A jury convicted appellant Marvin Holt of the felony offense of threats, D.C. Code § 22-2307 (1988 Supp.).1 On appeal, he challenged his conviction on several grounds and a division of this court voted to affirm. Holt v. United States, 547 A.2d 158 (D.C.1988), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 552 A.2d 529 (1989). On rehearing en banc, the full court considers only his principal argument,2 i.e., that it was improper to charge him under the felony threats statute instead of the misdemeanor threats statute, D.C.Code § 22-507 (1981).3 Appellant argues concurrently that the government, because it did not show an intent to extort on his part, failed to prove all of the elements of felony threats against him. He therefore urges this court to overrule its decision in United States v. Young, 376 A.2d 809 (D.C.1977), in which we rejected the contention that a specific intent to extort is a necessary element of a violation of the felony threats statute. We decline to overrule Young, and affirm.
Briefly, the facts underlying appellant’s conviction are these. The complaining witness, Venita Clinton, was in the hallway of her apartment building locking her apartment door one morning when a man grabbed her from behind and placed a gun to her head. During the struggle that ensued, her pocketbook fell to the ground and at one point the gun struck her on the jaw. The assailant held the pocketbook for *972a time but dropped it and ran away when a neighbor came out into the hall. Ms. Clinton gave the police a detailed description of her assailant. At the time of the assault, two neighbors saw a man matching that description running away from the apartment house toward the street where appellant lived.
In the early evening of the same day, Ms. Clinton was taking some things out of her car to bring into her apartment when a man who resembled her assailant of that morning walked toward her. She recognized the man’s eyes. As he passed her, he did not stop but said “I’m gonna get you, bitch.” Based on identifications by the complaining witness and the neighbors who had seen a man running away that morning, appellant was arrested and charged with armed robbery and felony threats.4 A jury acquitted appellant of all but the threats charge.
In his petition for rehearing, appellant argues that his alleged conduct on the afternoon of May 24 did not violate the threats statute under which he was charged because there was no showing of intent to extort on his part. To support this argument he relies chiefly on a reading of the legislative history of the District of Columbia’s felony threats prohibition favored by the dissenting judge in Young. See id. at 814-16. Tracking the Young dissent, he also contends that the disparity in potential sentence between the felony threats statute and D.C.’s simple threats statute, D.C.Code § 22-507 (1981), amounts to a violation of his eighth amendment rights. Given appellant’s actual sentence, indeterminate commitment of up to six years under the Federal Youth Corrections Act (FYCA), 18 U.S.C. § 5010(b) (repealed 1984), we do not reach the latter issue.5
The plain language of D.C.’s felony threats prohibition does not include any intent element. Faced with the lack of facial ambiguity as to the elements of the offense, appellant argues that this court must look behind the plain meaning of the statute to the legislative history to glean the legislature’s intent and that we must interpret § 22-2307 in light of § 22-2306. As this court has noted, a statute’s plain meaning does not prevail over “strong contradictory indications in the legislative history” or if the plain meaning would lead to absurd consequences. Citizens Ass’n of Georgetown v. Zoning Comm’n of the District of Columbia, 392 A.2d 1027, 1033 (D.C.1978) (en banc). There is “no rule of law forbidding resort to explanatory legislative history no matter how ‘clear the words may appear on “superficial examination.” ’ ” Id. at 1033. However, this court will “look beyond the ordinary meaning of the words of a statute only where there are persuasive reasons for doing so.” Peoples Drug Stores, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 470 A.2d 751, 755 (D.C.1983) (en banc).
We turn first to appellant’s contention that the legislative history of the felony threats statute establishes that Congress intended extortionate intent to be an element of the offense. He relies significantly on the dissenting opinion in Young and a statement by a division of this court in a later case to the effect that the purpose of Congress in enacting § 22-2307 was to prohibit extortion in various forms. Young, 376 A.2d at 815 (Mack, J., dissenting); Ball v. United States, 429 A.2d 1353, 1359 (D.C.1981) (“threats” (D.C.Code § 22-2307) not lesser included offense of “obstructing justice” (D.C.Code § 22-703(a)); no merger; conviction and concurrent sentences for charges of both offenses not double jeopardy). This court’s opinion in Ball did not *973indicate that its interpretation of the legislative history of the felony threats statute was inconsistent with the majority’s holding in Young, 429 A.2d at 1356 n. 6, 1359-60. Nonetheless, we address it in the course of disposing of appellant’s argument that the legislative history supports his position.
