dissenting and concurring in part.
I write separately with regard to sections I and II of the majority’s opinion. With respect to the search and seizure, I concur with the majority’s holding that there was no Fourth-Amendment violation; however, I respectfully dissent from its reasoning. As to the closure of the courtroom, I respectfully, but completely disagree, with the majority. Because I believe a reversible constitutional error was committed when the trial justice ordered the partial closure of the courtroom, I would vacate the judgment of conviction and order a new trial for the defendant.
I. Search and Seizure
A. Consent
I cannot agree with the majority that Jennifer Barkmeyer consented to Det. Swierk’s warrantless entry into her home and his subsequent seizure of the rope from the closet in the bedroom she shared with defendant. Given the constitutional implications of warrantless searches, courts have required that consent be “unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by duress or coercion.” Robinson v. State, 578 P.2d 141, 144 (Alaska 1978); State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 547 (Tenn.1992) (citing Liming v. State, 220 Tenn. 371, 417 S.W.2d 769, 770 (1967)). Consent to search may be either express or implied by the encompassing circumstances. See United States v. Jaras, 86 F.3d 383, 390 (5th Cir.1996). Various courts have refused to find implied consent when a suspect remained silent, absent the presence of any accompanying gestures.19 See id. at 390; United States v. Shaibu, 920 F.2d 1423, 1427 (9th Cir.1990).
In contrast, courts have found implied consent when one who is silent provides any one of a variety of cues to police that suggest consent. See United States v. Walls, 225 F.3d 858, 862-63 (7th Cir.2000) (finding consent when one of the defendants opened the door and stepped back to allow the police to enter); United States v. Gordon, 173 F.3d 761, 766 (10th Cir.1999) (the defendant did not respond verbally to the police’s request to open the bag in question, but removed the key to the bag from his pocket and handed it to the police); Commonwealth v. Voisine, 414 Mass. 772, 610 N.E.2d 926, 932 (1993) (the defendant pointed in the direction of the bedroom); see also United States v. Impink, 728 F.2d 1228, 1233 n. 3 (9th Cir.1984) (“In most implied consent cases, the suspect himself takes some action that implies consent — he gestures to the police to enter, * * * or assists in the search of others. In those cases, we have found that consent was ‘unequivocal and specific.’ ”). When an implied-consent finding is based on nonverbal gestures, such manifestations of consent must go beyond mere acquies*1009cence and cooperation. See United States v. Albrektsen, 151 F.3d 951, 955 (9th Cir.1998) (holding that the defendant’s moving aside when the police entered his motel room did not amount to implied consent).
Here, the record does not demonstrate that Jennifer expressly consented to Det. Swierk’s entry into her home or to his subsequent seizure of the rope from the bedroom.20 However, the majority seems to justify the detective’s actions based on Jennifer’s failure to object both when the detective entered her home and when she was told that the detective and her father were going into her bedroom. Because Jennifer’s silence was not accompanied by any nonverbal intimation demonstrating consent, I fail to see how her consent can be inferred. In my opinion, and with full appreciation of the majority’s view in this difficult case, inferring consent by Jennifer is conjecture that exceeds the scope of any recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment, and I decline to do so.
B. Inevitable Discovery
I also disagree with the majority’s rationale that the inevitable-discovery doctrine would prevent the application of the exclusionary rule to the present case. Under the inevitable-discovery doctrine, “[i]f the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means * * * then * * the evidence should be received.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984). The prosecution may not rely on speculation, but rather must meet this burden of proof based on “demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or impeachment.” Id. at 445 n. 5, 104 S.Ct. 2501.
To be sure, an exact definition of “inevitability” is difficult. See United States v. Cabassa, 62 F.3d 470, 474 (2d Cir.1995). However, some courts have defined the threshold as a “very high degree of probability that the evidence in question would have been obtained independently of the tainted source.” People v. Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 300, 408 N.Y.S.2d 395, 380 N.E.2d 224, 231 (1978); see United States v. Rogers, 102 F.3d 641, 646 (1st Cir.1996). One commentator has noted:
“The significance of the word ‘would’ cannot be overemphasized. It is not enough to show that the evidence ‘might’ or ‘could’ have been otherwise obtained. Once the illegal act is shown to have been in fact the sole effective cause of the discovery of certain evidence, such evidence is inadmissible unless the prosecution severs the causal connection by an affirmative showing that it would have acquired the evidence in any event.” 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, § 11.4(a) at 276 (4th ed.2004) (quoting Robert F. Maguire, How to Umpoison the Fruit — The Fourth Amendment and the Exclusion*1010ary Rule, 55 J.Crim.L., Criminology & Police Sci., 807, 315 (1964)).
