dissenting:
I would affirm the trial court’s dismissal, without prejudice, of this indictment, for in my opinion specific intent to extort is an element of the crime proscribed by D.C. Code 1973, § 22-2307.1
Admittedly, statutory language which is plain and unambiguous must be given effect — but not when a literal approach leads to absurd consequences and thwarts the manifest purpose of the statute.2 Our task is not simply to determine whether or not certain words are “ambiguous”; our task is to discover and effectuate the purpose or object of the statute. Thus, regardless of surface clarity and apparent lack of ambiguity, nothing “preclude[s] consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists.”3 For
words are inexact tools at best, and for that reason there is wisely no rule of law forbidding resort to explanatory legislative history no matter how “clear the *815words may appear on ‘superficial examination.’ ”4
The pertinent legislative history is succinct and compelling. Sections 22-2306 and 22-2307 of the D.C.Code were enacted into law as Title X of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 by way of a last minute amendment introduced by Senator Tydings and approved moments later by the Senate (and later by the House). The wording of sections 22-2306 and -2307 is identical to that óf the amendment which was introduced by Senator Tydings with the following explanation:
MR. TYDINGS. Mr. President, it is essential for the Senate — while it considers a national crime bill — to correct what appears to be a grave and damaging situation right here in Washington which threatens the commercial life of the city.
Every day reports come in, not only to me, but to my colleague from Maryland and the Senators from Virginia, of Washington merchants, and Marylanders and Virginians who own stores in the District of Columbia, who are being threatened and abused by extortionists and thieves. Every day, thugs walk into stores and demand or just take merchandise. And if the owner tries to stop them, they threaten to burn down his store. We hear of threats to merchants that if they attempt to rebuild stores burned out in the recent riots, they will be destroyed again. We hear reports of shakedowns and the protection racket here in the District of Columbia.
My amendment, which is similar to the one introduced in the House of Representatives by Mr. WHITENER and Mr. McMILLAN, would make extortion and transmission of threats to persons and property a felony punishable by $5,000 or 20 years’ imprisonment, or both.
There is no general prohibition of extortion in the District of Columbia Code today. The only Code provision dealing specifically with extortion is a 1902 law, section 22-1302 of the District of Columbia Code, dealing with false recordation of land records with intent to defraud. Section 22-2305, concerning blackmail, includes only threats to publish disgraceful accusations for the purpose of extorting funds or influencing conduct. Not covered are threats of injury to person or damage to property.
The amendment would create a new title V, making the present reversability provision title VI.
The extortion title has two sections. The first section, 1001 [§ 22-2306], prohibits extortion for money or other thing of value. The second section, 1002 [§ 22-2307], prohibits threats designed to influence conduct, such as threats to burn out a merchant if he attempts to locate his business in a certain area. These threats must be convincing threats, clearly believable and intended to be acted upon, against particular persons. Generalized or vague threats are not enough.
Specifically, section 1001 prohibits three kinds of action, when they are perpetrated “with intent to extort from any person, firm, association or corporation, any money or thing of value:” First, any demand for ransom for a kidnapped person; second, any threat to kidnap or any threat to injure any person; and, third, any threat to injure the property or reputation of any person.
Section 1002 [§ 22-2307] prohibits extortion intended to affect conduct, rather than to extract money. It prohibits threats to kidnap or injure any person or damage his property, regardless of the reason for the threat.
All offenses would be punishable by up to $5,000 fine and 20 years’ imprisonment.
As chairman of the Senate District Committee’s Subcommittee on Business and Commerce, I recently held hearings on the riot damage and the District’s *816rebuilding plans. I know the importance of this bill. Whether these reports of extortion are true is not the point. The fact is there is no general law on extortion in the District of Columbia at all now. We should enact such a law in any case. But it is particularly urgent now to give citizens and businesses in the District of Columbia the kind of assurance they need that the law will protect them against extortion.
% % Hc ‡ $
[114 Cong.Rec. 14778 (1968) (emphasis added).]
This is highly persuasive evidence that the congressional aim in enacting section 22-2307 (like that in enacting section 22-2306) was the proscription of extortion.5
Two additional factors buttress this conclusion. One is simply the fact that there was already a statute dealing with “simple” threats.6 The second and more important factor is the penalty provided for violation of section 22-2307: i. e., a five thousand dollar fine or up to twenty years’ imprisonment or both. The fact that the same penalty was provided in section 22-2306 suggests that the crimes were considered to be of equivalent seriousness, and require the same specific intent to extort. Moreover, twenty years’ imprisonment is an exceptionally harsh penalty, as a review of other Code sections indicates,7 and I am doubtful that Congress intended that the threat to injure, standing alone, would be punished more harshly than an actual injury.8 Yet that is the effect of the majority’s literal reading of this statute.
I respectfully dissent.
.Section 22-2307 reads as follows:
Whoever threatens within the District of Columbia to kidnap any person or to injure the person of another or physically damage the property of any person or of another person, in whole or in part, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction 133, 138 (4th ed. C.D.Sands 1974).
. Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48, 49 S.Ct. 52, 54, 73 L.Ed. 170 (1928).
. Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476, 479, 63 S.Ct. 361, 363, 87 L.Ed. 407 (1943), quoting United States v. American Trucking Assn’s, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 84 L.Ed. 1345 (1940). See also Newspaper Guild v. Levi, 176 U.S.App.D.C. 276, 283 n. 1, 539 F.2d 755, 762 n. 1 (1976) (Tamm, J., dissenting).
. The government has not ignored this legislative history but has attempted to minimize its impact by suggesting there is a gap between what the legislators intended to do and what they in fact did — an observation which I find somewhat strange in light of the purpose of legislative explanations.
. D.C.Code 1973, § 22-507:
Whoever is convicted in the District of threats to do bodily harm shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than six months, or both, and, in addition thereto or in lieu thereof, may be required to give bond to keep the peace for a period not exceeding one year.
. Compare the twenty year maximum penalty provided in section 22-2307 with the following: assault with intent to kill, or rape, or rob — not less than 2 nor more than 15 years (§ 22-501); assault with a dangerous weapon — not more than 10 years (§ 22-502); bribery — not more than 3 years (§ 22-701); obstructing justice— not more than 3 years (§ 22-703); blackmail— not more than 5 years (§ 22-2305); grand larceny — not less than one nor more than 10 years (§ 22-2201); robbery — not less than 2 nor more than 15 years (§ 22-2901).
.Compare the twenty year penalty provided in § 22-2307 for threatening to injure or to kidnap a person or to damage property, with: arson— not less than one nor more than 10 years (§ 22-401); malicious destruction of property worth more than $200 — not more than 10 years (§ 22-403); and mayhem or malicious disfigurement — not more than 10 years (§ 22-506). Kidnaping carries a potential life sentence (§ 22-2101).