DISSENTING OPINION BY
TAMILIA, J.:¶ 1 The majority’s Opinion, while proposing an analysis which brings together reasonable suspicion to make a stop and a muffler noise violation, fails to establish a legal basis for evidence of the muffler violation. For This reason, I respectfully dissent. The language of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4523, Exhaust systems, mufflers and noise control, (a) Compliance with established sound levels, (c) Mufflers and related equipment, the provisions of the Pennsylvania Code section 4523(a) incorporates by reference, the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions, and common sense all compel a result opposite of that which the majority advances.
¶ 2 Section 4523(a) provides, in pertinent part, the sound emitted by a muffler is “not to exceed the sound level for the vehicle as prescribed in regulations promulgated by the department.” It further provides: “The test procedures and instrumentation to be utilized shall also be established by regulation.” Id. (emphasis added). The regulations referenced by section 4523(a), as noted by the majority, are set forth in Title 67 of the Pennsylvania Code. The relevant Title 67 regulations, among other things, provide: “Any police officer shall be authorized to inspect, examine and test a motor vehicle in accordance with the procedures specified in this chapter.” 67 Pa.Code § 157.21, Inspection and examination of motor vehicles, (a) Police authorization (emphasis added). The regulations further provide: “Police officers selected to measure sound level of vehicles operated on highways shall have received training in the techniques of sound measurement and the operation of sound measuring instruments.” 67 Pa. Code 157.21(c), Training (emphasis added); see Chanceford Aviation Props, v. Chanceford Township Bd. of Supervisors, 592 Pa. 100, 923 A.2d 1099, 1104 (2007) (“The word ‘shall’ by definition is mandatory, and it is generally applied as such.”), citing Oberneder v. Link Computer Corp., 548 Pa. 201, 696 A.2d 148, 150 (1997).
¶ 3 Both Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, Security from searches and seizures, and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Unreasonable searches and seizures, protect citizens of this Commonwealth from, amongst other evils, “unreasonable” seizures. What could be more unreasonable, or for that matter more logically infirm, than allowing a police officer to formulate reasonable suspicion that a crime he has never been trained to investigate or charge *816is occurring — especially when this training is required by statute?
¶ 4 The majority seeks to answer this intractable dilemma by advancing the following analogy:8 “To hold [an officer must be trained as required by statute before initiating a stop based on a suspected violation of section 4523(a)] would be the equivalent of requiring law enforcement officers of our Commonwealth to be certified as lab technicians before they stop a suspected perpetrator for a drug or DUI violation.” Op. at 814. The majority fails to recognize this analogy is inherently flawed. Title 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802, Driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance, (a) General impairment, allows an offender to be prosecuted “after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the individual is rendered incapable of safely driving, operating or being in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle,” and section 3802(d)(2), Controlled substances, allows an offender to be prosecuted in like circumstances when he or she is driving under “the influence of a drug or combination of drugs.” In other words, not every drug or DUI violation need be proven with the use of testing mechanism, such as a blood test or breathalyzer. Cf. 67 Pa.Code 157.21(c). Section 4523(a) does not allow sound violations to be prosecuted without the use of testing mechanisms. This distinction between sections 3802(a) and (d) and section 4523(a) implicates the broader problem with the majority’s analogy. A drug or DUI stop can be initiated by an officer who possesses reasonable suspicion premised on facts common to everyday experience. For example, every one recognizes when a driver is swerving into an oncoming lane. An officer does not need specialized training to make such an observation and, as a consequence, such training is not required by statute. This reasonable suspicion can then be substantiated by resorting to other facts common to everyday experience — an observation of bloodshot eyes or slurred speech, etc. I have difficulty accepting the proposition that an untrained officer can reasonably suspect “through their own experience and their observations,” Op. at 814, that a moving vehicle is operating with an exhaust system that emits noise in excess of 76 to 84 decibels, depending on the attendant conditions. See 67 Pa.Code 157.11, Vehicular noise limits, (a) Prohibition. Relying on an indisputable visual perception is much different than relying on an untrained and disputable appreciation of moving sound.9 The General Assembly *817implicitly recognized as much when it replaced the subjective and vague quantum of proof required by former 75 P.S. § 828(a), which was based solely on an untrained and disputable appreciation of moving sound, with the wholly objective and empirical quantum of proof in current section 4523(a). See Op. at 813-14.
¶ 5 The majority takes its analysis a step further by unnecessarily holding that once “an officer hears an unusually loud exhaust, the officer may reasonably infer that there is a problem with the muffler and initiate a stop based upon a reasonable suspicion that the muffler is not ‘in good working order.’ ”10 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4523(c). I respectfully note my disagreement with this holding. Section 4523(c) requires every vehicle to be equipped with a muffler “in good working order.” Given the context in which this phrase appears, it unquestionably refers to the structure of a vehicle’s exhaust system, not the sound level the system emits. If reasonable suspicion and conviction under section 4523(c) could be predicated on sound level alone, as the majority holds, the language of section 4523(a) would not only be mere sur-plusage, it would be nullified. While there is no question sound level is a relevant factor in formulating reasonable suspicion that a section 4523(c) violation is occurring, it cannot be the only factor.
