Commonwealth v. Jackson

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY

BECK, J.:

¶ 1 I agree with the majority that the warrantless search of appellee Jackson’s desk was a violation of the Fourth Amendment, thus requiring suppression of the evidence seized as a result of the search, ie., the tapes and any other evidence gained by their seizure. However, I do not agree that the habeas court acted properly in discharging Ms. Jackson. Rather, I believe that even without the tapes, the record establishes a prima facie case against Ms. Jackson, which requires that she face trial on the charges lodged against her.

¶ 2 Where a criminal defendant seeks to challenge the sufficiency of evidence presented at her preliminary hearing, she may do so by filing a writ of habeas corpus with the court of common pleas. Commonwealth v. McBride, 528 Pa. 153, 595 A.2d 589, 590 n. 2 (1995). See also Commonwealth v. Saunders, 456 Pa.Super. 741, 691 A.2d 946 (proper means for challenging pretrial finding that Commonwealth has made out a prima facie case is petition for writ of habeas corpus), appeal denied, 550 Pa. 703, 705 A.2d 1307 (1997). In such instances, the habeas court acts in the capacity of a reviewing court to assess whether a prima facie case was presented at the preliminary hearing, that is, whether sufficient evidence exists to require the defendant to be brought to trial. Commonwealth v. Scott, 396 Pa.Super. 339, 578 A.2d 933, 936-37 (1990), appeal denied, 528 Pa. 629, 598 A.2d 283 (1991). The standard is clear: the Commonwealth establishes a prima facie case when it produces evidence that, if accepted as true, would warrant the trial judge to allow the case to go to a jury. Commonwealth v. Marti, 779 A.2d 1177, 1180 (Pa.Super.2001).

¶ 3 In this case, Ms. Jackson combined her suppression motion with her request for habeas relief. After it ruled that the tapes were inadmissible, the habeas court considered the remaining evidence against Ms. Jackson and concluded that it fell short of establishing a prima facie case. The habeas court reasoned: “Without the evidence of the two (2) audio cassettes, the Commonwealth’s case was insufficient to meet their [sic] burden to satisfy all of the required elements under the statute.” Trial Court Opinion, 6/28/01, at 9. The majority apparently agrees, relying on the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to find that all of the witnesses’ “knowledge of the tape recordings originated with, or were the product of, the tapes in the possession of Trooper Whitmoyer, which were suppressed.” Majority Opinion at 10-11. While this is true of some of the witnesses that appeared at the preliminary hearing, it is not true of all of them.

¶ 4 The majority correctly concludes that the testimony of those witnesses who relied on police-prepared transcripts is tainted and therefore inadmissible. Plain*419ly, that testimony was given as a direct result of the illegally seized tapes. Because those tapes were subject to suppression, all evidence that emanated from them likewise must be suppressed. However, both the habeas court and the majority have neglected to consider other relevant evidence presented at the preliminary hearing, evidence that was untainted by the illegal seizure.

¶5 Jill Kraemer testified that she discovered the tapes in Ms. Jackson’s desk, observed her name and others on them and listened to them. She described hearing her own voice and Jackson’s engaged in conversations that Kraemer remembered having with the postmaster. She also testified that she did not give permission to be recorded and was not aware that she was being recorded. Ms. Kraemer’s observations neither originated with nor were the product of Trooper Whitmoyer’s subsequent, illegal seizure.

¶ 6 Further, Ms. Kraemer and several other employees testified to statements made by Ms. Jackson at an office-wide meeting, wherein she admitted that she taped conversations with employees and was aware that she might lose her job as a result. These statements, admissions by the accused, neither originated with nor were the product of Trooper Whitmoyer’s subsequent, illegal seizure.

¶ 7 Ms. Kraemer’s testimony, along with that of the other employees who testified about Ms. Jackson’s statements, were not only admissible but were also sufficient to establish a prima facie case under 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5703(1). This evidence, if believed, established that Ms. Jackson recorded conversations she had with her employees without their permission. As a result, the habeas court erred in concluding that appellee was entitled to a discharge.

¶ 8 The habeas court’s further comments regarding its assessment of the case, including Ms. Jackson’s purported reasons for making the tapes and the question of whether the tape recorder was in plain view on Ms. Jackson’s desk, are simply irrelevant. Neither the credibility of the witnesses presented nor the validity of any claimed defenses is of any concern when determining if a prime facie case is present. See Liciaga v. Court of Common Pleas, 523 Pa. 258, 566 A.2d 246, 248 (1989) (preliminary hearing magistrate not empowered to make credibility determinations). See also Marti supra (Commonwealth establishes prima facie case when it produces evidence that, if accepted as true, would warrant the trial judge to allow the case to go to a jury; weight and credibility are not factors). Thus, it was neither necessary nor appropriate for the habeas court judge to make such findings at that stage in the proceedings.

¶ 9 Because I believe there is sufficient evidence to constitute a prima facie case under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5703(1), even without the tapes seized by Trooper Whitmoyer, I would find that the trial court erred in granting appellee habeas relief. As a result, I would affirm that part of the trial court’s order suppressing the tapes and any fruits thereof. In addition, I would reverse that part of the trial court’s order granting habeas relief and would remand the case for trial on all charges.