Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by
Cercone, J.:While I agree with the majority in reversing appellant’s conviction for burglary, I would also reverse his conviction on the robbery charge because of the lower court’s admission of the statements appellant made on the night of the crime.
The pertinent facts are as follows: Appellant and a companion were drinking beer and playing pool at Dominic Mandarano’s tavern in the afternoon and evening of January 19, 1974. At some time after 9:00 P.M., Mandarano, while sitting at the bar watching television, was struck from behind and knocked to the floor by appellant’s companion, a stranger to Mandarano. Appellant *611and his companion were the only two customers remaining in the tavern at this time. Mandarano remained conscious and saw appellant’s companion remove $150 to $250 from his pocketbook and another $110 from the cash register located behind the bar. Appellant was not present when his companion struck Mandarano; he had left moments before the assault and did not return.
Louis Vecchio and Charles Gapen, who were in Vecchio’s bar across the street from Mandarano’s tavern, observed appellant leave and enter the Mandarano tavern several times during the evening. After the attack on the tavern owner, Bruno Mandarano, the victim’s son, along with Gapen and Vecchio, accompanied the State Police in their search for appellant and his companion, who were the only suspects at that time. Appellant was located at his stepfather’s residence at approximately 2:00 A.M. He was taken to the patrol car and was asked to sit in the front seat where he was questioned by Trooper Michael Hertig of the State Police in the presence of Vecchio, Gapen and Bruno Mandarano who were seated in the back seat of the car. Trooper Hertig immediately read appellant his constitutional rights from the standard State Police waiver form which the Commonwealth introduced into evidence.1 Trooper Martinelli, while stand*612ing outside of his patrol car, heard Trooper Hertig read the rights as well as the waiver paragraph at the bottom of the standard waiver form. Although appellant stated that he understood his rights, he refused to sign the waiver form. Although the testimony of the witnesses other than the troopers was somewhat ambiguous and vague concerning the giving of the rights, all were sure that the form was read to the appellant. At the suppression hearing Gapen testified that appellant said, “I have been on both sides of the fence,” and also that appellant stated he understood his rights before questioning. At trial, Trooper Hertig was of the opinion that appellant had been drinking shortly before this first confrontation but was not intoxicated. The witnesses’ estimates of the length of the initial interview vary between twenty minutes to one hour.
The officers then proceeded to a magistrate’s office and, apparently on the basis of facts gathered in this interview, obtained a warrant for appellant’s arrest. The troopers then went to appellant’s sister’s home where appellant had told them he would be staying. At approximately 7:30 A.M. they arrested appellant and read to him his constitutional rights and the arrest warrant. However, they did not seek a waiver of rights from him at that time. At this point it appears that appellant again made a series of incriminating statements.
In addition to this prevailing argument that his burglary conviction violated the relevant provision of the Crimes Code,2 appellant contends that his incriminating statements to the police officer-witnesses were not given pursuant to a valid waiver of his right to remain silent and that, therefore, his robbery conviction should be reversed.3 I agree.
*613It is clear that a person under custodial interrogation who has been properly informed of his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to counsel may elect to waive these constitutional rights and permit questioning without counsel. However, any waiver must be knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily given. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); Commonwealth v. Purvis, 458 Pa. 359, 326 A.2d 369 (1974), Commonwealth v. Alston, 456 Pa. 128, 317 A.2d 241 (1974); Commonwealth v. Simms, 455 Pa. 599, 317 A.2d 265 (1974); Commonwealth v. Banks, 454 Pa. 401, 311 A.2d 576 (1973). In determining voluntariness the totality of the circumstances, including the defendant’s physical and mental state, must be considered. Commonwealth v. Hallowell, 444 Pa. 221 (1971). The waiver must be the product of the defendant’s free and uncoerced discretion. The duration and the methods of interrogation, the conditions of detention, the attitude of the police toward the defendant, the defendant’s physical and psychological state and all other conditions present which may serve to drain one’s powers of resistance to coercion and undermine self-determination — all must be considered in deciding whether the defendant has waived his right to silence. Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 460 Pa. 516, 333 A.2d 892, 894-95 (1975). The burden to prove a valid waiver by a preponderance of the evidence is upon the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Fogan, 449 Pa. 552, 296 A.2d 755 (1972). In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court said: “An express statement that the *614individual is willing to make a statement and does not want an attorney followed closely by a statement could constitute a waiver. But a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained.” 384 U.S. at 475.
