Appellants, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, president of the union, Douglas Dority, John Doe, and Mary Roe (“UFCW”), appeal the chancery court injunction barring them from entering any Wal-Mart or Sam’s Club store in the United States for the purpose of soliciting and distributing union information on the grounds that the grant of a nationwide injunction based on Arkansas trespass law was erroneous. UFCW argues that its behavior did not violate Arkansas law concerning trespass. UFCW further asserts that Arkansas law should not apply outside of this state and that, by holding that a trespass in Arkansas supported the issuance of a nationwide injunction based on Arkansas trespass law, the chancery court committed reversible error. Appellee, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (“Wal-Mart”), responds that the chancery court’s order is within the scope of an injunction and should stand. We conclude that the chancery court committed reversible error, and we reverse.
In September of 1999, the UFCW instituted what is referred to as a “blitz” of Wal-Mart Supercenters. In these blitzes, UFCW representatives entered Wal-Mart meat departments in several states and distributed information about its union to Wal-Mart employees. In some instances, the union representatives were asked to leave, and, when asked to leave, they always complied. There is no controversy as to whether the representatives of UFCW in Arkansas left Wal-Mart’s premises upon request to do so. They promptly left, and no criminal prosecution ensued.
On September 15, 1999, Wal-Mart filed a lawsuit in the Benton County Chancery Court seeking a temporary restraining order against the UFCW. Wal-Mart sought to restrain UFCW representatives from entering Wal-Mart stores for the purpose of distributing UFCW materials. Wal-Mart claimed that this behavior was an unauthorized trespass onto Wal-Mart property, and in violation of Wal-Mart’s “no solicitation/no distribution” policy. Wal-Mart stated in its complaint that its agents had contacted the UFCW by letters sent to the UFCW headquarters in several states and requested that the behavior stop; however, the incidents had continued. Wal-Mart claimed that it would be irreparably harmed if the UFCW was allowed to continue and requested a restraining order on this basis. On September 15, 1999, the chancery court entered a temporary restraining order on the basis of the “immediacy of the potential harm” to Wal-Mart. The case was removed to the federal district court. The district court stated that there was no federal question for it to review and remanded it to chancery court.
On June 14, 2000, the chancery court entered an order dissolving the temporary restraining order with respect to all Wal-Mart stores in states other than Arkansas. It also held that the court would not make a ruling on whether the injunction should become permanent until the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) had determined whether the blitzes were protected activity. The chancellor’s reasoning was that he had authority only to enjoin violations of law and did not have jurisdiction to enforce private company policies, such as Wal-Mart’s no-solicitation rule.
On April 23, 2001, the NLRB issued a memorandum order finding that UFCW’s solicitation inside Wal-Mart stores was not a protected activity under federal law. Based on the NLRB’s determination, on October 15, 2001, the Benton County Chancery Court issued a new temporary restraining order that forbade UFCW from “trespassing inside any of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.’s property, in violation of its no solicitations/no distribution rules[.]” On March 15, 2002, the chancery court made the restraining order permanent. The order prohibited UFCW representatives from the following:
Entering into and soliciting for any purpose inside any building owned or legally occupied by Wal-Mart, which building posts a sign at its entrance prohibiting solicitation.1
This prohibition and injunction includes all Wal-Mart stores, Wal-Mart Supercenters, Sam’s Clubs, and neighborhood markets, as well as any other buildings owned or legally occupied by WalMart within any state or territory of the United States of America.
The chancery court held that the UFCW representatives were “in violation of their license to enter Wal-Mart stores as business invitees” and that their behavior constituted an unlawful trespass on Wal-Mart property. The chancery court then issued a nationwide injunction barring UFCW representatives from entering any Wal-Mart store for the purpose of solicitation. We conclude that Wal-Mart can demonstrate no irreparable harm. For these reasons, the injunction in Arkansas is improper. Accordingly, we reverse.
This court reviews chancery matters, including injunctions, de novo.2 Custom Microsystems, Inc. v. Blake, 344 Ark. 536, 42 S.W.3d 453 (2001). The decision to grant or deny an injunction is within the discretion of the chancery judge. Id. The appellate court will not reverse the chancery judge’s ruling granting or denying an injunction unless there has been an abuse of discretion. Id. When considering an order that grants or denies an injunction, the appellate court will not delve into the merits of the case further than is necessary to determine whether the chancery court exceeded its discretion. Id. In Villines v. Harris, 340 Ark. 319, 11 S.W.3d 516, 519 (2000), we explained: “The sole question before the appellate court is whether the trial court ‘departed from the rules and principles of equity in making the order,’ and not whether the appellate court would have made the order.” Id. In reviewing the chancery court’s'findings, we give due deference to that court’s superior position to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be accorded to their testimony. Kelly v. Kelly, 341 Ark. 596, 10 S.W.3d 1 (2000). A chancellor’s conclusion of law is given no deference on appeal. Id.
