Dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that “a prisoner need not be competent to proceed through PCRA *321proceedings when a next friend has been appointed to act on his or her behalf because of such incompetence.” Majority Op. at 280. Because I would find that forcing a PCRA petitioner to proceed with his first PCRA petition when he is incompetent violates a PCRA petitioner’s rights to effective assistance of PCRA counsel and due process of law, the PCRA proceedings at issue in the instant case should be stayed until such time as Randy Haag becomes competent.
While it is well established that entitlement to counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution does not extend to a PCRA petitioner during collateral review, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 541 Pa. 108, 661 A.2d 352, 367 (1995) (citing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987)), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1121, 116 S.Ct. 931, 133 L.Ed.2d 858 (1996), a PCRA petitioner is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel during a first PCRA petition; this right has been provided to a PCRA petitioner by the Commonwealth through a procedural rule. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 904; Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 782 A.2d 517 (2001); Commonwealth v. Gamboa Taylor, 562 Pa. 70, 753 A.2d 780 (2000); Commonwealth v. Kenney, 557 Pa. 195, 732 A.2d 1161 (1999); Commonwealth v. Pursell, 555 Pa. 233, 724 A.2d 293 (1999); Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 554 Pa. 31, 720 A.2d 693 (1998); Commonwealth v. Priovolos, 552 Pa. 364, 715 A.2d 420 (1998).1
For the right to effective assistance of counsel in a first PCRA petition not to be illusory, a PCRA petitioner must, at a minimum, be able to consult with counsel and aid counsel in identifying any potential claims cognizable under the PCRA. Since PCRA counsel’s function is to identify any potential claims cognizable under the PCRA and properly present such claims to the court, it logically follows that a prisoner who is able to meaningfully consult with counsel is competent to participate in post-conviction proceedings. Conversely, a pris*322oner who, as a result of his own incompetency, is unable to meaningfully consult with counsel is not competent to participate in post-conviction proceedings.
In this case, it is undisputed that Haag’s incompetence prevents him from meaningfully consulting with PCRA counsel and thereby participating in post-conviction proceedings. Although the majority recognizes “that this case involves unusual factual circumstances such that it may be impossible to discover cognizable claims outside of the record”, Majority Op. at 280, Appellant is nevertheless ordered to proceed with any legal and record-based claims through Haag’s first PCRA petition as next friend because “if Haag regains competency, he may seek review of any undiscoverable claims through a second PCRA petition.” Id.
If Haag regains his competency and seeks to file a second PCRA petition, the PCRA court will have no jurisdiction to entertain the petition unless Haag can establish: (1) that one of the three statutory exceptions provided in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1) applies, see Commonwealth v. Yarris, 557 Pa. 12, 731 A.2d 581 (1999), Commonwealth v. Fahy, 558 Pa. 313, 737 A.2d 214; and (2) that in accordance with 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2), the petition was filed within 60 days of the date that his claims could have been presented. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2); Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d at 783; Commonwealth v. Beasley, 559 Pa. 604, 741 A.2d 1258 (1999). The majority holds that if Haag subsequently regains competency, any “undiscoverable” claims, i.e., any fact-based claims (as opposed to legal or record-based claims) which are identified through subsequent meaningful consultation with PCRA counsel, can be presented in a second PCRA petition under the “after discovered evidence” exception found in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(h),2 if the second PCRA petition is filed within 60 *323days of Haag regaining his competence. See Majority Op. at 280-81 n. 11.3
I do not believe that the restricted class of claims over which the PCRA court will have jurisdiction to address in a second PCRA petition under the exception found in Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) includes all potential cognizable PCRA claims which are presently unidentifiable by the next friend or PCRA counsel due to the inability of PCRA counsel to engage in meaningful consultation with Haag regarding his case, but would be capable of identification and development should Haag regain his competence and be able to consult with PCRA counsel. The exception found at Section 9545(b)(l)(ii) is a narrow one; the class of claims which fall under the exception is extremely limited. See Gamboa-Taylor, 758 A.2d at 785 (“conclusion that previous counsel was ineffective is not the type of after-discovered evidence encompassed by the exception”); see also Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 566 Pa. 323, 781 A.2d 94 (2001); Commonwealth v. Pursell, 561 Pa. 214, 749 A.2d 911 (2000); Commonwealth v. Lark, 560 Pa. 487, 746 A.2d 585 (2000).