In other words, likely discovery is not inevitable discovery.
Courts have applied the doctrine when investigative procedures already were in progress before evidence was discovered by illegal means. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 449-50, 104 S.Ct. 2501 (holding that the murder victim’s body would have been discovered even without the defendant’s illegally obtained statements, when the search for it had been underway and a grid system showed that the area in question would have been searched soon); State v. Trepanier, 600 A.2d 1311, 1318-19 (R.I.1991) (holding that the evidence would have been discovered because the police had been searching in the exact area where the evidence later was found). Courts also have applied the doctrine when, pursuant to some standardized police procedure or established routine, a certain evidence-revealing event definitely would have occurred later. See State v. Firth, 708 A.2d 526, 529 (R.I.1998) (holding that fingerprints from the crime scene would have been matched to the defendant because his fingerprints already were on file and the police would have checked that database as part of routine procedure); see also United States v. Almeida, 434 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir.2006) (holding that the drugs would have been found in the police’s routine search of the defendant after he legally was arrested).
In my opinion, the present matter is distinguishable from these limited categories of cases — no independent search was underway here and no search would have occurred as a matter of routine police procedure. The majority is persuaded that the seized rope inevitably would have been discovered by the police because William would have delivered it to the police had they refused to come and seize it themselves. The majority bases this presumption on the fact that William once before had delivered items he found in defendant’s vehicle to Det. Swierk. In my opinion, such a presumption is nothing more than “mere speculation,” State v. Licari, 659 N.W.2d 243, 261 (Minn.2003), that goes well beyond the present scope of the doctrine of inevitable discovery. Although William “might have” delivered the rope to the police, even if he was likely to do so, it cannot be said that he inevitably “would have” done so based on a single previous incident.
C. Apparent Authority
Nevertheless, I believe that the exclusionary rule should not be applied here because Det. Swierk, under any objective standard, reasonably believed that William had the authority to consent to the detective’s entry into the Barkmeyer home and to the seizure of the rope, irrespective of whether William had actual authority to give consent. In the absence of actual authority, a warrantless search based on third-party consent will be upheld if it comes within the “apparent-authority” exception. State v. Linde, 876 A.2d 1115, 1125 n. 7 (R.I.2005). Under this rule, the Fourth Amendment is not violated when officers enter without a warrant when they reasonably believed that the person who consented to their entry had the authority to admit them.21 Illinois v. Rodriguez, *1011497 U.S. 177, 186, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990). The standard for deciding the reasonableness of an officer’s belief is an objective one: “[W]ould the facts available to the officer * * * ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority over the premises?” Id. at 188, 110 S.Ct. 2793 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).
Courts have found apparent authority when the consenting individuals asserted their authority to consent and then took some affirmative actions on the premises that appeared to confirm that authority. See Iron Wing v. United States, 34 F.3d 662, 665 (8th Cir.1994) (holding that there was apparent authority when the consenting individual told the police she was living at the house and her familiarity with the house corroborated her statement); Commonwealth v. Hughes, 575 Pa. 447, 836 A.2d 893, 901 (2003) (holding that there was apparent authority where the consenting individuals opened the front door of the apartment for the police officers). In contrast, courts have declined to hold that there was apparent authority when police officers were unaware of any facts that suggested the individual consenting had the right to consent to a search. See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489, 84 S.Ct. 889, 11 L.Ed.2d 856 (1964) (holding that the police had no reason to believe that the defendant had authorized the hotel night clerk to permit the police to search his room); Riordan v. Texas, 905 S.W.2d 765, 772 (Tex.Ct.App.1995) (rejecting the prosecution’s apparent-authority argument because the officer knew the consenting individual did not live on the premises, did not expect her to be there, had sparse conversation with her, initiated the search of the premises, and made no inquiry into her authority to consent).
In the present case, I believe that it is arguable that William had actual authority to consent to the search because he was residing in the Barkmeyer residence for an indefinite period and given that he had “joint access” to the bedroom where he found the rope. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n. 7, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974) (“The authority which justifies the third-party consent * * * rests * * * on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the coinhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched.”).
