concurring.
I concur in the principal opinion. I write separately only to explain why I disagree with the dissent’s assertion that no writ of prohibition should issue because “the principal opinion addresses issues that are neither raised by the point relied on or jurisdictional.”
The dissent contends the issue for determination by this Court is limited to the relator’s point relied on. Ordinarily, I would agree with this general rule and concede that it applies to briefs filed with this Court after issuance of a preliminary writ of prohibition. See, e.g., State ex rel. Wilson v. Brown, 897 S.W.2d 171, 178 (Mo.App.1995). The instant case, however, is governed by Rule 84.18(a), which states:
Apart from questions of jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject matter and questions as to the sufficiency of pleadings to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or a legal defense to a claim, allegations of error not briefed or not properly briefed shall not
be considered in any civil appeal and allegations of error not presented to or expressly decided by the trial court shall not be considered in any civil appeal from a jury tried case.
(Italics added.) When a question of the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction is involved, Rule 84.13(a) authorizes this Court to raise the issue sua sponte and decide the matter on a ground that is not preserved, briefed or argued by the parties. See Adkisson v. Director of Revenue, 891 S.W.2d 131, 132 (Mo. banc 1995). In my view, this case presents two separate questions of subject-matter jurisdiction that can and should be addressed in this prohibition action.
Rule 67.02(a)(2) authorizes a plaintiff whose civil action is tried without a jury to dismiss the case anytime “prior to the introduction of evidence.” In Garrison v. Jones, 557 S.W.2d 247 (Mo. banc 1977), our Supreme Court held that this language “refers to the introduction of evidence at the trial of the cause on the merits.” Id. at 249; see also State ex rel. Brooks Erection & Constr. Co. v. Gaertner, 639 S.W.2d 848, 849 (Mo.App.1982); Washington Univ. Med. Center Redevelopment Corp. v. Komen, 637 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Mo.App.1982). That is the nub of the problem here. In Sooch v. Director of Revenue, 105 S.W.3d 546 (Mo.App.2003), the Eastern District of this Court held that a drug court commissioner had no jurisdiction to hear a trial de novo in a driver’s license revocation case absent statutory authorization to do so. Id. at 547. Because of that lack of jurisdiction, the drug court commissioner could not hear the evidence introduced at trial and then decide the case on the merits.
*112More to the point, that lack of jurisdiction means a drug court commissioner cannot even hear the evidence on the merits and then enter a finding and recommended judgment which is later adopted by an article V judge. In Roberson v. Director of Revenue, 108 S.W.3d 744 (Mo.App.2003) a driver’s petition for judicial review was heard by a drug court commissioner. The Eastern District of this Court held that the evidence on the merits had to be heard by an associate circuit or circuit judge:
Roberson filed a petition for review, and a trial de novo was held before a drug court commissioner. The findings and recommendations of the drug court commissioner were adopted by the associate circuit court as the judgment. Sooch requires a finding in the present case that the drug court commissioner lacked jurisdiction to hear the trial de novo of Roberson’s petition for review. Therefore, in light of our decision in Sooch, we must remand the case for trial de novo before an associate circuit or circuit court judge.
Id. at 745-46. Therefore, I believe Roberson refutes the dissent’s contention that “the involvement of the official who conducted an evidentiary hearing for purposes of recommending findings to the circuit court is not a matter of jurisdictional concern .... ”
Neither State v. Ralls, 8 S.W.3d 64 (Mo. banc 1999) nor Transit Cas. Co. In Receivership v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 995 S.W.2d 32 (Mo.App.1999) support a contrary conclusion. In Ralls, the Supreme Court decided a drug court commissioner could not preside over a felony jury trial, even though § 478.466 states that such a commissioner, “[sjubject to approval or rejection by a circuit judge, .... shall have all the powers and duties of a circuit judge.” Ralls, 8 S.W.3d at 64. In Transit Cas. Co., the Western District of this Court held that a circuit judge could not delegate his decision-making authority to a Special Master appointed pursuant to Rule 68.01 “because only judges comprising the courts designated in article V, section 1 of the Missouri Constitution may constitutionally exercise the judicial power.” Transit Cas. Co., 995 S.W.2d at 34. The statement in Ralls, 8 S.W.3d at 65, that “many functions might properly be delegated to a drug court commissioner subject to the review of an article V judge” appears to be obiter dictum because it was not necessary to the decision. See Martinez v. State, 24 S.W.3d 10, 16 (Mo.App.2000). In any event, I do not believe that hearing evidence on the merits, making factual findings and recommending how an article V judge should dispose of the case is one of the undefined “functions” which can be delegated to a drug court commissioner. See Roberson, 108 S.W.3d at 745-46; Transit Cas. Co., 995 S.W.2d at 34-35.
Subject-matter jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong. Missouri Soybean Ass’n v. Missouri Clean Water Comm’n, 102 S.W.3d 10, 22 (Mo. banc 2003). Here, the drug court commissioner did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to try a dissolution action, even by consent of the parties. See Oberreiter v. Fullbright Trucking Co., 117 S.W.3d 710, 716 (Mo.App.2003) (subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent or estoppel, and the lack thereof cannot be waived). Therefore, the evidence presented by the parties before the commissioner was a nullity and did not constitute “the introduction of evidence” within the meaning of Rule 67.02(a)(2). See Gunnett v. Girardier Bldg, and Realty Co., 70 S.W.3d 632, 642 (Mo.App.2002) (when a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, it has no right, power or authority to act in the matter; any action the court *113takes is null and void). Since no evidence had been introduced before Judge Sharp at a trial on the merits of relator’s dissolution action prior to December 18, 2003, relator was authorized by Rule 67.02(a)(2) to voluntarily dismiss her case. See Garrison, 557 S.W.2d at 249.
Once relator’s voluntary dismissal was filed, it was immediately effective without any action by the trial court. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vulgamott, 96 S.W.3d 96, 104 (Mo.App.2003); Barnett v. Weidner, 901 S.W.2d 281, 283 (Mo.App.1995); Samland v. J. White Transp. Co., Inc., 675 S.W.2d 92, 96 (Mo.App.1984). Judge Sharp lost jurisdiction as of the date of the dismissal. Vulgamott, 96 S.W.3d at 104; Freeman v. Leader Nat. Ins. Co., 58 S.W.3d 590, 595 (Mo.App.2001). It is well settled that once a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses his or her petition:
nothing remains before the court upon which it can act; even an order reinstating the case on the trial docket at the plaintiffs request is a nullity. The legal situation is as though the suit had never been brought. No steps can be taken, and any step attempted in the dismissed suit is a nullity.
Rickman v. Coughlin, 75 S.W.3d 334, 338 (Mo.App.2002). Therefore, Judge Sharp’s order of February 5, 2004 stating that relator’s dissolution action “not be dismissed” was a nullity. In re Estate of Klaas, 8 S.W.3d 906, 909 (Mo.App.2000).
A writ of prohibition is appropriate whenever a trial court exceeds its jurisdiction. See Missouri State Bd. of Registration for Healing Arts v. Brown, 121 S.W.3d 234, 236 (Mo. banc 2003); State ex rel. Chassaing v. Mummert, 887 S.W.2d 573, 577 (Mo. banc 1994). Accordingly, a permanent writ of prohibition lies to prevent Judge Sharp from continuing his attempts to exercise jurisdiction over relator’s dissolution action, which no longer exists and must be treated as if it had never been brought.