*324In fact, under established Superior Court case law, any such claim by Haag would be time-barred. In Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 780 A.2d 700 (Pa.Super.2001), the Superior Court held that an appellant’s claim of mental illness did not fit any exception to the timeliness requirements of the PCRA. The Superior Court reasoned:
Fahy narrowly interprets the exceptions to what is contained literally in the PCRA statute. See [Fahy, 737 A.2d at 222.] The statute does not include mental illness as an exception. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(l)(i)-(iii). Although other areas of the law may be structured to accommodate mental illness, the PCRA time restrictions are not. Our Supreme Court has interpreted the statutory filing exceptions literally, clearly stating that if an exception is not in the statute, then it does not exist. See Fahy, supra. Additionally, equitable principles such as equitable tolling are not applicable due to the jurisdictional nature of the PCRA time limits. Id. Thus, the time limits cannot be extended, except as the statute contemplates. Id. If we were to grant Appellant’s request in this case, we would effectively create a new exception not permitted under the PCRA statute. We decline to do so.
Id., 780 A.2d at 703. Apparently, under the majority opinion, the Superior Court’s reasoning in Hoffman has been rejected sub silentio.
Additionally, the right to counsel in a second or subsequent PCRA petition is not co-extensive with the right to counsel in a first PCRA petition. While Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(A) provides for the appointment of counsel in a first PCRA petition when the petitioner satisfies the judge that he is unable to afford or otherwise obtain counsel, Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(B) provides for the appointment of counsel in a second or subsequent PCRA petition only in cases where the petitioner can further establish that an evidentiary hearing is required.4 Thus, there *325exists the possibility that a PCRA petitioner such as Haag would be uncounseled at the time he regains his competence. To obtain review of any potential cognizable PCRA claims in his second PCRA petition, such an uncounseled petitioner would then have 60 days to: (1) identify on his own any potential cognizable PCRA claims which a next friend would have been unable to bring in a first PCRA petition; and (2) either carry the burden of establishing that an evidentiary hearing is required in order to qualify for the appointment of counsel or be compelled to proceed pro se.
The procedure suggested by the majority effectively requires the PCRA court to adjudicate that portion of the PCRA proceeding that involves legal and record-based claims that the next friend and counsel are able to identify and postpone consideration of claims that are unidentifiable without the petitioner’s participation until the petitioner becomes competent. This Court’s rules and the PCRA itself neither contemplate nor authorize a bifurcation of a PCRA adjudication. Such a bifurcated procedure does not insure that claims not identified in the first petition can be properly presented in a second PCRA petition and therefore violates petitioner’s right to effective assistance of PCRA counsel.
Furthermore, if claims which are capable of development only after meaningful consultation with PCRA counsel ultimately fall outside the scope of claims which overcome the jurisdictional bar to their review in a second PCRA petition, the petitioner would suffer a violation of his limited due process rights. The majority recognizes that although the Commonwealth is under no constitutional obligation to provide a means for collaterally attacking convictions, because the Commonwealth has provided the PCRA as the sole vehicle to *326pursue collateral relief, the procedures of the PCRA must comport with the fundamental fairness mandated by the Due Process Clause.5 See Majority Op. at 17-20. At a minimum, the fundamental fairness mandated by the Due Process Clause requires a procedure which ensures that all potential claims cognizable under the PCRA can be: (1) identified through a PCRA petitioner’s meaningful consultation with PCRA counsel; and (2) properly asserted.
