer. See Kirby v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 761 S.W.2d 859, 867 (Tex.App.-Austin 1988), rev’d, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex.1989). That argument, however, was unanimously rejected by this Court. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex.1989) (Edgewood I). Therefore, we continue to try.
. Also, I concur in the Court’s disposition of the claims of the Gutierrez plaintiffs and Somerset districts. Accordingly, I join in Parts VI and VII of the Court’s opinion and in those portions of the Court's judgment.
.The Constitution of 1876 was adopted in response to the Radical Reconstruction period in Texas. Radical Reconstruction after the Civil War brought Texas a militaristic school system with the State exercising absolute authority over the training of Texas children. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex.1989) (Edgewood I). The Constitution of 1869 continued to place the burden on the State to provide for the support and maintenance of a system of "public free schools.” Tex Const. of 1869, art. IX, § 1, reprinted in Tex. Const, app. at 612. This system was funded by the permanent school fund, poll taxes, general taxes, and local taxes. Stewart & Clark, supra, at 104; Stern, supra, at 983 (1991). The system proved to be expensive and financially ruinous for the State. Stern, supra, at 983.
. However, article XI, section 10 of the Constitution did permit incorporated cities to levy local taxes to supplement state funds provided for public education. Davis, 57 Tex. at 234.
. Article VII, section 3 provides in pertinent part:
[T]he Legislature may also provide for the formation of school district [sic] by general laws; *486and all such school districts may embrace parts of two or more counties, and the Legislature shall be authorized to pass laws for the assessment and collection of taxes in all said districts and for the management and control of the public school or schools of such districts, ... and the Legislature may authorize an additional ad valorem tax to be levied and collected within all school districts heretofore formed or hereafter formed, for the further maintenance of public free schools, and for the erection and equipment of school buildings therein....
Tex. Const, art. VII, § 3 (emphasis added). With the 1883 amendment, article VII, section 3 provided for a state property tax to maintain and support public schools, hence the reference in that provision to an "additional” local property tax. The state property tax ultimately was abolished by constitutional amendment in 1968. Tex. Const, art. VIII, § 1-e.
. By 1915, disparities in local tax resources had grown such that the Legislature made a special appropriation of equalization aid for rural school districts that were already taxing at the maximum legal rate. Act of May 26, 1915, 34th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 10, 1915 Tex.Gen.Laws 22. Noting the disparities in local taxable wealth, the Court rejected challenges to this rural equalization aid in Mumme v. Marrs, 120 Tex. 383, 40 S.W.2d 31, 36 (1931), finding authority for such aid in article VII, section 1. The disparities have continued to this day resulting in five legal challenges to the State’s financing system, including the present challenge, in the last twenty-two years. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973); Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489 (Tex.1992) (Edgewood III); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex.1991) (Edgewood II); Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d 391.
. For the 1993-94 school year, the Commissioner of Education recommended and sought from the Legislature an appropriation of $8,683 billion. Tex.Educ Agency, Requests for Legislative Appropriations for Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, at 3 (1992). The Legislature declined to fully fund Senate Bill 7 appropriating only $7.2 billion. Act of May 27, 1993, S.B. 5, art. Ill, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1051, 1993 Tex.Gen.Laws 4518, 4988.
. For the 1993-94 school year, 294 districts, representing 1,652,643 students or 38% of all students in the State, will pay 50% or more of the costs of the Tier 1 basic education program. Over 100 school districts will pay virtually 100% of the cost of the basic education in their own districts and, in addition, put into the system $400 million to $600 million to pay for educating students in other districts throughout the State.
. The Court confuses Tier 1 and Tier 2 and concludes that Senate Bill 7 is adequate because districts can combine their Tier 1 and Tier 2 funds to provide the basic program of education that meets accreditation and other legal standards. Tier 1 and Tier 2 have very distinct statutory purposes. The fact that the Court and State give no meaningful distinction to Tier 1 and Tier 2 simply illustrates the unsuitability of Senate Bill 7.