In the instant case all witnesses agreed that on the first occasion appellant refused to sign the waiver of rights form but indicated that he “understood his rights.” Appellant was then questioned and made various contradictory and incriminating statements.
In Commonwealth v. Youngblood, 453 Pa. 225 (1973), our Supreme Court, in a similar case in which a defendant had refused to sign a waiver of rights form but had then proceeded to answer police questions stated:
“In concluding that the Commonwealth has not sustained its burden as to voluntariness, see Commonwealth v. Nathan, 445 Pa. 470, 477, 285 A.2d 175 (1971)i we adopt the reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which held in an analogous situation that ‘. . . the defendant’s refusal to sign the waiver form, followed by an apparent willingness to allow further questioning, should have alerted the agents that he was assuming seemingly contradictory positions with respect to his submission to interrogation. Instead of accepting the defendant’s equivocal invitation, the agents should have inquired further of him before continuing the questioning to determine whether his apparent change of position was the product of intelligence and understanding or of ignorance and confusion. However, no further inquiry took place. In the absence of such an inquiry we are compelled to conclude that the defendant’s ... responses to the questions asked him were not made after a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights.’ United States v. Nielsen, 392 F.2d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 1968). See also United States v. Jenkins, 440 F.2d 574 (7th Cir. 1971).
*615“Our position today is not inconsistent with prior decisions of this Court. In three recent cases we have held that a defendant’s initial exercise of Miranda rights did not foreclose a later waiver. In each instance, however, the waiver was preceded by a complete reexplanation of those rights, conspicuously absent in this case. Commonwealth v. Grandison, 449 Pa. 231, 296 A.2d 730 (1972); Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 445 Pa. 1, 281 A.2d 852 (1971); Commonwealth v. Franklin, 438 Pa. 411, 265 A.2d 361 (1970) .” (Emphasis added.) 453 Pa. at 233-234.
The Commonwealth bears a “heavy burden” to prove that the accused understood his rights. Commonwealth v. Goldsmith, 438 Pa. 83 (1970). In the instant case, may the statement by appellant that he understood his rights combined with his responses to questioning be taken together to show a valid waiver where appellant also refused to sign a proffered waiver form? I think not. This case is illustrative of a similarly ambiguous and contradictory position taken by the accused in the Nielsen and Youngblood cases.4 Here, as in those two cases, there is no evidence in the record of an express statement by the appellant that although he “understood” his rights, he chose to waive them. Without a further determination by the interrogating officers that appellant waived as well as understood his rights, the reason for his refusal to sign the waiver, combined with responses to questioning, remained unclear. There is no evidence on the record that the officers attempted to clear up the ambiguity or attempted to explain to appellant that his *616refusal to sign the waiver did not of itself preclude the use of his statements against him. Contrary to an interpretation of implied waiver, the evidence is equally susceptible to an inference that the appellant thought that nothing he said could be used against him as long as he chose not to sign the waiver form. This appears- to be precisely the kind of situation envisioned by our Supreme Court in Youngblood, supra, in which an accused’s contradictory position remained unclarified on the record, thereby precluding any finding of a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of Miranda rights. Commonwealth v. Goldsmith, supra, 438 Pa. at p. 86.
This situation is distinguishable from that in Commonwealth v. Canales, 454 Pa. 422 (1973) in which an accused gave an oral statement to a police officer, insisting that nothing be written down. There appellant contended that this should have alerted the police to the fact that he was not waiving his rights knowingly, intelligently or voluntarily. However, in Canales the accused said to the interrogating officer, “it will be your word against mine,” giving rise to an inference that the accused was aware that bis oral statements could be used against him in court and, that he felt that he could prevail in a credibility contest against the police officer. Canales’ statements were held admissible because the court concluded that the waiver was knowing and intelligent. In the instant case, we hold that the facts surrounding this initial interrogation of appellant fail to support a valid waiver of his Miranda rights.5
*617We conclude that all statements made to the investigating officers, including those made at the time of appellant’s arrest only a few hours after the initial interrogation, were inadmissible against him because of the infirmities of the initial interrogation. At the time of his arrest appellant was again advised of his Miranda rights. However, he was not at that time requested to execute a waiver of those rights. Apparently appellant then made several unsolicited and incriminating statements. Although volunteered statements are not barred by the Fifth Amendment, and the police need not stop and warn those who make statements not elicited by questioning, Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at 478; Commonwealth v. Davis, 462 Pa. 27, 336 A.2d 888 (1975), I do not feel that this is such a situation. I view the second confrontation as part and parcel of the first interrogation since there existed a direct relationship between the two confrontations, separated as they were by only a few hours during which appellant was sleeping. In fact, during the first interview the investigating officers made it clear to appellant that they would probably be returning to continue questioning him first thing in the morning. It is quite likely that appellant again concluded that nothing he said could be used against him because of his previous refusal to sign the waiver form.