Both the Young dissent and the discussion in Ball rely on remarks by Senator Tydings, then Chairman of the Senate District of Columbia Committee’s Subcommittee on Business and Commerce, when he introduced a last-minute floor amendment to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1976), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1202 (1984), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3796C (1977). His proposal eventually became D.C.Code §§ 22-2306 (repealed 1982) and -2307 (1988 Supp.). The court, in Ball, noted that Senator Tyd-ings “stressed that the bill was designed ‘to correct what appears to be a grave and damaging situation right here in Washington which threatens the commercial life of the city.’ ” 429 A.2d at 1359 n. 12 (quoting 114 Cong.Rec. 14778 (1968)).
That Senator Tydings deplored on the floor of the Senate the behavior of “extortionists and thieves” did not necessarily reflect that intent to extort was an element of all the offenses his amendments defined. It is apparent from his remarks that Senator Tydings considered threats a concomitant of extortionate behavior, but that is not to say that extortionate intent is a necessary element of any threat prohibited by the provision that became § 22-2307. Senator Tydings said of that section that it “prohibits extortion intended to affect conduct, rather than to extract money.” It is significant that he went on to state that “[i]t prohibits threats to kidnap or injure any person or damage his property, regardless of the reason for the threat.” 114 Cong.Rec. 14778 (1968).
Because Senator Tydings was the author of the amendment, and in the absence of a conference report or remarks from the floor manager, his remarks are a significant factor in determining the intent of the legislature. We cannot, however, read them in a ■ vacuum. In introducing his amendment, Senator Tydings noted its similarity to one being introduced in the House of Representatives by Congressman Whitener.6 Whitener stated that his bill was the result of a request and proposed legislation from D.C. Commissioner Walter Washington to bring D.C. law into conformance with a federal statute that prohibited communication of threats across state lines, 18 U.S.C. § 875 (1988 Supp.).7 114 Cong.Rec. 15013-15014 (1968). Tracking the language of the federal statute, the new measure as requested by the Commissioner and approved by the House of Representatives prohibited some crimes of which the intent to extort was an explicit part, and others of which it was not. It is
*974significant that the federal statute did not make intent to extort an element of felony threats.8 While he referred to his bill as “antiextortion legislation,” 114 Cong.Rec. 15012 (1968), Congressman Whitener noted with regard to the anti-threat provision that “the Commissioner included in his recommended legislation a provision specifically making it a felony ... to threaten to physically damage the property of another.” 114 Cong.Rec. 15013 (1968).
The most notable difference between the Whitener and Tydings versions is that the Tydings amendment made no differentiation in penalty between threat, extortion and blackmail. Nonetheless, the two measures are similar in that neither explicitly includes an intent element in the threat offense. From the House debates on the Omnibus Crime Bill as amended by the Senate, it appears that members of the House of Representatives thought that the Tydings amendment was substantively the same as the Whitener bill. See, e.g., 114 Cong.Rec. 16286 (1968) (remarks of Representative Machen) (“Last week the House passed a separate bill on this matter and I supported it. Therefore, since title X is the same bill, I also support it.”); 114 Cong. Rec. 16298 (1968) (remarks of Representative Pollock) (“This title would bring the District of Columbia code in conformance with an existing statute ... 18 U.S.C. § 875 — which makes certain crimes that required an interstate connecting link or series of illegal events in the perpetration of a crime applicable to the District of Columbia without an interstate communication. The reelected crimes are attempts to extort by any communication for release of kidnapped persons or threats to kidnap persons or threats to injure persons, property or reputations ... Maximum penalties would be $5,000 fine and 20 years imprisonment.” ). The penultimate sentence of Representative Pollock’s quoted statement appears ambiguous as it could be read to say that there are three kinds of attempts to extort or that there are three crimes of which attempt to extort constitutes one. His earlier reference to the federal statute establishes that the second reading is the correct one.
