Commonwealth v. Pokorny

CAVANAUGH, Judge,

concurring:

I agree with the result reached by the majority that appellee should be resentenced since it appears from the record that the lower court sentenced in deviation from the *389guidelines. However, I do not rely upon the holding in Commonwealth v. Septak, from which I have written a dissenting opinion. Rather, a review of the record shows that the lower court sentenced on the basis of an erroneous offense gravity score and for that reason remand is required.

Appellee, Carl Pokorny, pled guilty to unlawful restraint and conspiracy to commit unlawful restraint. Neither of these misdemeanor charges are contained in the bills of information. Nothing contained in the information, therefore, may be construed as putting appellee on notice of facts giving rise to application of the deadly weapon enhancement. Since appellee did not plead guilty to any of the original charges, he may not be sentenced on the basis of them.

The offer of proof presented by the Commonwealth at the guilty plea colloquy did refer to appellee’s possession of a gun during certain portions of the criminal episode. Therefore, unlike in Septak, there has been a showing that appellee was alerted to his use of a deadly weapon. Appellee did not challenge the Commonwealth’s recitation of the facts at the guilty plea hearing and, in response to questioning by the court, indicated his agreement with the factual presentation made by the assistant district attorney.

Therefore, I agree that, under these circumstances, the lower court erred in failing to apply the deadly weapon enhancement provision of the sentencing code.

I believe it is clear from the record that the lower court applied the sentencing guidelines for a felony of the second degree, with an offense gravity score of “six.” This was error since both of the crimes to which appellee pled guilty were misdemeanors. The offense gravity score for a misdemeanor of the first degree is “three.” I agree that the lower court has discretion to deviate reasonably from the sentencing guidelines upon an adequate statement of its reasons for so doing.