Concurring.
I join the Majority Opinion, which correctly holds that mandamus relief against the Department of Corrections is inappropriate in this matter. I write separately to further address the options available to a sentencing judge in a violation of probation/parole (“VOP”) hearing, as well as the proper manner by which to challenge an alleged failure to award sentencing credit for time served in the VOP context.
First, I note that the unappealed sentence of the VOP judge here was perfectly proper under the only existing appellate precedent concerning the VOP time credit issue before us, an opinion by Judge (now Justice) Eakin in Commonwealth v. Bowser, 783 A.2d 348 (Pa.Super.2001), allocatur denied, 568 Pa. 733, 798 A.2d 1286 (2002). The sentence was also consistent with the only existing law prior to Bowser on related matters involving the powers of VOP sentencing judges. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 443 Pa.Super. 479, 662 A.2d 658 (1995), allocatur denied, 544 Pa. 607, 674 A.2d 1071 (1996) (credit for time previously served in prison required in VOP context only because VOP court imposed statutory maximum sentence; in that instance, failure to accord time credit would result in illegal aggregate sentence exceeding statutory maximum).
*452The facts that are relevant here are that: (1) appellee’s underlying claim of an entitlement to have his VOP sentence credited with the time he served prior to his original sentence ripened the very moment his VOP sentence was imposed; (2) appellee should have raised his sentencing credit argument by contemporaneous objection, or on post-sentencing motions, or on direct appeal, or via a petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) 1; and (3) appellee failed to do so, instead seeking to employ mandamus to have the Department indirectly undo the VOP judge’s reasoned sentencing scheme. Had appellee challenged the sentence in the appropriate fashion on direct appeal, the VOP sentencing judge would have had an opportunity to rule on the matter, explain the basis for his decision, and if he thought the claim had merit, award appropriate relief. The Superior Court then could have ruled on the propriety of the decision (as it did in Williams and Bowser) and, if relief were deemed required, remanded with instructions, see Commonwealth v. Goldhammer, 512 Pa. 587, 517 A.2d 1280 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 950, 107 S.Ct. 1613, 94 L.Ed.2d 798 (1987) (upon sentencing remand, trial court may reconsider entire sentence where appellate court’s ruling altered trial court’s sentencing scheme for protection of society and rehabilitation of criminal); and this Court could have intervened if we thought the issue worthy of discretionary review. Even after appellee failed to seek relief directly, the PCRA afforded him a second bite at the apple and a second potential for rational review of his sentencing claim, again beginning with the sentencing judge, the authority in the best position to assess his claim in the first instance.2
The. basis for appellee’s sentencing credit claim did not spring into existence only after he reported to prison; it *453existed all along, and he had ample opportunity to litigate the claim. The fact that appellee clads the waived sentencing claim in mandamus clothing should not have confused the Commonwealth Court into thinking that it was obliged to create a new and extraordinary avenue for collateral attack on sentences. In recent years, this Court has repeatedly emphasized that the PCRA is the “exclusive vehicle for obtaining state collateral relief on claims which are cognizable under the PCRA.” Commonwealth v. Robinson, 575 Pa. 500, 837 A.2d 1157, 1162 (2003) (collecting cases). As a consequence, this Court has also consistently disapproved of the judicial creation of ad hoc exceptions to the PCRA, such as employing the fiction of “nunc pro tunc ” awards of relief so as to create a mechanism to avoid the clear requirements of the PCRA. Id. at 1158. See also Commonwealth v. Hall, 565 Pa. 92, 771 A.2d 1232 (2001) (PCRA petitioner cannot pursue reinstatement of direct appeal rights nunc pro tune outside framework of PCRA). Because appellee failed to challenge his sentence, despite an opportunity to do so before the sentencing court and/or on direct appeal, his exclusive potential collateral remedy sounded under the PCRA. Appellee neglects to address his failure to pursue these defaulted avenues of review.