Given the apparent confusion between the two versions, different in form and penalty, of the threat and extortion prohibitions and the general air of urgency to pass the omnibus bill and then refine its provisions later, see, e.g., 114 Cong.ReC. 16275, 16281,16283-85 (1968), it is unwarranted to depend on Senator Tydings’ remarks alone to reflect the legislature’s purpose in enacting the felony threats statute. Even if one assumes arguendo that the threats statute was designed solely to enhance the protections available to businesses against extortionists and thieves, the threats statute need not include an element of extortionate intent in order to serve that purpose. Having reviewed the legislative history, we think it accurate to say that while preventing extortion was the main purpose of the amendments in question, it was not the sole purpose. Rather, the purpose included *975broadly a prohibition against threats, extortionate or not. The legislative history relied upon by appellant does not support his interpretation strongly enough to override the plain meaning of the statutory language. There is no clear indication of a legislative purpose that is at odds with the plain meaning. Cf. Mulky v. United States, 451 A.2d 855, 857 (D.C.1982).
To address appellant’s next argument, we return to our statement in Peoples Drug Store, Inc., supra, that we will “look beyond the ordinary meaning of the words of a statute only where there are persuasive reasons for doing so.” 470 A.2d at 755. Appellant apparently perceives one “persuasive reason” in the notion that because D.C.Code §§ 22-2306 and 22-2307 were enacted together, they are, in effect, in pari materia and must therefore be construed together.
Appellant would misapply the doctrine of in pari materia, as that doctrine that does not refer primarily to coincidence of enactment. Statutory provisions in pari mate-ria relate to the same subject matter or have the same purpose or object, see, e.g., Maynard v. Thrasher, 77 Ga.App. 316, 48 S.E.2d 471, 473 (1948); Gillespie v. City of Maroa, 104 Ill.App.3d 874, 60 Ill.Dec. 646, 649, 433 N.E.2d 688, 691 (1982), regardless of when they are enacted. Applestein v. Osborne, 156 Md. 40, 143 A. 666, 672 (1928); Quality Clothes Shop v. Keeney, 57 Ind.App. 500, 106 N.E. 541, 542 (1914). The comparison of statutes in pari mate-ria is an aid in determining legislative intent when the language of a statute is ambiguous. State v. Fremont Lodge of Loyal Order of Moose, 151 Ohio St. 19, 84 N.E.2d 498, 503 (1949); Stevens v. Linton, 190 Tenn. 351, 229 S.W.2d 510, 512 (1950). D.C.’s felony threat prohibition is not ambiguous on its face; in fact, the explicit inclusion of the element of intent to extort in the extortion prohibition with which it was enacted suggests that the legislature knew how to specify such intent if it wished. The fact that it was enacted and codified in tandem with an extortion provision does not establish that the two statutes address the same subject matter. Appellant would have us assume what he hopes to prove. We conclude that we need not construe the two statutes together in order to divine the meaning of the felony threats statute, § 22-2307.
We observe next that the circumstances under which the felony threats statute remains on the books today tend to undermine appellant’s position. While we acknowledge that subsequent legislative actions do not carry interpretative weight equivalent to that accorded actions of the enacting body, the D.C. Council’s extensive revisions to the D.C.Code following the report of the D.C.Law Revision Commission provide a guide as to the scope and application of the statute. In 1979, the Commission developed a proposal recommending reform of D.C. law relating to theft, extortion, fraud and forgery.9 Following a series of public hearings based on that proposal, several D.C. Council members introduced a bill containing reform proposals for those areas of the law. In the resulting legislation, the Council revisited the chapter in which the felony threats statute was codified and repealed the entire chapter except for § 22-2307, which it left in place. The effect was to repeal all of the chapter’s provisions dealing specifically with intent to extort, but to leave in force the felony threats provision that does not contain any reference to intent to extort. The bill included provisions to redefine the offenses of extortion and blackmail, now codified at D.C.Code §§ 22-3851 and 22-3852 (1988 Supp.).
