concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I do not believe that the form of the verdict is legally sufficient to authorize the imposition of a death sentence. Section 565.008 (now repealed) provided as follows:
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4. ... The jury, if its verdict is a recommendation of death, shall designate in writing, signed by the foreman of the jury, the aggravating circumstance or circumstances which it found beyond a reasonable doubt.
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The statutory aggravating circumstance relied on is as follows:
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2. (1) ... the offense was committed by a person who has a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions;
The only portion of the verdict which responds to this aggravating circumstance reads as follows:
The defendant has a substantial criminal history, including convictions for burglary, armed robbery, and forcible rape.
*740The jury made no express finding of “serious assaultive convictions” and included in the verdict a conviction for burglary which cannot be properly described as “as-saultive.” If the state is to exact the death penalty, procedures should be strictly followed and the verdict should be literally precise. The omission of a single word may be fatal to the prosecution’s cause. State v. Gilmore, 650 S.W.2d 627 (Mo. banc 1983). The verdict did not meet the statutory standard. It matters not that no specific command of MAI-CR2d may have been violated.
Because of the position I take it is not necessary to discuss other issues in any detail. I concur in all other respects with the principal opinion. Extended analysis of Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir.1985) is not necessary because the two jurors who might have served indicated reluctance to “put somebody in jail,” and so were properly excludable for the guilt-innocence phase. Compare State v. Kenley, 693 S.W.2d 79 (Mo. banc 1985). See my Concurring Opinion in State v. Malone, 694 S.W.2d 723 (Mo. banc 1985). I also agree that the court was justified in correcting the perceived errors in instruction, but see some inconsistency in requiring the trial judges in other criminal cases, and in civil cases, to remain silent as robots when confronted with jurors’ questions showing legitimate concern about instructions.
The death penalty was appropriately submitted to the jury. The State is entitled to a new trial of the punishment phase if it desires. I would affirm the conviction for capital murder but would remand for a new trial of the punishment phase. The State of course could waive the death sentence, in which case it would be appropriate for the court to sentence the defendant to the mandatory life term with a minimum of 50 years.