Because appellee’s waived sentencing claim was subject to collateral review either under the PCRA or not at all, I obviously agree with the Majority that the mandamus relief awarded by the Commonwealth Court in this case was erroneous. A claim of entitlement to sentencing time credit could implicate the ministerial duties of the Department and could be a proper subject of mandamus review, but only if the judgment of sentence lawfully ordered that time credit be awarded and the Department then refused to comply with that lawful directive. See Jackson v. Vaughn, 565 Pa. 601, 777 A.2d 436, 438 (2001) (“Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that will only lie to compel official performance of a ministerial act or mandatory duty where there is a clear legal right in the plaintiff, a corresponding duty in the defendant, and want of any other appropriate and adequate remedy.”). No such time credit was ordered by the VOP judge here; accordingly, the *454Department was not authorized to violate the sentencing order by awarding time credit on its own. Mandamus cannot properly issue against the Department in such a situation.
Furthermore, even if the merits of appellee’s claim for sentencing credit were reviewable on mandamus, I believe it is clear that the claim lacks merit. The Sentencing Code consists of eight subchapters, encompassing “General Provisions,” “Sentencing Authority,” “Sentencing Alternatives,” “Informational Basis of Sentence,” “Imposition of Sentence,” “Further Judicial Action,” “Appellate Review of Sentence,” and “Registration of Sexual Offenders.” Not surprisingly, Section 9760 of the Sentencing Code, which deals with credit for time served, is found in Subchapter E, which governs “Imposition of Sentence.” That Subchapter also addresses related matters such as the computation and order of service of sentences, id. § 9761, places of confinement, id. § 9762, and the types of sentence which may be imposed—e.g., guilt without further penalty, probation, partial confinement, total confinement, intermediate punishment. Id. §§ 9753-56, 9763.
In contrast, the sentencing court’s power of “modification or revocation of order of probation” is addressed only in Sub-chapter F, which governs “Further Judicial Action” after sentence has been imposed. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771. Though quite detailed otherwise, Section 9771 makes no reference whatsoever to time credit. With respect to revocation of probation, it states that the court “may revoke an order of probation upon proof of the violation of specified conditions of the probation.” Id. § 9771(b). Once probation is revoked, the Section provides that “the sentencing alternatives available to the court shall be the same as were available at the time of initial sentencing,” with consideration being given to the time spent on probation. Id. The provision goes on to require that a hearing be held before probation is revoked, id. § 9771(d), and also to impose the following, single limitation upon the VOP judge’s sentencing determination:
(c) Limitation on sentence of total confinement.—The court shall not impose a sentence of total confinement upon revocation unless it finds that:
*455(1) the defendant has been convicted of another crime; or
(2) the conduct of the defendant indicates that it is likely that he will commit another crime if he is not imprisoned; or
(3) such a sentence is essential to vindicate the authority of the court.
Id. § 9771(c).
Thus, the judge in a VOP sentencing proceeding faces very different questions than he does when formulating an initial sentence. The VOP judge is faced with rather unique concerns—concerns not present at initial sentencing—of whether his probationary order and conditions have been violated; if so, whether that violation warrants revocation or some lesser response; if revocation is warranted, whether a sentence of total confinement is warranted; and, if total confinement is warranted, how long the term of confinement should be. The notion that a VOP judge should go to the trouble of formulating a revocation sentencing term which is commensurate with the violation, but then be required to discount the term formulated for that distinct purpose to account for already-credited time served prior to the initial sentence, is absurd as well as impractical. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1); Commonwealth v. Gillespie, 573 Pa. 100, 821 A.2d 1221, 1225 (2003). To double-credit time previously served ignores the very nature of a VOP sentencing proceeding; it is not required under the only provision of the Code addressing VOP sentencing; and I would not read Section 9771 as if it sub silentio imported the inapposite requirement from Section 9760.
