dissenting.
I must again dissent from the Court’s continued application of its per se exclusionary rule in juvenile confessions. My reasons for so doing have been most recently set forth in Commonwealth v. Smith, 472 Pa. 492, 506, 372 A.2d 797, 804 (1977) (Pomeroy, J., dissenting, joined by Eagen, C. J.). See also, e. g,, Commonwealth v. Webster, 466 Pa. 314, 329-31, 353 A.2d 372, 379-80 (1976) (Pomeroy, J., dissenting). In addition, I am satisfied from a review of the record that the admission of appellant’s statements at this bench trial was, at most, harmless error. The Commonwealth’s eyewitness and expert testimony, together with the circumstantial evidence, was overwhelming, and I can see no purpose to be served by a new trial when the record shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the result will be the same.
EAGEN, C. J., joins in this dissenting opinion.