In Betrand Appeal, 451 Pa. 381, 388 (1973), our Supreme Court enunciated the test for determining whether a subsequent statement is “tainted” by an initial illegality by the authorities. In Betrand, the court said:
“The seminal case on this issue is Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963), where the Supreme Court announced that the relevant test is: c... whether granting establishment of the primary *618illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.’...
“The Supreme Court also noted that the challenged evidence may be purged of the primary taint only (1)' if it results from 'an intervening independent act of a free will,’ Wong Sun, supra at 486 .... or (2) if the connection between the arrest and the evidence has 'become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.’ ” 451 Pa. at 388-889.
In Commonwealth ex rel. Craig v. Maroney, 348 F.2d 22, 29 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1019 (1966), the Third Circuit noted two factors of major significance in determining the relationship between an illegal custodial act and subsequent statements: (a) The proximity of the illegal custodial act to the statements; and, (b) The intervention of unrelated circumstances subsequent to the arrest that provide a cause so unrelated to the original illegality that the statement may not be said to be directly related to or derived from the illegality.
Here, appellant’s statements at the time of his arrest followed the initial custodial questioning by only a few hours. Further, there were no “unrelated circumstances” subsequent to the initial illegal custodial act to purge the unsolicited statements of the initial taint. In view of our determination that there was a direct causal connection between the initial custodial interrogation and appellant’s later unsolicited statements, we hold that the entire process was tainted by the failure of the police to determine whether appellant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.
Accordingly, appellant’s convictions for burglary and robbery should be reversed.
Hoffman and Spaeth, JJ., join in this concurring and dissenting opinion.
. “My name is Trooper Michael D. Hertig. I wish to advise you that you have an absolute right to remain silent; that anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law; that you have a right to talk to an attorney before and have an attorney present with you during questioning, that if you cannot afford to hire an attorney, one will be appointed to represent you without charge before any questioning, if you do desire. If you decide to answer any questions, you may stop any time you wish.
WAIVER
I fully understand the statement advising me of my rights and I am willing to answer questions. I do not want an attorney and I understand that I may refuse to answer questions any time during the questioning. No promises have been made to me, nor have any threats been made against me.
Signature
. Act of December 6,1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, §1, 18 Pa. C.S. §3502 (1973).
. It is of interest that, outside of appellant’s statements to the investigating officers, there is little evidence connecting him *613to the crime. Aside from the appellant’s statement, it could be determined only that he was present at the scene of the crime, but not at the time of the robbery; that he had arrived with the person who struck the victim Mandarano and was the actor’s companion; and that appellant left the tavern a few moments before the victim was struck and robbed. A strong suspicion of guilt is not sufficient to support a conviction. Commonwealth v. Herman, 227 Pa. Superior Ct. 326 (1974). Commonwealth v. Wilson, 225 Pa. Superior Ct. 513 (1973).
. In Nielsen, supra, a suspect after being advised of his rights declined to sign a waiver of rights form. However, he then refused an offer to call his attorney, saying “it could wait til later on in the morning” and then told the F.B.I. agents that they could “proceed with the questioning.” The court held that the government had not established a waiver. See also United States v. Crisp, 435 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1970) and United States v. Stuckey, 441 F.2d 1104 (3d Cir. 1971).
. Commonwealth v. Martin, .... Pa. (1975), upon which the majority herein relies in affirming the lower court’s decision to allow appellant’s statements into evidence, was only a plurality opinion (Justices ROBERTS, Nix and Manderino concurred in the result, and Justice Eagen dissented). Therefore, its precedential value is suspect. Furthermore, the plurality opinion stated that questions of voluntariness turn on the facts of the particular cases, and that the record in Martin satisfied the plurality that “Martin was aware of his rights and voluntarily gave *617the oral statements now challenged.” .... Pa. at .Martin, of course, was not questioned in a police car at 2:00 A.M. while confronting three of his accusers, including the son of the victim.