dissenting. I am unable to agree with the majority opinion because as I see it there are two glaring constitutional defects in Act 2 of the First Extraordinary Session of the Sixty-Second General Assembly. I think it would be difficult to imagine a more patent conflict with Amendment No. 49 than that contained in the proposal to establish a factory to be erected on 25 acres of land in Baxter County. The majority has not simply given a liberal interpretation to Amendment No. 49. Instead it has strained the definition of the term “industry” beyond reason and it has misapplied the doctrine that the Legislature has the power to do anything1 which is not prohibited by the Constitution and adopts an interpretation of Act 2 which would permit, for example, the establishment of a factory at Damascus in Faulkner County under the terms of a compact between Faulkner County and Perry County, in spite of the fact that Damascus is in the extreme northern part of Faulkner County and accessible to the inhabitants of Perry County only by way of Toad Suck Ferry or by a circuitous highway route through either Conway County or Pulaski County. Going further, the majority’s interpretation of Act 2 would permit the adjoining counties of Little River and Miller to enter into a compact under which a factory could be constructed in Oklahoma, Texas, or Louisiana, because if the majority’s understanding of the term “industry” is. correct, jobs would be created in these bordering states in which the inhabitants of Little River County and Miller County could find employment and thereby benefit. If these examples seem absurd, the fault lies wholly with the basic misconception of the meaning of the Constitution on which the majority proceeds.
The majority’s theory that the Legislature has all legislative power except where limited expressly or by implication by the Constitution is undoubtedly correct. The fallacy lies, however, in its application. The original Constitution, Article 12, Sec. 5, laid down a flat prohibition on the lending of credit by a county. Certain express exceptions have been made as in Amendments 10, 13, 18, 32 and 38. Amendment 49 is nothing more than an additional exception to the general constitutional prohibition on the lending of credit by a county. In other words, Amendment 49 removes from the prohibited area the lending of credit by a county “for the purpose of securing and developing industry . . . within the county . . . ” The conclusion is inescapable that the general prohibitions on the lending of credit by a county prohibit what is sought to be done by Act 2 unless Amendment 49, either expressly or by necessary implication, has removed the prohibition for the purposes stated therein. It is clear, then, that the theory of the majority that the Legislature may do all things which it is not prohibited from doing is irrelevant to the case at bar. In my opinion, this case presents the following questions: Does Amendment 49 permit the issuance of bonds in the county for the purpose of establishing an industry in another county? Does “within the county” mean what it says? If it does not mean what it says, then how far beyond the borders of a county may the industry be established and still comply with the constitutional restriction? In my view, the Constitution does mean what it says. The industry must be established within the county. The word “within” means physically within the limits of the county. The word “industry” means what common language has always dictated, i.e., a factory, a plant, a complexity of physical manufacturing or processing operations having a more or less well defined center. It does not mean the indirect effect of such an establishment. For, if this were true, it is no far cry to hold that the General Motors Corporation industry is located in Pulaski County, because certainly the economic effects of that industry are of great benefit to the inhabitants of Pulaski County. The decision of the majority espouses the ‘ ‘ trickle down” theory of economics, the logical conclusion of which is that it makes no difference where an industry (factory, plant, etc.), is established so long as the benefits therefrom in some way will accrue to the inhabitants of the county involved. Thus, I am convinced that the majority has made a radical departure from the plain meaning of Amendment 49 and other relevant prohibitions of the Constitution, a departure without precedent and one moreover which contains the seeds of destruction insofar as the system of constitutional limitations on the lending of credit by counties is concerned.
Not only do I believe the majority has made a fundamental error in its construction of Amendment 49,1 think that it has completely ignored the true meaning of Article 7, Section 28 of the Constitution. In my judgment Section 2 of Act 2 is an obvious attempt to delegate the powers of the County Court to a three-member commission. Under this section, the Commission is empowered to hold title as trustee to any property or construction with the proceeds of bonds which may be issued. They are empowered “to take all steps and to make and enter into all contracts and agreements necessary or incidental to the securing and developing of industry that is mutually beneficial to the parties to the compact” subject to the approval of the County Court. The Commission may employ engineers, architects, inspectors, managers, attorneys and such other employees as in its judgment may be necessary in the execution of its powers and duties and may fix their compensation. All expenses and liabilities incurred in carrying out the duties and powers of the Commission may be paid from available funds, including without limitation, funds obtained from the issuance of bonds or from revenues derived from facilities constructed or acquired from the proceeds of such bonds.” The Commission is empowered “after the construction or acquisition of any lands, buildings or facilities, and subject to the limitations contained in this Act ... to reconstruct, extend, equip, improve, operate, maintain, sell, lease, contract concerning, or otherwise deal in or dispose of the said lands, buildings or facilities. ’ ’ All of this the Commission is empowered to do in the face of the following constitutional language:
‘ ‘ The county courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in all matters relating to county taxes, roads, bridges, ferries, paupers, bastardy, vagrants, the apprenticeship of minors, the disbursement of money for county purposes, and in every other case that may be necessary to the internal improvement and local concerns of the respective counties. The county court shall be held by one judge, except in cases otherwise herein provided. ’ ’ Art. 7, Sec. 28.
These purported powers of the Commission created by Act 2 are exactly the kinds of powers which this Court held belonged exclusively to the County Court in the case of Campbell, County Judge, v. Little Rock School Dist., et al., 222 Ark. 615, 262 S. W. 2d 267. The majority apparently has assumed that so long as the County Court has some control over the expenditure of funds there is no unlawful delegation. This is a direct reversal of the principles stated in the Campbell decision. The Commission under Act 2 is given discretionary power, not merely the duty of performing ministerial functions. If the system of management by County Courts contemplated by the Constitution is to be maintained, then Act 2 must fall. Article 7, Section 28, and Act 2 cannot simultaneously be the law.
For the reasons stated above, I respectfully dissent.