(dissenting in part), I am unable to agree with that portion of the majority opinion wherein the action of the trial court in dismissing the plaintiff’s appeal as to the granting of the special permit is approved. A change of zone or the granting of a special use which is dependent for its proper functioning on action by other agencies and over which the zoning commission has no control cannot be sustained unless the necessary action appears to be a probability. Stiles v. Town Council, 159 Conn. 212, 221, 268 A.2d 395; Farina v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 157 Conn. 420, 254 A.2d 492; see Faubel v. Zoning Commission, 154 Conn. 202, 210, 224 A.2d 538; Brustein v. Zoning Commission, 151 Conn. 101, 105, 193 A.2d 523; Luery v. Zoning Board, 150 Conn. *316136, 145, 187 A.2d 247; Whalen v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission, 146 Conn. 321, 326, 150 A.2d 312; Gordon v. Zoning Board, 145 Conn. 597, 603, 145 A.2d 746. This does not mean that a zoning commission cannot act because action by local and state highway departments or other governmental agencies will be required. In Stiles, supra, where extensive action by other agencies, both state and local, was required, there was evidence before the zoning authority from which a finding could be made that it was probable that the appropriate action would be taken. Under these circumstances the action of the zoning authority in changing the zone and granting a special use was upheld. In the present case no such evidence was presented.
I am particularly concerned about the following language in the majority opinion: “With the recent legislative indication of approval of greater flexibility in modern zoning administration and the development of the floating zone concept, the strict application of the rule as stated in Stiles v. Town Council, 159 Conn. 212, 221, 268 A.2d 395, to instances of exceptions and special use permits may often prevent desirable changes where the accomplishment of the change depends upon cooperative or dependent action by the zoning authority and other municipal agencies over which it has no control. In such instances it is, of course, desirable, where feasible, that the zoning authority ascertain that there is a reasonable probability that such action will eventuate. In many circumstances, however, other municipal agencies may properly be reluctant to commit themselves to a course of action before knowing that if such a commitment is made it will meet such conditions as the zoning authority will deem advisable. Such a stalemate is clearly undesirable. Under such *317circumstances where cooperative action is necessary to accomplish a desirable result a stalemate can best be avoided by approval which may be conditional. We would, accordingly, hold that where an exception or a special permit is granted and the grant is otherwise valid except that it is made reasonably conditional upon favorable action by another agency or agencies over which the zoning authority has no control, its issuance will not be held invalid solely because of the existence of any such condition.”
The plain meaning of this holding is that a zoning authority should follow the rule of Stiles, Farina and Faubel when it deems it feasible and that it may ignore it when it sees fit so to do by making its action “reasonably conditional upon action by another agency, or agencies over which the zoning authority has no control.” The result of such a ruling will be chaos instead of order.
The minutes of the defendant commission contain the following findings concerning traffic and safety as related to the application for the change of zone: “The road system is capable of handling the demands in an adequate fashion. In order to insure efficiency and safety, some physical improvements, as well as supervisory control over traffic movements at peak times will be necessary... . Although we believe the 500' of Partrick Road which will serve as the primary access to the site is capable of handling the demand, improvements are considered;/ necessary to provide efficiency and safety. These improvements will be discussed under the Special Permit consideration. . . . Other safety considerations are built-in to requirements for improvements and traffic control covered in the Special Permit requirements.”
The commission then proceeded to approve the *318change of zone and considered the application for a special permit under the provisions of chapter 9 of the regulations. The authority of the commission is limited by the regulations to the imposition of on-site conditions for the approval of a special permit. There is no authority in the regulations to impose off-site conditions. The commission voted to grant a special permit in accordance with numerous conditions. The on-site requirements were carefully considered and the plaintiffs raise no question as to their validity, since the imposition of such conditions is authorized by the regulations. The commission also laid down certain other conditions and off-site requirements. It required as a condition that Par-trick Road be widened to three lanes for a distance of 500 feet and for evergreen plantings to be made on either side of the road; that the applicant pay at least 50 percent of the cost of the road improvements and be solely responsible for providing the required trees along the roadside. It directed the applicant to regrade the embankment on the southeast side of the intersection of Newtown Turnpike and to relocate a section of Newtown Road. It also required that the applicant provide three traffic policemen at various locations on public highways at certain hours of the day to direct traffic and to provide safety for the area. It assumed the mantle of the traffic authority by designating the direction of the flow of traffic on public highways and the location of signs to be placed there. Another condition required the applicant to construct a school bus parking area on the west edge of Oakwood Lane on town property to serve school children in the area in a safe manner. The desire to achieve safety for the residents of Westport is commendable, but the commission had absolutely no power or authority to do these things.
*319An examination of the zoning regulations applicable to the granting of a special permit indicates that the authority to impose conditions is limited to such as may be carried out on the site of the property in question. “Where, as here, a special exception ... is involved, the board may impose conditions only to the extent allowed by the zoning regulations themselves. Huhta v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 151 Conn. 694, 697, 202 A.2d 139; Service Realty Corporation v. Planning & Zoning Board of Appeals, 141 Conn. 632, 636, 109 A.2d 256.” Shulman v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 154 Conn. 426, 429, 226 A.2d 380. “The improvement of public streets involves the expenditure of public funds and the approval of municipal agencies over which the . . . [commission] has no control.” Farina v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 424.
Even if regulations had been adopted authorizing the defendant commission to impose such conditions, such regulations would be invalid. To determine whether a regulation was within the authority of the commission to enact we do not search for a statutory prohibition against such an enactment; rather, we must search for statutory authority for the enactment. Avonside, Inc. v. Zoning & Planning Commission, 153 Conn. 232, 236, 215 A.2d 409. No administrative or regulatory body can modify, abridge or otherwise change the statutory provisions under which it acquires authority unless the statute specifically grants it that power. Finn v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 156 Conn. 540, 546, 244 A.2d 391; State ex rel. Huntington v. McNulty, 151 Conn. 447, 449, 199 A.2d 5. Section 8-2 of the General Statutes provides for no such grant of authority to planning and zoning commissions.
The trial court was not in error in dismissing the *320plaintiffs’ appeal from the action of the defendant commission in approving a change of zone. There was error in the action of the defendant commission in granting the special permit and the case should be remanded to the Court of Common Pleas with direction to sustain the plaintiffs’ appeal as to the granting of the special permit.