¶ 6 The facts of this case illustrate the way in which section 4523(a) can now be used as a pre-text to initiate traffic stops. At the suppression hearing, Officer Rice testified he initially suspected the Tran-sAm was being operated by a driver with a suspended license and that: “[i]t was going very fast.” N.T., Suppression Hearing, 4/2/07, at 7-8. Officer Rice wrote in his narrative report: “We saw a black Trans AM go by driving in a reckless manner.” Record, No. 5, Exb. A. Officer Rice testified, after subtle prodding from the prosecutor, the TransAm was “much louder” than “other Firebirds that would have passed.” N.T. at 8. In his narrative, however, Officer Rice noted that he initially noticed, “[h]alf of the exhaust was missing.” Record, No. 5, Exb. A.
¶ 7 At the outset, Officer Walls testified he was on the lookout for the TransAm because he had been told by Officer Rice the “vehicle was to have no exhaust and the driver was to be ... under suspension.” N.T. at 39. Officer Walls then testified he pulled over the TransAm “because of the loud exhaust and I thought the person operating the vehicle was under suspension.” N.T. at 40. Yet, Officer Walls conceded on cross-examination he did not make any mention of a loud exhaust in his call notes and also could not recall what pieces were missing from the TransAm exhaust, although he did recall personally examining the exhaust system. N.T. at 37, 40. Officer Rice, while pumping gas, purportedly was able to see half of the TransAm’s exhaust was missing simply by viewing the vehicle “going very fast” in passing. N.T. at 9; see also Record, No. 5, Exb. A. Yet Officer Walls, despite following the TransAm for approximately “quarter to half a mile” and despite the fact he apparently had been instructed by Officer Rice to look out for a TransAm with no exhaust, did not testify to seeing any structural deficiencies with the vehicle’s exhaust. N.T. at 35. To the contrary, Officer Walls testified he suspected the TransAm exhaust was faulty based solely on: “The noise, how loud it was.” Id. He never testified to seeing “half of the exhaust missing” before pulling the Tran-sAm over.11
*818¶ 8 It is clear from the evidence of record the suspected noise violation is an ad hoc rationalization contrived to justify an otherwise unwarranted traffic stop. The majority’s holding gives officers free rein to pull over vehicles based on the reasonable suspicion an exhaust system is “just louder” than other exhaust systems or is “unusually loud” without having the training required to formulate this reasonable suspicion and without being equipped with the expertise to substantiate this suspicion. See N.T. at 34. There is no question but that at first glance, this situation presents what appears to be a Hobson’s choice. On one hand, the General Assembly has made it clear drivers who operate vehicles with exhaust systems that violate the sound limits set forth in 67 Pa.Code § 157.11(a) are to be penalized. On the other hand, the General Assembly, by virtue of requiring intricate and time-consuming training, has imposed a burdensome requirement officers must satisfy before being able to articulate reasonable suspicion that an exhaust system violation is occurring. But the General Assembly, in my opinion, has made its intentions known. The real choice in this case is between disregarding unequivocal statutory and codified language in hopes of mitigating the perceived malevolence which results from: “the citizens of our Commonwealth [being] regularly assaulted by sounds emanating from amplified exhaust systems” (Op. at 814), and upholding Constitutional protections. This is a choice which is not difficult for me to make. In my opinion, the majority’s holdings today extend the power of police to untenable limits. For the above stated reasons, I dissent.
. The majority also sets forth a second analogy: "Just as an officer may conduct an investigative detention when he or she smells burning marijuana emanating from the direction of someone smoking a hand-rolled cigarette or ‘blunt,’ so can an officer stop a vehicle when he or she hears what sounds like a faulty muffler.” Op. at 815. The distinction between formulating reasonable suspicion based on a trained appreciation of the smell of marijuana and formulating reasonable suspicion based on an untrained and disputable appreciation of moving sound should be, or will become, apparent. See infra.
. There are only two "sound violations” contained within the Vehicle Code. The first is the faulty exhaust prohibition provided by 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4523, Exhaust systems, mufflers and noise control, (a) Compliance with established sound levels. The second is a prohibition against "certain sound devices” provided by 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4535, Audible warning devices, (b) Certain sound devices prohibited. Section 4535(b) contains an absolute prohibition against "siren[s], bell[s], whistle[s]”. Section 4535(b) also contains a residual prohibition against "any device emitting a similar sound or unreasonably loud or harsh sound.” Notably, my research failed to uncover a single reported or unreported decision in which a police officer predicated an investigatory stop on reasonable suspicion that a driver was in violation of the section 4535(b) residual prohibition.
. The majority fails to define the term "unusual.” A motorcycle exhaust system would often be considered "unusually” loud when compared to most car exhaust systems.
. The majority states, "the vehicle owner testified at trial that the vehicle in fact was missing a muffler.” Op. at 815, n. 7, citing N.T., Suppression Hearing, 6/12/07, at 5. The vehicle owner also testified the TransAm was equipped with a catalytic converter and a Y pipe and that it was quiet with these two exhaust system components. Id. Whatever the case may be, a post hoc rationalization is no better than an ad hoc rationalization.