But, even if William did not have actual authority to consent to the detective’s entry and seizure, I believe it was certainly reasonable for Det. Swierk to believe that he did. Viewing the facts of this case through the prism of the Rodriguez reasonable-police-officer standard, we must consider what Det. Swierk knew at the point he located and seized the rope from the closet in the master bedroom. It appears that the detective was aware that William was staying at defendant’s home at the relevant time, and certainly with the knowledge and approval of his daughter. There is no question that he was not an overnight guest.
Also, William had initiated contact with Det. Swierk after he arrived from California, had inquired about the investigation, and had established himself as the principal contact person for the family. Detective Swierk previously had met with William, at the latter’s request, and William had turned over several items taken either from the home or defendant’s vehicle to the detective in an effort to assist in the criminal investigation. Furthermore, Wil*1012liam informed the detective about the rope and requested that Det. Swierk come to the house to retrieve the item. Finally, when he entered the home, Det. Swierk walked directly by Jennifer, who was sitting in the living room. It is particularly noteworthy that Jennifer did not object to William’s allowing the detective into her home and then into her bedroom. To me, that is a fact that impacted the detective’s reasonable belief that William had authority to consent.
Based on these facts, I reach the inescapable conclusion that it was reasonable for Det. Swierk to believe that William was a coinhabitant of the Barkmeyer residence, even if temporarily, and that he had the authority to consent to the detective’s entry into the home, his search of the bedroom closet, and his seizure of the rope. For these reasons, and although I respectfully disagree with the majority’s reasoning, I concur in its holding that the hearing justice properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress.
II. Closure of the Courtroom
I also respectfully dissent from the rationale of the majority with respect to the issue of the partial closure of the courtroom. The majority has no hesitation in assigning error to the trial justice’s order restricting attendance to specified individuals and excluding other “unnecessary personnel” from defendant’s trial, and I agree. I depart from the majority’s reasoning, however, regarding the effect of that error.
The trial justice’s decision to partially close the courtroom may well have been based soundly upon medical reports and other documentation that he reviewed, and he may have considered the arguments of counsel. The problem is, however, that whatever process the trial justice engaged in was undertaken in chambers and was not on the record. I agree with the majority that this was error. What dooms defendant’s challenge, according to the majority, is defense counsel’s failure to demonstrate that anyone actually was excluded from the courtroom, as well as his failure to suggest to the trial justice that his closure order could have been tailored more narrowly.
The majority reasons that the record fails to illuminate whether anyone actually was excluded from the courtroom. In my opinion, this is a classic harmless-error analysis and is flawed in light of our holding in State v. Torres, 844 A.2d 155, 162 (R.I.2004). The majority cites two decisions of this Court, State v. Lerner, 112 R.I. 62, 308 A.2d 324 (1973), and State v. Fayerweather, 540 A.2d 353 (R.I.1988), to support its proposition that the trial justice’s error is not reversible based on a dearth of evidence of exclusion.
In Lerner, 112 R.I. at 91, 308 A.2d at 342, the trial justice denied the defendant’s motion to conduct his trial in a larger courtroom. The defendant argued that this denial violated his right to a public trial as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Id. In denying the defendant’s appeal on this issue, we said:
“No basis is established in the record that the size of the courtroom in any way deprived defendant of a fair trial. The trial justice pointed to factors which militated against a change of courtroom and in the sound exercise of his discretion denied this motion.
“While it is suggested that the public would be excluded from the trial, nothing in the record establishes that the public actually was excluded. * * * On the basis of the record and the briefs presented, we are unable to conclude that defendant was prejudiced in any way by the size of the courtroom.” Id.
*1013In Lerner, however, there is no indication whatsoever that the trial justice issued an order to close the courtroom or even that he was asked to do so — he simply declined the defendant’s request to move the trial to a larger courtroom. Further, Lerner was decided well before Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984) and Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. 501, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984), in which the United States Supreme Court clearly delineated rules for trial justices to abide by when considering courtroom closures.
