(dissenting).
¶ 30. The majority concludes neither the Fourth Amendment nor the Wisconsin Constitution recognizes an expectation of privacy in bank records and therefore suppression of the State's unlawfully obtained bank records and tainted evidence is not an available remedy in a criminal proceeding. Because I would hold people have a constitutional right *403under the Wisconsin Constitution against unlawful searches and seizures of their bank records, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 31. Wisconsin Const. Art. I, § 11, provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis added).
Here, the State concedes that it obtained Michelle Popenhagen's bank records in violation of Wis. Stat. § 968.135. It admits it did not even attempt to comply with the probable cause requirement. Section 968.135 provides:
Upon the request of the attorney general or a district attorney and upon a showing of probable cause under s. 968.12, a court shall issue a subpoena requiring the production of documents, as specified in s. 968.13(2). The documents shall be returnable to the court which issued the subpoena. Motions to the court, including, but not limited to, motions to quash or limit the subpoena, shall be addressed to the court which issued the subpoena. Any person who unlawfully refuses to produce the documents may be compelled to do so as provided in ch. 785. This section does not limit or affect any other subpoena authority provided by law. (Emphasis added.)
¶ 32. The issue in this case centers on whether people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their bank records. In my opinion they do. The right to be secure in one's papers has been applied to a person's private papers since 1886. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 621 (1886).
*404¶ 33. I recognize that in United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976), the United States Supreme Court held there was no legitimate expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment in bank records. However, since Miller, which has been criticized in many academic circles, both Congress and the Wisconsin Legislature responded with legislation strengthening a customer's legitimate right to privacy in bank records. I will confine myself to Wisconsin's legislative response, as I apply only our Wisconsin Constitution and state laws.
¶ 34. It has been recognized and established for some time that it is the prerogative of Wisconsin to afford greater protection to a person's liberties within the boundaries of its constitution and laws. State v. Doe, 78 Wis. 2d 161, 171, 254 N.W.2d 210 (1977). The State does not dispute this.
¶ 35. Thus, we first have our Wisconsin Constitution protecting our citizens' right to their papers and effects from unreasonable seizure without a search warrant establishing probable cause. The legitimate expectation of privacy to a person's bank records was reinforced by our legislature in 1979 when it created Wis. Stat. § 968.135, which protects a customer's right to documents such as bank records from subpoenas unless the attorney general or district attorney shows the same probable cause as required in search warrants.
¶ 36. It is noteworthy this statute is included in Wis. Stat. ch. 968, our procedural statute for commencement of criminal proceedings, and follows Wis. Stat. § 968.12, which lists the requirements for a search warrant. Importantly, it is not under a general civil procedure for obtaining a citizen's private bank records. Nor is this a situation where a nongovernmental agency *405acquired the bank records. Wisconsin Stat. § 968.135, in my opinion, establishes our citizens' reasonable expectation of privacy in bank records in the context of criminal proceedings.
¶ 37. The State's argument that Wis. Stat. § 968.135 does not include a provision stating that suppression is a sanction for unlawfully subpoenaed bank records is unpersuasive. Interestingly, when one looks at the legislative requirements for a search warrant, the sanction of suppression, or any other sanction for that matter, is not specifically stated. That sanction arises from our constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
¶ 38. Therefore, in my opinion, people have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their bank records and when the attorney general or district attorney fails to show probable cause for the subpoena, not only must the subpoena be quashed or limited, but the records and evidence obtained unlawfully must not be used in any criminal proceedings. It is no different from the attorney general or district attorney obtaining a search warrant without establishing probable cause. When the State unlawfully obtains a search warrant or, as in this case, unlawfully obtains subpoenaed bank records, the evidence must be suppressed so that it is not used in the criminal proceeding.
¶ 39. Finally, this case involves the flagrant violation of Wis. Stat. § 968.135. No attempt was made to comply with the statute, nor has any explanation been offered for the abuse of this process. Yet the State wants us to ignore the statute and allow evidence resulting from its unlawful seizure to be used in a criminal proceeding. I am not persuaded. The only appropriate *406remedy in this criminal proceeding is the exclusion of the records and tainted evidence, as the trial court correctly concluded. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.