In revising the law of extortion and blackmail in enacting the reform legislation, the Council had the benefit of this court’s interpretation of § 22-2307 in Young and Ball for its consideration. While there is no mention of either case in the legislative history of the District of Columbia Theft and White Collar Crimes Act of 1982, we assume legislative aware*976ness of the prior judicial interpretation of statutory language, see, e.g., In re A.B., 556 A.2d 645, 648 (D.C.1989) and, given the Council’s opportunity to revise the felony threats statute and confirm its supposed status as a member of the extortion family, we conclude that the D.C. Council’s interpretation of § 22-2307 comports with that of this court in Young in that we declined to read in the element of extortionate intent.
Appellant also argues that an interpretation of § 22-2307 without the element of extortionate intent should be disfavored as it would then be redundant of § 22-507. The Supreme Court has pointed out, however, that redundancy in criminal enactments is permissible. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979). As we have pointed out, the D.C. Council apparently did not consider the statutes unduly redundant as it left both in place after a revision effort with the stated goal of eliminating redundant provisions in the D.C.Code. Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, District of Columbia Council Bill No. 4-144 [D.C.Law 4-164], the “District of Columbia Theft and White Collar Crime Act of 1982,” at 2, 4 (June 1, 1982). Accordingly, this argument for a construction of the statute favorable to appellant also fails.
In short, having studied the language of the felony threats statute, considered whether other statutes might illuminate its meaning, reviewed the legislative history, and weighed appellant’s contentions concerning statutory construction, we remain of the view that intent to extort is not an element of the felony threats statute, § 22-2307, and decline to overrule our holding in Young.
Affirmed.
.Section 22-2307 provides:
Whoever threatens within the District of Columbia to kidnap any person or to injure the person of another or physically damage the property of any person or of another person, in whole or in part, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
. For the division’s treatment of appellant’s other grounds for appeal, see Holt v. United States, 547 A.2d 158, 158 n. 2 (D.C.1988).
. D.C.Code § 22-507 (1981) provides:
Whoever is convicted in the District of threats to do bodily harm shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than 6 months, or both, and, in addition thereto or in lieu thereof, may be required to give bond to keep the peace for a period not exceeding 1 year.
. D.C.Code §§ 22-2901, 22-3202, and 22-2307 (1981 and 1988 Supp.).
. The appropriate focus of an eighth amendment analysis is the sentence actually imposed. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-92 and n. 16, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 3009-10 and n. 16, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1982).
In addition, we observe that D.C.Code § 22-2307 provides for a 20-year maximum sentence with no mandatory minimum; accordingly, the sentencing court was not obligated to give a sentence more severe than that available under the simple threats statute, § 22-507. Moreover, the FYCA sentence actually imposed here was one the trial court could have imposed under either the misdemeanor or the felony threats statute.
. Congressman Whitener introduced the measure to the House of Representatives four days later as a bill, H.R. 17417, which the House passed without debate. 114 Cong.Rec. 15014 (1968).
. In setting out the federal statute, it is observed that subsections (a) and (c) do not require intent to extort:
(a) Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any demand or request for a ransom or reward for the release of any kidnapped person, shall be fined no more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
(b) Whoever, with intent to extort from any person, firm, association, or corporation, any money or other thing of value, transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another, shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
(c) Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
(d) Whoever, with intent to extort from any person, firm, association or corporation, any money or other thing of value, transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to injure the property or reputation of the addressee or of another or the reputation of a deceased person or any threat to accuse the addressee or any other person of a crime, shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 875 (emphasis added).
. In setting forth the Whitener bill, we observe that, as with the federal statute set forth in footnote 7, the first and third subsections do not require intent to extort:
That whoever (1) transmits within the District of Columbia any communication containing any demand or request for a ransom or reward for the release of a kidnapped person, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both; (2) with intent to extort from any person, firm, association, or corporation, any money or other thing of value, transmits within the District of Columbia any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both; (3) transmits within the District of Columbia any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another or physically damage his property, in whole or in part, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both; or (4) with intent to extort from any person, firm, association, or corporation, any money or other thing of value, transmits within the District of Columbia any communication containing any threat to injure the property or reputation of the addressee or of another or the reputation of a deceased person or any threat to accuse the addressee or any other person of a crime, shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
114 Cong.Rec. 15012 (1968) (emphasis added).
. The relevant proposals were contained in chapters 9 and 10 of Bill 3-226, which was enacted into law in that form.