dissenting. I agree with the majority’s conclusion that Judge Coffey engaged in serious misconduct. I also agree with the majority that Judge Coffey was complicit in an intentionally fraudulent transfer because she took valuable property and aided her husband in shielding it from creditors, including the PCC, an arm of this court, and that she ignored and interfered with the commands of a valid supreme court order, thereby *192adversely affecting the administration of justice. I further agree with the majority that the purpose of the intentionally fraudulent transfer and disregard of this court’s order “stemmed from selfish motives,” which allowed use of the shielded monies to make improvements and to build equity in Judge Coffey’s private residence. Additionally, I agree with the majority that Judge Coffey’s conduct caused the PCC to incur unnecessary costs in recovering its debt and inflicted “actual damage to the integrity and public perception of the judiciary.” I also agree with the majority that Judge Coffey did not fully cooperate with the PCC and the JCC. I also agree with the majority that Judge Coffey was less than forthright with and made evasive and misleading statements to the JCC. I disagree, however, with the majority’s conclusion that the aforementioned conduct by a sitting judge who served as a member of the JCC for a number of years warrants only a three-year suspension. Simply put, when one whose job it is to enforce the law, instead interferes with and disregards the law to her own benefit, the public rightfully questions whether the judicial system itself is worthy of respect. It is impermissible for a judge’s conduct to threaten the credibility of the court. As such, I would indefinitely suspend Judge Coffey from sitting as a judge to protect the public and to maintain the integrity of the judiciary.
A judge has a duty to be honest. See Sup. Ct. R. 38, Canon 1 commentary (a judiciary with integrity requires honest judges). Implicit in the duty of honesty is a duty to be candid and forthright and to avoid making misrepresentations and statements that are deceptive or evasive. The record, as reflected in the majority opinion, amply supports the majority’s conclusion that Judge Coffey’s statements to the JCC were evasive, misleading and less than forthright. The JCC also found her cooperation was compromised based, in part, upon her statements.
In our attorney discipline cases we have recognized that not only lying, but also “attempting to mislead the [disciplinary] committee in an effort to cover up [misconduct] . . . evidences serious disregard for the institutions the respondent as an attorney has sworn to protect and uphold, and disbarment is the only sanction that will truly protect the public and maintain public confidence in the bar under these circumstances.” Fitzpatrick’s Case, 132 N.H. 211, 217 (1989) (emphasis added); Budnitz’ Case, 139 N.H. 489, 493 (1995). Thus, we increase the sanction imposed when a respondent is dishonest to the disciplinary committee even if the dishonesty stems from an attempt to mislead rather than from an outright lie. Moreover, even the AJS Study, adopted by the majority, factors into the judicial sanction determination whether the judge was candid, less than forthcoming, or gave evasive testimony to the disciplinary committee. AJS Study, supra at 82.
*193It is undeniable that Judge Coffey engaged in a continuous course of misconduct over a period of years. See Bosse’s Case, 155 N.H. 128, 132, 134 (2007) (distinguishing between cases where we disbarred attorneys based upon misconduct “involving] a continuing course of dishonest conduct, including lying to the PCC” from those cases resulting in a lesser sanction that stemmed from “an isolated instance of misconduct”). In addition to her complicity in an intentionally fraudulent transfer in 2003, Judge Coffey disregarded and interfered with the explicit commands of a valid court order over a period of years, from August 2005 through November 2007, and she repeatedly gave deceptive and evasive statements to the JCC or its representatives from January 2007 through December 2007. As the JCC found, Judge Coffey had considerable funds available far in excess of the amount needed to satisfy this court’s order and the funds were available on multiple occasions after we issued the order. Therefore, Judge Coffey’s conduct was ongoing, and the majority should have increased her sanction accordingly.