First, we must review the grounds upon which the chancery court ordered the injunction. The chancery court set out the standard used for establishing sufficient grounds for a permanent injunction: “[T]he movant must show (1) that it is threatened with irreparable harm; (2) that this harm outweighs any injury which granting the injunction will inflict on other parties; (3) a likelihood of success on the merits; and (4) that the public interest favors the injunction.” Dawson v. Temps Plus, Inc., 337 Ark. 247, 987 S.W.2d 722 (1999).
Irreparable harm is the touchstone of injunctive relief. Wilson v. Pulaski Ass’n of Classroom Teachers, 330 Ark. 298, 954 S.W.2d 221 (1997). Harm is normally only considered irreparable when it cannot be adequately compensated by money damages or redressed in a court of law. Kreutzer v. Clark, 271 Ark. 243, 607 S.W.2d 670 (1980). It is where an injury is a recurring one and the damages are substantial that equity will restrain by injunction. Meriwether Sand & Gravel v. State Ex. Rel., Attorney General, 181 Ark. 216, 26 S.W.2d 57 (1930).
Here, the chancery court states that Wal-Mart showed irreparable harm:
[Rjefusing the injunction would be a denial of justice because redress may not be available through money damages in light of the nature of the act, To show irreparable harm, the complainant must show some danger of recurrent violation of his legal rights. Additionally, injunctive relief is appropriate to prevent a threatened disturbance of the peaceable use, enjoyment, and possession of real property. Thus, an injunction is a proper remedy against wrongful trespasses.
The chancery court then described the irreparable harm that would befall Wal-Mart if the injunction were not issued:
[T]he union workers have “disturbed Wal-Mart’s peaceable use, enjoyment, and possession of its property. Moreover, Wal-Mart has a right to conduct business without interference by the UFCW.
Wal-Mart contends that the trial court was correct in its conclusion that Wal-Mart had established irreparable harm, noting the trial court’s findings that Wal-Mart could not be made whole by monetary damages “as the damages were speculative and useless,” and claiming that the facts adduced at trial “established that the representatives threatened to continue to trespass on Wal-Mart property despite repeated requests that they abide by the no-solicitation policy.” There was no showing that UFCW representatives in Arkansas returned to Wal-Mart facilities after being asked to leave.
Wal-Mart further argues that its workers were distracted by the UFCW workers’ solicitations and that the time and effort it took to enforce their no-solicitation policy detracted from other duties. Wal-Mart alleged that its employees were distracted and that the UFCW representatives created a bad impression with customers. However, Wal-Mart failed to offer the testimony of a single Wal-Mart employee aside from the store managers who dealt with UFCW representatives.
Wal-Mart also alleged the loss of customer “good will.” However, Wal-Mart offered no evidence of any customer complaints due to UFCW solicitations, and evidence showed that sales actually increased during this time. Two persons passing out literature in one store and three passing out literature in another store on a single occasion hardly supports a claim of a threat of irreparable harm. Wal-Mart simply fails to provide evidence of irreparable harm, and the trial court abused its discretion in granting the injunction. For these reasons, we hold that Wal-Mart’s allegations do not constitute a showing of irreparable harm.
In addition, although Wal-Mart claims that the UFCW trespassed by “violating Wal-Mart’s rights as a property owner,” the cases upon which it relies for this point are inapposite. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), dealt only with First Amendment rights and did not address whether a trespass occurred. Local Union No. 313, Hotel and Restaurant Employees’ International Alliance v. Stathakis, 135 Ark. 86, 205 S.W. 450 (1918), is factually distinguishable because, in that case, the striking employees were actively disrupting the café owners’ business and assaulting and intimidating patrons on the sidewalks.
As we conclude that there was no showing of irreparable harm, we need not address the remaining factors in the test for determining whether an injunction should issue.
Wal-Mart also filed a motion to strike certain portions of UFCW’s reply brief for raising new arguments on appeal and for being nonresponsive to its brief. After reviewing the contents of the reply brief, it is clear that it is sufficiently responsive and raises no new arguments. We deny this motion.
Based upon our well-established rule concerning the review of injunctions, we do not delve more deeply into the merits of the case further than is necessary to determine whether the chancery court exceeded its discretion. Because there was no showing of irreparable harm, the chancery court’s issuance of an injunction was clearly erroneous. Having made that determination, we need not address the issue of whether the nationwide injunction was proper. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
Brown, J., and Imber, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. Special Associate Justice Janet Moore, dissenting. Corbin, J., not participating.The chancery court did not distinguish from its prohibition against all solicitation, such activities as the United Fund, the Children’s Miracle Network, and the World War II Memorial Fund. All of these solicitations are exceptions to Wal-Mart’s rule against solicitation.
Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution became effective on July 1, 2001, designating all courts as “circuit courts.” Pursuant to Amendment 80, we no longer have separate “chancery courts” and “circuit courts.” The courts have now been merged and carry the designation of “circuit courts.” The de novo standard of review has not been affected.