Beckwith v. Beckwith

KELLY, Associate Judge

(concurring):

While I do not doubt that the trial court had authority to order the appellant to submit herself and her child to blood grouping-tests, I am not persuaded that D.C.Code 1973 § 16-2343 is the source of this authority. My reading of the legislative history of § 16-2343 leads me to believe that it applies only to proceedings to establish paternity, D.C.Code 1973, § 11-1101(11), actions brought against a putative father to enforce support of his child. D.C.Code 1973, §§ 11-1101(3), (10) and actions seeking custody of minor children, D.C.Code 1973, § 11-1101(4).

As the majority states, the predecessor statute to D.C.Code 1973, § 16-2343 was limited specifically to the paternity cases, the pertinent language being: “When it is relevant to the prosecution or defense of an illegitimacy action . . . .” In its present form, the section provides:

When it is relevant to an action over which the Division has jurisdiction under section 11-1101, the court may direct *549that the mother, child, and the respondent submit to one or more blood tests to determine whether or not the respondent can be excluded as being the father of the child, but the results of the test maybe admitted as evidence only in cases where the respondent does not object to its admissibility. Where the parties cannot afford the costs of a blood test, the court may direct the Department of Public Health to perform such tests without fee. D.C.Code 1973, § 16-2343.

Concededly, the first clause of the section as amended appears to apply this provision to all actions under which the Division has jurisdiction pursuant to D.C.Code 1973, § 11-1101, including divorce, where paternity is relevant. In my judgment, however, this interpretation is not supported by its legislative history.

The provision was first introduced in the House as part of House Bill No. H.R. 16196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). In that bill the provision appeared, in the identical language in which it ultimately was enacted, under the heading “Subchapter II.—Paternity Proceedings." The committee report which accompanied H.R. 16196 explained that:

The provisions of this subchapter relate to the establishment of paternity and to provide for the support of children born out of wedlock. [H.R. Rep. No. 907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. at 58 (1972).]

The. committee noted that one purpose of the subchapter was to separate jurisdiction over paternity proceedings from that of juvenile cases and to provide that paternity proceedings become civil rather than quasi-criminal as had been the case under then existing statutes. Id. at 58-9. Another stated purpose of the subchapter was to allow the Corporation Counsel to “bring an action on behalf of a wife or child . . . to enforce the support of the wife or child where it appears that a public burden has been incurred or may be incurred.” Id. at 59. With respect to blood tests, the report stated:

When blood tests are relevant to an action filed under this subchapter, the court may direct the mother, child, and respondent to submit to one or more tests to determine whether the respondent can be excluded as being the father of the child. The results of any test may be admitted only where the respondent does not object. [Id., at 59; emphasis supplied.]

No mention is made in the report of anj legislative intent to extend the application of the blood test provision beyond those proceedings specifically referred to in the report. Consequently, I do not believe we can infer that Congress intended to extend this provision to divorce proceedings. Accordingly, I would rest the trial court’s authority to order the blood tests on Super. Ct.Dom.Rel.R. 35(a), which provides:

Order for Examination. When the mental or physical condition (including the blood group) of a party, or of a person in the custody or under the legal control of a party, is in controversy, the court may order the party to submit to a physical or mental examination by a physician or to produce for examination the person in his custody or legal control. The order may be made only on motion for good cause shown and upon notice to the person to be examined and to all parties and shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination and the person or persons by whom it is to be made.1

The notice and motion' requirements of the rule, as the majority notes, have been served by the attention given to the motion for reconsideration.

. See Beach v. Beach, 72 App.D.C. 318, 114 F.2d 479 (1940).