In Fayerweather, 540 A.2d at 353-54, the defendant argued that the trial justice erroneously granted the prosecution’s motion to close the courtroom during the testimony of a six-year-old sexual-abuse victim. Deciding against the defendant, this Court held that “[tjhere is nothing to suggest that a significant number of individuals attended the trial or wished to attend or were unable to gain admittance to the courtroom when the six-year-old was about to testify.” Id. at 354. Because of that, this Court held that “the defendant suffered no prejudice and the trial justice’s error, if any, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id
In other words, in Fayerweather, even though we determined that the trial justice’s failure to conduct the hearing before restricting public access to the courtroom was constitutionally deficient, we pointed out that the record was devoid of evidence that anyone was prohibited from attending the proceeding, and, therefore, declared the error to be harmless. But, Fayerweather is singularly inapplicable here because when we decided Torres, some eighteen years later, we adopted and embraced the United States Supreme Court’s holding that “violations of the Sixth Amendment’s public-trial provision are not subject to a ‘harmless error’ analysis.” Torres, 844 A.2d at 162 (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) and Waller, 467 U.S. at 49 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2210).
The majority also faults defendant for not specifying those individuals to whom the order would apply. However, there are two ways that a member of the public can be excluded from a trial — either by being asked to leave after he already has been seated, or by being barred from entering after the order takes effect. Even if defendant could have specified the people in the former category, he would have no awareness of those in the latter category.
The majority further faults defendant for not affirmatively suggesting less confining restrictions to the trial justice’s partial closure order. In essence, the majority blames defendant for the trial justice’s error because defendant was not more specific or aggressive. As authority for this conclusion, the majority cites a string of cases. See Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 155-56 (4th Cir.2000); Brown v. Kuhlmann, 142 F.3d 529, 541 (2d Cir.1998); Ayala v. Speckard, 131 F.3d 62, 71 (2d Cir.1997).
It is significant that in each and every one of those cases, the trial justice had conducted a hearing on the closure motion in open court and he had made findings of fact to support his order. At that point, courts have reasoned that a defendant cannot sit idly by, but must make some suggestions about how the court’s objectives to partially close the courtroom can be carried out in a more narrowly tailored fashion. But here, the order was fatally flawed from the beginning because there was no hearing, no findings based upon that hearing, and no record for us to review.
*1014Errors by trial justices may be harmless or reversible.22 Because a public trial is a right guaranteed to an accused by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 10, of the Rhode Island Constitution, we held in Torres, 844 A.2d at 162, that violations of these provisions are not subject to harmless error.
In my opinion, therefore, the trial justice’s issuing an order to partially close the courtroom in this case, absent the constitutional safeguards set forth in the case law, was reversible error. I would, therefore, vacate the judgment of conviction and order a new trial for this defendant.
. It should be noted, however, that various courts have held that a suspect’s silence, in response to the police’s explicit request for consent, can be used to infer consent. See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 173 F.3d 761, 766 (10th Cir.1999) (holding that the defendant consented when he failed to object to a search of his locked bag after an officer asked him to open the bag).
. Detective Swierk testified on cross-examination to the following sequence of events:
"Q. Now, when you went back to the house with Mr. Wilson, were you invited into the house?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Who invited you in?
“A. I believe Jennifer and [Jane] were still there. At that time they were home.
"Q. Did you have a conversation with Jennifer about coming into the house?
“A. I — just knocking on the door and saying — we did not get into specifics as to what we were there for. I think [William] told [Jane] that grandpa needs to show the detective something.”
I do not believe this testimony suggests that "Jennifer invited [the detective] into the home,” as the majority asserts. Rather, I read the testimony as showing only that Jennifer was in the house when the detective entered.
. The majority asserts that under Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990), the apparent-authority doctrine should be applied only when the police relied on a mistaken factual determination concerning an individual's authority to consent. Although the Rodriquez Court applied the doctrine in such a situation, I do not believe the Court required that police rely on a mistake of fact as a prerequisite to applying the doctrine; rather, the Court focused on the reasonableness of the police officers’ belief.
. There is a body of law, however, that provides that an inadvertent or very brief closure of a courtroom is a trivial error not requiring reversal. See, e.g., Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir.1996) (holding that a brief and entirely inadvertent courtroom closure, when the testimony was videotaped and later repeated in open court, was sufficiently trivial that the defendant’s Sixth-Amendment rights were not violated); United States v. Al-Smadi, 15 F.3d 153, 154-55 (10th Cir.1994) (holding that a brief and inadvertent closure that went "unnoticed by any of the trial participants” did not violate the defendant's Sixth-Amendment rights); Snyder v. Coiner, 510 F.2d 224, 230 (4th Cir.1975) (holding that a brief closure based on the sheriff’s misinterpreting the judge’s request to keep the courtroom quiet was "entirely too trivial to amount to a constitutional deprivation”). The record here, however, reveals that the closure was neither inadvertent nor brief.