dissenting.
This case is about a court that has come full circle. Just six years ago, faced with gross disparities in the school financing system, we unanimously decided that every school district must have similar revenues for similar tax effort. Today’s cobbled-together opinion rejects that mandate, and instead sanctions dissimilar revenues for similar tax effort. This holding is not based on any matters that were tried in the district court. Instead, it is based on the previously-rejected premise that the state’s constitutional responsibility is satisfied by providing most schoolchildren with the very least, and the favored few with the best money can buy. Because I believe this doctrine has no place in the field of public education, nor in the jurisprudence of this state, I dissent.
I.
Until today, there was a clear, simple test for determining whether the public school finance system was “efficient,” as required by article VII, section 1 of the Texas Constitution:
There must be a direct and close correlation between a district’s tax effort and the educational resources available to it; in other words, districts must have substantially equal access to similar revenues per pupil at similar levels of tax effort.
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex.1989) (“Edgewood I ”). Applying this test in Edgewood I, we held that the school finance system was inefficient because it failed to provide rich and poor districts with substantially-similar access to revenues. Id.
We also noted in Edgewood I that the finance system was inefficient in the sense that it failed to provide a “general diffusion of knowledge statewide.” Id. We made plain, however, that this failure was simply *500another result of the disparity in access to revenue:
Children who live in poor districts and children who live in rich districts must be afforded a substantially equal opportunity to have access to educational funds. Certainly, this much is required if the state is to educate its populace efficiently and provide for a general diffusion of knowledge statewide.
Id. (emphasis added).
We applied the same standard two years later, holding that the school finance system remained inefficient because it still failed to provide a “direct and close correlation between a district’s tax effort and the educational resources available to it.” Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491, 496 (Tex.1991) (“Edgewood II”) (quoting Edgeivood I, 777 S.W.2d at 397). There is no mention in Edgewood II of any requirement that the Legislature provide for a “general diffusion of knowledge”; our decision was based solely on the continuing disparity in access to revenue between rich districts and poor districts. Id.
The standard adopted in Edgewood I, and applied in Edgewood II, does not require equal spending in every district. Rather, the standard recognized the importance of local control: some districts might choose to tax and spend at higher levels than others. Thus, in both opinions, we noted that a local community could choose to supplement the financing of education. Edgewood II (on rehearing), 804 S.W.2d at 500; Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 398. We emphasized, however, that all districts must have the opportunity to provide such supplementation on a similar basis. In Edgeivood I, we explained that a district’s ability to supplement must not depend on its property wealth; instead, “any local enrichment must derive solely from local tax effoii." 777 S.W.2d at 398 (emphasis added).1 Similarly, in Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 500, we emphasized that local supplementation is permissible only “so long as efficiency is maintained” — in other words, so long as rich and poor districts still have substantially-similar access to revenues. At no point have we ever indicated that the basic mandate of Edgewood I — similar yield for similar effort — only applies to a particular range of tax rates.
In accordance with our prior opinions, the trial of this case focused solely on the issue of whether Senate Bill 7 provides all districts with substantially-similar access to revenue at similar tax rates. The property-wealthy districts tried to shift the focus away from this standard; but the district court was steadfast, calling the issue “very simple”:
THE COURT: ... This is the equity test of Edgewood I, does the bill meet it or not meet it. We’re not going to back up and retry all these issues that you lost on and that the Supreme Court has written on.
So I am not going to let us back up. If you have anything on what we’re here on today which is substantially the same revenue for substantially the same tax effort, then you need to ask that.
All you did, Mr. Olson, was articulate the whole theory of the first trial which was that there is some basic foundation that everybody is entitled to and over that it’s enrichment, and we don’t have to worry about it—
MR. OLSON: Your honor—
THE COURT: —and we’ve already crossed that bridge.
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That is not what this trial is about. This trial is about substantially equal revenue for substantially equal tax effort. That’s what we’re trying to figure out.
The State shared the district court’s view of “efficiency.” The State’s lead expert, who provided the bulk of the State’s evidence, testified that he understood this Court’s opinions to require very similar yields for equal tax effort across all wealth levels.
Neither the district court nor the parties could have foreseen that this Court would *501' abruptly change the ground rules for determining “efficiency.” An examination of the majority’s opinion shows how dramatically those rules have changed.
II.
The last time this case was before this Court, one justice authored an opinion criticizing the Edgewood I standard. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489, 524 (Tex.1992) (Edgewood III) (Cornyn, J., concurring and dissenting). The opinion urged this Court to decide “the substantive level of education our constitution requires”; and it repeatedly referred to this level as “a minimally adequate education.” Id. at 526-27. The opinion was especially critical of our unanimous holding in Edgewood I that “[t]he amount of money spent on a student’s education has a real and meaningful impact on the educational opportunity offered to that student.” Id. at 529-31 (quoting Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d at 393).