.The Court, the trial court below, and the State all refer to the provisions of Chapter 36 as “recapture.” This is incorrect. Recapture presupposes that whatever is captured once belonged to or was owned by the person or entity that has re captured the item. The use of the term "recapture” continues the false pretense that the $400 million to $600 million in local property tax revenues brought into the system from the *489wealthiest districts constitute state funds. A more honest designation for these funds is “captured” local tax revenues.
The Court additionally falls into a far more dangerous trap. The Court approves the capture provisions of Senate Bill 7 by concluding that the $280,000 cap permits the State to utilize the "excess resources in the wealthiest districts.” 893 S.W.2d at 468-69. Excess of what? The property within a district has whatever value it has by virtue of market forces. The notion that the State may determine that an individual or entity has some level of wealth that is "excess” and that must be distributed to others is certainly new to Texas law and is contrary to the fundamental principles of private property upon which this Country was founded.
. In 1983-84, at the beginning of the Edgewood saga, the average local tax rate in the State was $.61. Texas Research League, Bench Marks 1993-94 School District Budgets 22 (1994). By 1988-89, local districts throughout the State averaged a tax rate of $.88 per hundred valuation. Id. By 1992-93, the average local tax rate jumped to $1.38 per hundred valuation, an increase of 57% over the 1988-89 rate. Id. To achieve fiscal neutrality, Senate Bill 7 requires all districts to be taxing at $1.50 by 1996-97.
. This money is captured from 104 of the State's 1042 school districts representing only 6% of the total students. These districts pay not only 100% of the costs of educating students in their districts, but bear the full responsibility of equalizing funding to the remaining 938 school districts.
. I join Justice Hecht’s view, 893 S.W.2d at 498, "that §§ 36.003(3) and (4) of the Education Code and the code sections which implement them, §§ 36.091-.096, and 36.121-.123, violate article VII, section 3 of the Texas Constitution.” I simply do not reach this issue because Senate Bill 7, at the threshold, does not pass constitutional muster. Additionally, I could not join Justice Hecht’s suggested injunction, at 498, as it would be too narrow a remedy to address my more significant concerns.
. As the Court notes, Senate Bill 7 raised the guaranteed yield maximum tax rate from $1.27 under Senate Bill 351 to $1.50, but reduced the amount guaranteed from $22.50 to $20.50. Because of the reduction in the amount guaranteed per penny of tax effort, districts naturally will be forced to tax at the $1.50 rate to maintain their guaranteed yield funding.
. The Court misconstrues the ban on state ad valorem taxes in article VIII, section 1-e as prohibiting only a "statewide” ad valorem tax where the State imposes on districts some uniform tax at a uniform tax rate. This is incorrect. There may be variations in the rate. What is determinative is that the State mandates the local tax and uses the revenues thus generated for state purposes.
. In fact, a district would have to have a wealth level per student of $260,740 to be able to raise the $2,300 basic allotment by levying the Tier 1 tax of $.86. Only 120 of the State’s 1042 districts have that wealth level or higher. Moreover, a district would need a wealth level of $348,837 to raise $3,000 at a Tier 1 tax rate. Only 75 districts have that wealth level or higher.
. While I agree generally with the Court's approach to efficiency, I think it important to note that the standard of efficiency first enunciated in Edgewood I is based upon a false premise. In defining efficiency solely as equal access to similar revenues for similar levels of tax effort, Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 397, the Court presumed that the property in high wealth districts was insulated from taxation and support for education because that property was taxed at relatively low rates. Id. See also Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 497. This presumption ignores the reality that, at least for residential properties, property values reflect the quality of education available in the district and that taxpayers often pay for education in the purchase price of their homes. That is to say, these property owners, in raw dollars, actually pay the same for their educational programs as is paid by other property owners in other ¡districts although the tax rate required to generate those dollars may be less.