Perhaps the temptation to overstate the effect of Section 9760 derives from the practical fact, which was recognized by the Superior Court in Williams, that a previous period of incarceration may limit the sentencing options of a VOP judge in the sense that it prevents him from imposing a maximum statutory sentence because an aggregate sentence beyond the statutory maximum would be illegal. Thus, in the case sub judice, where appellee had already served twenty months and six days on these offenses, the greatest minimum VOP term of *456incarceration that could have been imposed for any of appellee’s first degree felonies would be eight years, three months and twenty-four days (i.e., ten years minus twenty months and six days). Viewed in this light, a VOP judge adequately “credits” a defendant for “time spent in custody” so long as he does not impose a VOP sentence which, when combined with the initial sentence, exceeds the statutory maximum.
In this regard, I believe that the Superior Court’s approach in Bowser reflects an accurate understanding of the nature of VOP sentencing options, which stands in contrast to the Commonwealth Court’s approach in the case sub judice:
Appellant received ... a maximum of 23 months incarceration and a consecutive 36-month term of probation. He received credit on the former for time spent in jail, and was paroled. While serving the probationary portion of the sentence, his probation was revoked.... He now wants time previously credited to his incarceration component to be credited to the sentence he received upon revocation of his probation component.
Having received credit for the time in jail on the first component of the sentence, appellant did not spend the last half of the 23-month incarcerative portion of the sentence in jail. Probation began after that credit. Credit has been given once; had no credit been given, he would not have been paroled [as early as he was] ... and his probation would not have begun for some months thereafter. We see no reason to award duplicate credit in the second component of the sentence.
783 A.2d at 349-50 (footnote omitted). So long as the aggregate sentence (initial sentence plus VOP sentence) is less than the statutory maximum, I would hold here, as Justice Eakin did in Bowser, that duplicative credit for time served is inappropriate. The VOP sentence here, therefore, was legally sound.
Finally, even if I were able to agree with the Commonwealth Court’s contrary reading of the Sentencing Code, I would still disagree with its grant of relief for the further *457reason that the VOP sentencing judge should have been afforded an opportunity to respond to that new reading. The Commonwealth Court’s reading of the Code would essentially require VOP judges to go through the following cumbersome four-part process after finding that total confinement is appropriate: (1) determining what term of incarceration the VOP warrants; (2) adding the previous term(s) of incarceration already served to the term distinctly warranted by the VOP; (3) announcing a new aggregate sentence; and then (4) announcing a “credit” against that aggregate. The notion that a VOP judge is required to offset previous time served against any new VOP sentence he fashions, and thereby must fashion a VOP sentence which is inflated to account for the previous time served to be offset, is certainly novel and would mark a clear departure from existing law. A VOP sentencing judge cannot be faulted for failing to anticipate this reading of the Code, and if such were to become the law, the judge should be given the initial opportunity to fashion a VOP sentence that reflects both the punishment he thought appropriate for the VOP and the endless and duplicative time credit that would have been required by the Commonwealth Court’s convoluted reading.
The question of whether a VOP judge properly “credited” the probationer for time already served on the original sentence is primarily a question implicating the VOP sentencing judge’s intention in crafting an appropriate sentence. The VOP judge here alone knows what his intention was in sentencing appellee to two to four years’ state imprisonment without awarding duplicative “time credit” against the VOP sentence. Appellee’s failure to seek timely review via direct appeal or through the PCRA has silenced the VOP judge. The judge being presumptively rational, it is safe to assume that he determined that the VOP alone warranted an additional two to four years’ imprisonment in a state correctional facility, in addition to the county time that he was well aware that appellee had previously served. For all the Commonwealth Court knows, the trial court consciously “credited” appellee for his previous sentence by not imposing consecutive *458sentences, or harsher ones. Since the judge likely intended that appellee serve two to four years in addition to his previous county term—a perfectly legal sentence—the Commonwealth Court should have afforded him the opportunity to effectuate that scheme.
. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541 etseq.
. Since appellee did not raise his time credit claim via a direct appeal from the VOP proceeding, the sentencing claim would be waived under the PCRA. However, appellee could have resurrected the claim in the usual way that waived claims are resurrected under the PCRA: i.e., by forwarding a derivative claim that his VOP counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the failure to award time credit, or by arguing another exception to the PCRA waiver provision.