“Judges personify the justice system upon which the public relies to resolve all manner of controversy, civil and criminal.” Matter of Mazzei, 618 N.E.2d 123, 125 (N.Y. 1993). “It is a great public trust. Indeed, judges are the most visible symbol of the rule of law in our society.” Snow’s Case, 140 N.H. 618, 627 (1996). “[Deception is antithetical to the role of a Judge who is sworn to uphold the law and seek the truth.” Matter of Collazo, 691 N.E.2d 1021, 1023 (N.Y. 1998) (quotation omitted) (sanction imposed on judge was removal where he gave false statements in judicial discipline proceedings); see Matter of Mazzei, 618 N.E.2d at 126 (sanction imposed on judge was removal where judge completed and submitted false credit card application, used the card, and made misrepresentations to investigating bank).
Applying our current jurisprudence, if an attorney engaged in serious misconduct by partaking in an intentionally fraudulent conveyance, ignoring and interfering with the commands of a valid court order, giving evasive and misleading testimony to the disciplinary committee, thereby failing to cooperate fully with that committee, and personally benefiting from such misconduct, that attorney, undoubtedly, would be disbarred. We cannot hold our judges to a lesser standard.
Indefinite suspension is the most severe sanction that this court can impose upon judges — just as disbarment is the most severe sanction that this court can impose upon attorneys. Our constitution allows judges to “hold their offices so long as they behave well.” N.H. Const. pt. I, art. 35. When they do not, we are empowered to implement the constitutional mandate by taking the necessary disciplinary measures short of removal. In re Mussman, 112 N.H. 99, 102-03 (1972). Thus, indefinite suspension *194falls within the ambit of the exercise of our constitutional authority. It has never been the tradition of the jurisprudence of this court to refuse to exercise judicial power when there was an established need for it and there was no constitutional barrier to its exercise. Id. Therefore, this court has previously recognized its authority to indefinitely suspend a judge. See In re Mussman, 112 N.H. at 103 (recognizing our authority to order suspension of a judge); In re Mussman, 113 N.H. 54, 57 (1973) (ordering judge suspended from sitting on the bench so long as he is suspended from practicing law, which was indefinitely); cf. Welanko’s Case, 99 N.H. 413, 414 (1955) (ordering indefinite suspension of attorney).
The determination as to whether or not the legislature or the Governor and Council should remove Judge Coffey is an issue that is solely within their province. Our role is solely to issue appropriate discipline. Where, as here, a sitting judge has committed the above-described “serious misconduct,” a severe sanction is required. By her actions, she has demonstrated a continuing disregard for the integrity of the judicial system. Moreover, Judge Coffey’s “conduct is fundamentally inconsistent with the responsibilities of judicial office.” In re Graziano, 696 So. 2d 744, 753 (Fla. 1997); see Fitzpatrick’s Case, 132 N.H. at 217 (attempting to mislead the disciplinary committee evidences a serious disregard for the institutions that the respondent swore to protect and uphold); In re Renke, 933 So. 2d 482, 496 (Fla. 2006) (removing judge from office). While I recognize the majority’s concerns that a lengthy suspension adversely affects the administration of justice occasioned by a judge’s absence, such effect on the judiciary pales in comparison to the alternative of failing to apply the appropriate sanction.
It is the “duty and responsibility of courts to . . . protect the judicial processes from being brought into disrepute and to act vigorously when confronted with acts or conduct which tend to obstruct or interfere with the due and orderly administration of justice.” State v. Moquin, 105 N.H. 9, 11 (1963).
Without judges who follow the law themselves, the authority of the rule of law is compromised. Cf. Snow’s Case, 140 N.H. at 627. Accordingly, the sanction imposed must take into account the concerns of future litigants who appear before Judge Coffey and question why they would need to follow the rule of law that she imposes upon them when she herself has not followed the law.
Given the serious nature of the misconduct in this case, and after considering the available authority and applying the relevant factors, I would hold that an indefinite suspension without pay is necessary in order to maintain the integrity of the judiciary, maintain public confidence in the *195judiciary, and prevent similar acts of misconduct in the future. See Petition of Judicial Conduct Comm., 151 N.H. 123, 126 (2004); Petition of Thayer, 145 N.H. 177, 181 (2000).
I respectfully dissent.