dissenting.
I dissent. My views in opposition to the per se exclusionary rule relative to juvenile confessions, and also to the retroactive application thereof to cases tried before the Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. McCutchen, 463 Pa. 90, 343 A.2d 669 (1975), have been frequently stated and need not be here repeated. See, e. g., Commonwealth v. Jamison, 474 Pa. 541, 379 A.2d 87(1977) (dissenting opinion of Pomeroy, J., joined by Eagen, C. J.); Commonwealth v. Graver, 473 Pa. 473, -, 375 A.2d 339, 340 (1977) (dissenting opinion of Pomeroy, J., joined by Eagen, C. J.); Commonwealth v. Smith, 472 Pa. 492, 506-509, 372 A.2d 797, 804-06 (1977) (dissenting opinion of Pomeroy, J., joined by Eagen, C. J.); Commonwealth v. Lee, 470 Pa. 401, 406-08, 368 A.2d 690, 693-94 (1977) (dissenting opinion of Pomeroy, J., joined by Eagen, J., and Jones, C. J.); Commonwealth v. Chaney, 465 Pa. 407, 409, 350 A.2d 829, 831 (1975) (dissenting opinion of Pomeroy, J., joined by Jones, C. J., and Eagen, J.).
EAGEN, C. J., joins in this dissenting opinion.