The position taken in this one-justice opinion, which advocated a standard very different from the one set out in Edgewood I, has now been adopted by a majority of this Court. According to the majority, the constitution requires the Legislature to provide a minimally-adequate education, which the majority describes as a “general diffusion of knowledge.” The majority concludes that Senate Bill 7 meets this requirement:
In Senate Bill 7, the Legislature equates the provision of a “general diffusion of knowledge” with the provision of an accredited education. By instituting the accountability regime set forth in Chapter 35, the Legislature has, we conclude, met its constitutional obligation to provide suitably for a general diffusion of knowledge.
893 S.W.2d at 463. The majority then recasts our Edgewood I standard as applying only to the provision of this minimally-adequate education:
The State’s duty to provide districts with substantially equal access to revenue applies only to the provision of funding necessary for a general diffusion of knowledge.
893 S.W.2d at 464 (emphasis in original).2 Because the present finance system enables every district to meet accreditation requirements, the majority necessarily concludes that Senate Bill 7 is efficient.
All of this will come as a surprise to the litigants. The “general diffusion of knowledge” requirement has never been a part of this case. Because the district court was applying the original Edgewood I standard, it severed out what it called “adequacy issues,” including the issue of “whether the legislature appropriates sufficient funds for districts to provide a constitutionally, minimally acceptable education.” Thus, there is virtually no evidence on this issue in the record.
The little evidence that did come in indicates that Senate Bill 7’s accreditation requirements do not even satisfy any previously-articulated concept of a “minimally acceptable education.” The author of today’s opinion has previously construed the constitution to require “an essential level of learning by which each child in Texas is enabled to live a full and productive life in an increasingly complex world.” Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d at 525-26 (Cornyn, J., concurring and dissenting). At the trial of the present case, the Texas Commissioner of Education testified, in regard to Senate Bill 7, that “our present accreditation criteria at the acceptable level ... does not match up with what the real world requirements are.”
But the majority shows no interest in any evidence on this issue. Nor is it concerned about input from the parties: in all of the voluminous briefing before this Court, no party makes any argument based on a “general diffusion of knowledge” requirement. On its own initiative, the majority simply seizes upon these four words; equates them with accreditation requirements; and decides that our constitution requires no more.
The consequence of this holding is obvious. Accreditation requirements may be so lax that any school district in the state, no matter how underfunded and lacking in facilities, *502will meet those requirements. The poorest districts will have no practical means of improvement, because the State is now excused from providing any funding above the bare minimal level. Wealthier districts, meanwhile, will have access to enormous revenues with even the slightest marginal tax effort.
The majority’s only defense against this problem places the Court in an inherently untenable role. The majority asserts that “the State’s provision of a general diffusion of knowledge must reflect changing times, needs, and public expectations.” 893 S.W.2d at 466 n. 14. Evidently this Court is to continually reassess the state’s accreditation requirements to determine whether they are satisfactory. The Court is to make this critical determination based on its own collective wisdom, without regard to any evidence or briefing. Even the expert opinion of the Commissioner of Education will be dismissed as irrelevant.
Until recent years, the enormous complexity of the school system was thought to make efficiency a political question not suitable for judicial review. See Kirby v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 761 S.W.2d 859, 867 (Tex.App. —Austin 1988) (reversed by Edgewood I). Under Edgewood I, though, this Court was able to assess the efficiency of the school finance system by reference to a clear standard: similar access to similar revenues at similar levels of tax effort. The simplicity of this standard is what made the enforcement of article VII, section 1 justiciable.
Today’s departure from the strict Edge-wood I standard will mire the judiciary in deciding purely political questions. Even if we could speak coherently on such issues, addressing them at all is inconsistent with the proper role of the judiciary.
III.
Senate Bill 7, as construed by the majority, plainly violates the standard set out in Edge-wood I. Under the majority’s writing, Senate Bill 7 places no meaningful cap on tax rates. Thus, by authority of a special law adopted in 1953,3 districts containing 37 percent of the weighted students in the state may presently impose operations and maintenance taxes of up to $2.00. Additionally, the Legislature is now free to remove the present $1.50 cap on other districts, so any district in the state will be able to tax at whatever level it chooses.
Given this reading, Senate Bill 7 does not provide districts with substantially-equal access to similar revenues per pupil at similar levels of tax effort. Because the state provides no funds at rates in excess of $1.50, every additional penny of tax effort above that level generates 28 times more in the wealthiest districts than it does in the poorest. Thus, at a $2.00 tax rate, the richest districts will enjoy $6,146 per weighted student, while the poorest can only generate $3,608 per weighted student.
The majority defends Senate Bill 7 by asserting that districts in the three lowest wealth groups will be able to provide a “general diffusion of knowledge” with a $1.31 tax rate, while districts in the three highest wealth groups must tax at approximately $1.22. 893 S.W.2d at 465 & n. 12. These figures are skewed in two important respects. First, even accepting all of the majority’s assumptions, the wealthiest group of districts will actually be able to meet accreditation requirements at a rate of $1.12.4 Thus, the majority is tolerating a 19-cent difference — rather than a 9-cent difference— in the tax rates that rich and poor districts must levy to meet accreditation requirements.
