The facts in this case are adequately set out in the dissenting opinion.
In our judgment, the holding of the dissent is at odds with the well-established principle that, once all of the elements of a cause of action have occurred, the running of the statutory period of limitation is not delayed until the claimant becomes aware of the identity of the alleged tortfea*4sor. Thomas v Ferndale Laboratories, Inc, 97 Mich App 718; 296 NW2d 160 (1980).
The dissent places much reliance on O’Keefe v Clark Equipment Co, 106 Mich App 23; 307 NW2d 343 (1981). The O’Keefe panel cited, and applied, the "rule” set forth by this Court in Charpentier v Young, 83 Mich App 145, 149-150; 268 NW2d 322 (1978):
"We, therefore, conclude that whether a party seeking to add parties to the litigation has complied with the court rules so as to entitle him to suspend the running of an applicable statute of limitations in favor of an added party, is for determination in the first instance by the trial court. An added party may obtain the trial court’s review of the circumstances leading up to the filing of the amended complaint by filing a motion for accelerated judgment based upon the statute of limitations. The trial court may then review de novo the procedural steps taken by the amending party to assure that dilatory tactics have not unjustly deprived the added party of his legitimate statute of limitations defense. It is then within the discretion of the trial court to grant or deny the motion based upon his evaluation of the circumstances in each case.”
Concurring in the result, Judge Riley expressed the view in Charpentier that a more definite rule would be preferable to the majority’s general discretion standard:
"A statute of limitations is primarily a technical counting process which provides some measure of security to the parties in regard to when the statutory bar goes into effect. A possible rule would be that the statute be tolled for the amount of time the court takes to decide on a motion to amend if that delay extends beyond the date on which the original limitations period would end. The problem of dilatory actions to *5increase this delay could be handled by the trial court’s vigilance over its motion docket.” 83 Mich App 152.
The Supreme Court reversed in Charpentier:
"Leave to appeal considered November 30, 1978, and, pursuant to GCR 1963, 853.2(4), in lieu of leave to appeal, the Court of Appeals is reversed, the trial court’s accelerated judgments in favor of defendantsappellees are set aside, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. The statute of limitations was tolled for 21 days, from March 10 to March 31, 1976, the time during which the motion to amend complaint and add parties defendant was pending, plaintiffs having demonstrated due diligence by seeking a decision on their motion within three weeks.” 403 Mich 851; 291 NW2d 926 (1978).
In this case, the dissent states: "I am unable to ascertain from the brief order how much of the Charpentier rationale is reversed and to what matters the test of due diligence is to be applied.” Our reading of the Supreme Court’s order, however, persuades us that the Supreme Court rejected the general discretion standard of this Court’s Charpentier majority. See Moore v Flower, 108 Mich App 214, 217; 310 NW2d 336 (1981):1
"We see, as did Judge Riley in her concurrence in Charpentier, supra, a serious problem with permitting the trial court to extend a defendant’s liability depending on whether the trial court, in its discretion, finds that a plaintiff exercised diligence in attempting to join that defendant. Application of statutes of limitations is a counting procedure with a primary purpose being to give the parties and the courts a specific time at which the statutory bar goes into effect. We find that the Supreme Court order in Charpentier, supra, applies *6such a rule and hold that, when a plaintiff moves to add a party defendant or to amend a complaint to do so, the statute of limitations is tolled during the time in which the motion to add parties or amend the complaint is pending in the trial court.”
While we are persuaded of no reason to prohibit the filing of "John Doe” complaints, it is our opinion that the running of the applicable statutory limitation period is not interrupted by the filing of such a complaint. The Supreme Court has identified the purposes served by statutes of limitation:
"Statutes of limitations are intended to 'compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time so that the opposing party has a fair opportunity to defend’; 'to relieve a court system from dealing with "stale” claims, where the facts in dispute occurred so long ago that evidence was either forgotten or manufactured’; and to protect 'potential defendants from protracted fear of litigation’.” Bigelow v Walraven, 392 Mich 566, 576; 221 NW2d 328 (1974), citing 51 Am Jur 2d, Limitation of Actions, § 17, pp 602-603.
Would-be plaintiffs must diligently investigate potential claims within the time frames established by the Legislature. Defendants are entitled to notice of claims within the applicable statutory limitation period. See Meda v City of Howell, 110 Mich App 179; 312 NW2d 202 (1981).
Reversed.
D. L. Sullivan, J., concurred.Remanded, 414 Mich 897; 323 NW2d 6 (1982), On Remand 121 Mich App 235; 329 NW2d 35 (1982).