concurring.
Because this Court held that the 1974 burglary conviction used to enhance applicant’s sentence in the present case (attempted capital murder) was void due to a fundamentally defective information, it appears initially applicant is entitled to relief in the form of a *21new sentencing hearing.1 However, I would file and set this cause to reconsider our opinion in No. 71,833 on the ground that the doctrine of laches should have been applied at that time, and, therefore, he may not now be entitled to relief.
While we have never applied the doctrine of laches to applications for writs of habeas corpus filed under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 11.07, federal courts and the courts of several states have long recognized the equitable doctrine of laches in this area. See Rule 9, 28 U.S.C. 224; Strahan v. Blackburn, 750 F.2d 438, 441 (5th Cir.1985); Walters v. Scott, 21 F.3d 683, 683 (5th Cir. 1994); Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 116 S.Ct. 1293, 1298, 134 L.Ed.2d 440 (1996); Falkner v. State, 586 So.2d 39 (Ala.Crim.App.1991); In re Stankewitz, 40 Cal.3d 391, 220 Cal.Rptr. 382, 708 P.2d 1260 (1985); Thomas v. State, 903 P.2d 328 (Okla.Crim.App.1995); Flute v. Class, 559 N.W.2d 554 (S.D.1997).
The doctrine of laches does not impose an absolute deadline analogous to a statute of limitations by which an applicant must file his habeas corpus petition in order to have it considered on the merits. It is my opinion, however, that a twenty year interval between the date of conviction and the date of filing of the habeas corpus application challenging the validity of that conviction may well be per se unreasonable.2 As laches is a concept rooted in principles of equity, to allow challenges to decades-old non-capital convictions, absent the most compelling showing of good cause justifying such a delay, is not equitable to the State and offends the interest society has in finality of judgments in criminal cases.
Accordingly, I would file and set this application in order to determine:
(1) Whether the doctrine of laches should be adopted by this Court and, if so, whether it should be applied in the present case; and
(2) In light of Studer and the 1985 amendment to Texas Constitution, Article 5, Section 12(b), should we revisit our holding in Cause No. 71,833 and, thereby, apply Stu-der to all applications for writ of habeas corpus filed after the date our holding in Studer became final.
However, as the Court is presently not inclined to address the applicability of the doctrine of laches to writs filed pursuant to Article 11.07,1 join the opinion of the Court.
. Ex parte Patterson, No. 71,833 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (unpublished).
. It should be noted that, under current law, applicant would not be able to challenge the validity of the 1974 burglary conviction as the information was not fundamentally defective and he did not timely challenge the information via pretrial objection. Studer v. State, 799 S.W.2d 263 (Tex.Crim.App.1990).