Second, though the majority does not say so, its yield figures are based on the assumption that districts will still be maintaining their 1993 tax rates in 1996-97. The record shows that this assumption is groundless. In the five years before trial, districts raised *503their tax rates by an average of about 12 cents per year; and all parties agreed that districts would continue to raise their rates to at least $1.50. The average tax rate in 1992-93 was already $1.29. Thus, we may safely assume that many districts are presently on the edge of the “equalized system,” if not outside it, so the disparity in yield is undoubtedly far greater than the majority suggests.
The inescapable truth is that poor districts will now be much worse off than rich districts, even if tax rates do not go far beyond $1.50. At full implementation of Senate Bill 7, a $1.50 tax rate in the richest school districts will generate $4,421 per weighted student. That level of revenue is simply beyond the reach of the poorest school districts; even if they were to tax at a rate of $3.00, they could only generate $4,317 per weighted student.
The unfairness of this system is exacerbated by Senate Bill 7’s failure to include any provisions for facilities. With operations and maintenance taxes approaching $1.50 already, there is little room left in Tier 2 for meeting facilities needs. This is not a significant problem for the wealthiest districts, since they are able to generate significant additional funds from them own tax bases by levying debt taxes. Poor districts, however, are able to generate only a small fraction of those amounts. Poor districts are thus forced to choose between funding current operations and funding capital expenditures.
The record demonstrates that this problem is as pervasive now as it was at the time of Edgewood I. Expert testimony established that $3 billion was needed to upgrade facilities to meet minimum standards, and that the poorer districts were in greater disarray than others. A 1992 Texas Education Agency study introduced at trial confirms this appraisal; it concludes that poor districts have older buildings, and have proportionately more space in portable buildings.5 The report details the extent of the more pressing needs: for example, 281 high schools have no rooms designed to be science labs;6 694 campuses have no gymnasiums, and an additional 8,139 have insufficient gym space to meet them needs; 482 campuses have no libraries, and an additional 4,041 campuses have insufficient library space to meet their needs. Children, teachers, and parents in these districts might well have difficulty accepting the view that “there is no direct correlation between money and educational achievement.” Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d at 530 (Cornyn, J., concurring and dissenting).
Given this $3 billion need, poorer districts will not be able to carry the necessary debt service within a $1.50 tax rate. As of 1992-93, the poorest districts in the state already had debt tax rates averaging 33 cents. Testimony at trial established that a poor district would have to double or triple its rate to 66 or 99 cents to have the same level of funding for facilities as districts from average wealth on up.
Several experts testified that meeting facilities needs would impair the ability of poorer districts to provide for current operations. The district court accordingly found that a poor district that diverts Tier 2 funds from operations to facilities might be unable to meet accreditation requirements. Thus, under either the Edgewood I standard or the standard adopted today, this Court has the constitutional responsibility to leave the present injunction in place.
⅝ ⅜ ⅜ ⅝ ⅜ ⅝
Like another court did twenty-two years ago, the majority today leaves this state with only the hope that the Legislature will voluntarily choose to provide all children with similar educational opportunity. Unfortunately,
in the meantime, countless children unjustifiably receive inferior educations that ‘may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.’
*504San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 71-72, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1316, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494, 74 S.Ct. 686, 691, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1964)).
. The majority, not surprisingly, completely omits this language from its opinion, even though it relies heavily on other language in the very same sentence. 893 S.W.2d at 463 (quoting, in part, the sentence in Edgewood I stating that our holding did not preclude communities "from supplementing an efficient system established by the legislature; however....”).
. The majority does not provide any page cite for this assertion, because nothing resembling it can be found in any of our previous Edgewood decisions.
. Tex.EducCode Aux.Laws art. 2784g (Vernon 1995) [Act of May 14, 1953, 53rd Leg., R.S., ch. 273, 1953 Tex.Gen.Laws 710, amended by Act of Feb. 12, 1959, 56th Leg., R.S., ch. 7, 1959 Tex. Gen.Laws 14],
. At trial, the State presented its evidence by individual wealth group, each including five percent of the weighted students in the state. Because the gap between the poorest and wealthiest is so dramatic, the majority extrapolates its own alternative data by averaging the figures for the three highest and lowest groups.
. The TEA study is based on information collected in the course of the statewide school facilities inventory required by statute. See Tex.Educ.Code § 16.401. The report states that it was intended to provide “a useful basis for discussion of the costs associated with meeting the state’s needs.”
. There was testimony at trial regarding a science teacher in Brownsville who has never had a lab to teach in, even though the State ostensibly requires that his students have a certain number of hours of lab experience.