The majority holds that Haag’s right to fundamental fairness under the Due Process Clause is not violated, reasoning that “[t]he ability of a next friend to investigate and raise all cognizable claims on behalf of an incompetent prisoner so that the prisoner may promptly seek relief, and the ability of the petitioner to raise undiscoverable claims if he or she regains competence, sufficiently protects the limited due process rights of the prisoner.” Majority Op. at 285 (emphasis added). I do not believe that the procedure suggested by the majority will prevent the waiver of claims which are presently unidentifiable due to the inability of PCRA counsel to engage in meaningful consultation with Haag regarding his case, but would be capable of identification and development should Haag regain his competence and be able to consult with PCRA counsel. I cannot therefore agree with the majority’s conclusion that Haag’s due process rights are sufficiently protected.6
The Commonwealth asserts that “[n]o purpose would be served by appointment of a next friend if the litigation for which the next friend was appointed were to remain stalemated by the very condition which made appointment of a next friend appropriate.” Brief for Appellee at 12-13. I disagree. Appellant as next friend has raised the issues of: (1) whether Haag is competent to waive the filing of a first PCRA petition;7 and (2) whether forcing Haag to proceed *327through a bifurcated PCRA proceeding violates a PCRA petitioner’s rights to PCRA counsel and due process. The significance of the next friend’s filing of the present PCRA petition is the preservation of Haag’s PCRA rights.
Accordingly, because I conclude that forcing a PCRA petitioner to proceed with his first PCRA petition when he is incompetent violates a PCRA petitioner’s rights to effective assistance of PCRA counsel and due process of law, the PCRA proceedings at issue in the instant case should be stayed until such time as Randy Haag becomes competent. I therefore respectfully dissent.
Mr. Justice NIGRO joins this dissenting opinion.. This Court has not addressed the issue of whether a right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel exists under the Pennsylvania Constitution. See Priovolos, 715 A.2d at 422; Travaglia, 661 A.2d at 367; Commonwealth v. Jermyn, 551 Pa. 96, 709 A.2d 849, 857 n. 22 (1998); see also, Pa. Const, art. I, § 9.
. Section 9545(b) provides in pertinent part:
(b) Time for filing petition.—
(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment *323becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves that:
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained through the exercise of due diligence;
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(h).
. The majority states that, "[a]s this issue is not ripe, and may never be, we must leave it for another day.” Majority Op. at 281 n. 11. I fail to understand how the majority can explicitly hold that should Haag regain his competence, any fact-based claims which can be identified through subsequent meaningful consultation with PCRA counsel can be presented in a second PCRA petition under Section 9545(b)(1)(h), and at the same time proclaim that it is not addressing the issue because it is not ripe. Although the majority claims to be leaving this issue for another day, in reality, the majority addresses the issue head on by establishing a procedure that requires Appellant to proceed on Haag’s behalf with any legal and record-based claims, and postpones consideration of any fact-based claims identifiable only after Haag becomes competent for presentation in a second PCRA petition filed under Section 9545(b)(1)(h).
. Rule 904 provides, in pertinent part:
(A) Except as provided in paragraph (F), when an unrepresented defendant satisfies the judge that the defendant is unable to afford or otherwise procure counsel, the judge shall appoint counsel to repre*325sent the defendant on the defendant’s first petition for post-conviction collateral relief.
(B) On a second or subsequent petition, when an unrepresented defendant satisfies the judge that the defendant is unable to afford or otherwise procure counsel, and an evidentiary hearing is required as provided in Rule 908, the judge shall appoint counsel to represent the defendant.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 904.
. U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1.
. When the issue of life and death hangs in the balance, one would assume that if we were to err, we would err on the side of caution and avoid even the slightest possibility of violating the due process rights of a capital defendant.
. Raising the issue of whether a capital defendant is competent to waive the filing of a first PCRA petition will no longer require an *327assertion of incompetence by a next friend as a result of the 2000 amendment to Pa.R.Crim.P. 904, which added paragraph (F). Rule 904 now requires that at the conclusion of direct review in a death penalty case, before the defendant will be permitted to waive post-conviction collateral review, the trial judge must conduct a colloquy on the record and find: (1) that the defendant is competent; and (2) that the waiver is knowing, intelligent and voluntary. The rule now provides, in pertinent part:
(F) Appointment of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases.
(1) At the conclusion of direct review in a death penalty case, which includes discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States, or at tire expiration of time for seeking review, upon remand of the record, the trial judge shall appoint new counsel for the purpose of post-conviction collateral review, unless:
(a) the defendant has elected to proceed pro se or waive post-conviction collateral proceedings, and the judge finds, after a colloquy on the record, that the defendant is competent and the defendant’s election is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary;
Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(F)(1)(a).